Part II: Unity in Trinity, or the Triunity of God

Monotheism is the foundation of all true religion, and therefore we must not dismiss the subject of this volume without demonstrating that the dogma of the Divine Trinity neither destroys nor endangers the unity and simplicity of God. The Blessed Trinity must be essentially conceived not only as Trinity in Unity, but likewise as Unity in Trinity. It is impossible to separate the one from the other.¹

We shall begin this second part of our treatise with a consideration of Tritheism, which is the heretical antithesis of the dogma of the Blessed Trinity. Tritheism is no less destructive of the dogma of the Trinity than Monarchianism (Unitarianism) in its diverse forms.² It is against Tritheism that the Athanasian Creed teaches: “Sicut singillatim unamquamque personam Deum ac Dominum confiteri Christiana religione compellimur, ita tres Deos aut Dominos dicere catholica religione prohibemur — For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord, so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say, there be Three Gods or Three Lords.”³

The unitas in Trinitate or triunitas (=trinitas) may be regarded from a threefold point of view: (1) As unity of nature;⁴ (2) as unity of external operation;⁵ and (3) as unity of circumincession or mutual inexistence.⁶ Tritheism is the heretical contradictory of all three of these, but it is most directly opposed to unity of nature, and for this reason we proceed to consider it in the first Section of the following Chapter, which is devoted to the Consubstantiality of the Three Divine Persons.

CHAPTER I: ONENESS OF NATURE, OR THE CONSUBSTANTIALITY OF THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS

SECTION 1: TRITHEISM AND THE CHURCH

1. The Heresy of Tritheism

This heresy did not assume definite proportions until after the dogma of the Trinity had been formally defined. The Arians and Semi-Arians escaped the formal charge of Tritheism, because they represented the Logos as a creature of the Father, and the Holy Ghost as a creature of the Logos. But as they held these two Persons to be divine at least by grace and merit, they were frequently accused by the Fathers of fostering the Tritheistic heresy.

a) John Philoponus, a famous expounder of Aristotle and a votary of Monophysitism,⁷ is reputed to be the real founder of Tritheism, which he pressed into the service of his Christological heresy. When it was urged against his Monophysitic position, that to confuse Nature and Person in Christ would surely lead to a similar confusion in the Divine Trinity, and therefore ultimately to Tritheism, Philoponus answered: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct individuals of the species “God,” in precisely the same way that Peter, Paul, and John are three different individuals of the species “man,” and they must therefore be looked upon as “three part-substances in one common, abstract substance.”⁸

b) In the Middle Ages, according to the authentic testimony of the Fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 1215), Abbot Joachim of Flora in Calabria⁹ conceived the oneness of the Three Divine Persons as a mere collective and generic unity.¹⁰ It is difficult to see under the circumstances how this rather hotblooded and ill-advised monk could dare to accuse Peter Lombard of having heretically represented the Blessed Trinity as a quaternity. We must add, however, that Joachim de Floris died penitently, professing absolute submission to the authority of the infallible Church.¹¹

c) About the middle of the nineteenth century a German theologian, Anton Günther (†1863), gave grievous scandal by teaching that the Three Divine Persons constitute a purely formal unity, which is neither specific nor numerical. The Absolute — such in brief was his theory — in virtue of “a theogonic process of self-realization,” posits itself three times in succession, first as thesis, secondly as antithesis, and thirdly as synthesis, whereby the Divine Substance becomes triplicated, that is, develops into three relative substances or Persons, who formally coalesce into an “Absolute Substance” or Absolute Personality.¹²

2. The Condemnation of Tritheism

The Church has at all times strenuously rejected Tritheism in every guise.

a) As early as A. D. 262, Pope Dionysius, in a dogmatic epistle which Scheeben rightly calls epoch-making,¹³ sharply censured certain Tritheistic expressions of Bishop Denis of Alexandria.¹⁴ “Neque igitur admirabilis et divina unitas,” he declared, “in tres divinitates est separanda neque factionis [= facturae] vocabulo dignitas ac summa magnitudo Domini [= Christi] est diminuenda — Neither then may we divide into three Godheads the wonderful and divine Monad; nor disparage with the name of ‘creature’ the dignity and exceeding majesty of the Lord.”¹⁵ St. Sophronius of Jerusalem (†638) wrote a refutation of Monotheletism, in which the “novi Tritheitae” are castigated unmercifully. This treatise was declared to be orthodox and was bodily incorporated into the canons of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, A. D. 680. “Numeratur igitur SS. Trinitas,” we read there, “non essentiis aut naturis et diversis deitatibus vel tribus dominationibus, sicut insaniunt Ariani et sicut novi Tritheitae¹⁶ furiunt, vanissime dicentes, essentias tres et naturas tres et tres dominationes et tres deitates… . Eum, qui ista recipit aut sapit aut novit, anathematibus percellimus.”¹⁷

b) More important and more definite than these and in fact all other medieval decisions, is the “Caput Damnamus” hurled by the Fourth Council of the Lateran against Abbot Joachim de Floris (A. D. 1215). Oswald calls it “the last solemn, and also the most effective and most definite decision ever uttered by the ecclesiastical magisterium in regard to this mystery.”¹⁸

α) The salient point of this decision is that the “one summa res”¹⁹ is at the same time “truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,” in such wise that, excluding all semblance of “quaternity,” the “Three Persons together and each Person separately” actually coincide and are numerically identical with that “summa res.”²⁰ Inasmuch as no distinction attaches to the Divine Nature, which is absolute, but only to the Divine Persons, who are relative, the same Council says: “Et illa [summa] res non est generans neque genita nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus qui procedit, ut distinctiones sint in personis et unitas in natura.”²¹ That is to say, it is not the Divine Nature which generates, or is begotten, or proceeds, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Ghost who proceeds.

The Council elucidates this point by continuing, in more popular language: “Licet igitur alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus, non tamen aliud; sed id quod est Pater, est Filius et Spiritus Sanctus idem omnino, ut secundum orthodoxam et catholicam fidem consubstantiales credantur.”²² From these premises flows a conclusion which is of prime importance for the consideration of the Divine ὁμοουσία = ταὐτουσία, or Consubstantiality, viz.: that one and the same “summa res” simultaneously exercises two separate and distinct functions, — the functions of one Absolute and three Relatives. Under the first-mentioned aspect of the Blessed Trinity it would be heretical to say: “The Divine Nature (summa res) generates, or is begotten, or proceeds”; while under the aspect mentioned in the second place, this same “summa res” is the Father who generates, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Ghost who is breathed. It is this twofold functioning of the one “summa res” that enables us to give opposite replies to the queries “What?” and “Who?” To the query: “What is the Father?” the answer is: “Id quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, idem omnino,” while if it be asked: “Who is the Father?” the reply will be: “Alius Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus.”

β) In order still more accurately to define this identity of nature, which underlies the distinction of Persons, the Council enters upon a somewhat detailed exposition, from which we shall quote a salient passage: “Pater enim ab aeterno Filium generando suam substantiam ei dedit, iuxta quod ipse testatur: ‘Pater quod dedit mihi maius omnibus est.’ Ac dici non potest, quod partem substantiae suae illi dederit et partem ipse sibi retinuerit, cum substantia Patris indivisibilis sit, utpote simplex omnino. Sed nec dici potest, quod Pater in Filium transtulerit suam substantiam generando, quasi sic dederit eam Filio, quod non retinuerit ipsam sibi: alioquin desiisset esse substantia. Patet ergo, quod sine ulla diminutione Filius nascendo substantiam Patris accepit: et ita Pater et Filius habent eandem substantiam, et sic eadem res et Pater et Filius necnon Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque procedens.” It would be impossible to give a clearer explanation than this of the Consubstantiality of the Three Divine Persons in the sense of absolute ταὐτουσία.

γ) On the basis of this pregnant conciliar definition theologians have attempted to answer the difficult question: Of what kind is the distinction between Nature and Person, or between summa res absolute and summa res relative? It is evident from the explanation of the Fourth Lateran Council, which we have just quoted, that the distinction in question cannot be a real distinction. For if the Three Divine Persons were really distinct from their common Nature, the Godhead would contain four separate entities, viz.: Nature, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to posit a purely logical distinction (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis); else the Three Persons would coalesce with the Divine Substance — they would cease to be realities and sink to the level of mere modes of manifestation, as was alleged by the Sabellians. The truth must lie somewhere between these heretical extremes. Precisely where, is not so easy to determine.

There are three Scholastic distinctions which can be applied here without trenching on revealed dogma. They are the modal distinction of Durandus, the formal distinction of Duns Scotus, and the virtual distinction of St. Thomas Aquinas. In applying these distinctions, however, we find that the modal and the formal, if pressed to their ultimate logical conclusions, entail a species of composition altogether inadmissible in the Godhead, and also a real composition in each separate Divine Person. According to Durandus, this composition is one of essence and “mode”; according to Scotus, its elements are essence and “formality.” These incongruities have led the great majority of Catholic theologians to adopt the virtual distinction of the Thomists.²³ According to this theory, the one “summa res” is both absolute and relative in such wise that, in the simultaneous discharge of an absolute and a relative function, it is formaliter unum et virtualiter multiplex. Hence the Divine Nature differs from each Divine Person by the so-called distinctio rationis ratiocinatae sive virtualis sive cum fundamento in re, of which Cardinal Cajetan says: “Absolutum et relativum ita ibi sunt, ac si essent distincta, et rursus ita [una summa res] exercet munus utriusque, ac si essent distincta.”²⁴ This distinction is based on the same principle as the current one between the “essential” knowledge which belongs to the whole Trinity, qua absolute Spirit, and the “notional” understanding which is proper to the Father alone, qua Begettor of His consubstantial Word. (Cfr. also the distinction between “essential” and “notional” volition or love.)

c) Among the more recent pronouncements of the ecclesiastical teaching office regarding the dogma of the Blessed Trinity, special mention must be made of the dogmatic Bull “Auctorem fidei,” issued by Pope Pius VI against the Council of Pistoia, A. D. 1786. This Bull rejects the formula “Deus in tribus personis distinctus” (instead of distinctis) as suspicious. Günther’s Tritheistic teaching was censured by the S. Congregation of the Index on January 8, 1857, and formally condemned by Pope Pius IX in a lengthy letter, addressed June 15, 1857, to Cardinal Geissel, Archbishop of Cologne. A provincial council held with the approval of Pius IX at Cologne, in 1860, cited all the Trinitarian definitions which we have adduced in this volume as an inexpugnable bulwark of the orthodox faith against the vagaries of Günther. And the schema which the Commission on Dogma had prepared for the Vatican Council shows that the Holy See intended to brand Günther’s errors as formally heretical.²⁵