Part II Chapter I §1 Article 2: Speculative Development of the Dogma of the Hypostatic Union

Article 2: Speculative Development of the Dogma of the Hypostatic Union

n6 UNITY IN DUALITY ARTICLE 2 SPECULATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOGMA OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION i. The Dogma in its Relation to Reason. — The Hypostatic Union of the two natures in our Lord Jesus Christ is a theological mystery, and as such absolutely indemonstrable. But it is not, as the Rationalists allege, repugnant to reason. a) A theological mystery is one the very existence of which unaided human reason is unable to discover, and which, to adopt the phraseology of the Vatican Council, by its own nature so far transcends the created intelligence that, even when delivered by Revelation and received by faith, it remains shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are wayfarers on this earth.1 a) That the Hypostatic Union is a mystery in the above mentioned sense appears from the fact that, unlike the Blessed Trinity, it is not part of the inner divine being and life of the Godhead, but the result of a free decree. Whatever God has freely decreed to effectuate in time, can be perceived by no other medium than the manifestation of the divine Will itself, either as an actual fact (e. g., the Creation) or through supernatural revelal Cone, Vatican., Sess. HI, de Fide et Rat., can. i (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1816). THE DOGMA AND REASON 117 tion (e. g., the end of the world). The whole question therefore comes to this, whether human reason can subsequently, that is, after the event, perceive the intrinsic possibility of the Hypostatic Union or demonstrate it by stringent arguments. Fathers and theologians agree in answering this question in the negative. St. Cyril of Alexandria speaks of ” the mystery of Christ ” as something so ineffably profound as to be altogether incomprehensible.2 Leo the Great confesses: ” Utramque substantiam in unam convenisse personam, nisi fides credat, sertno non explicate 8 Suarez is in perfect accord with St. Thomas Aquinas,4 in fact he voices the belief of all the Schoolmen when he says : ” Non potest humane vel angelica cognitione naturali evidenter cognosci sen demonstrari, incarnationem esse possibilem; est communis theologorum.” 5 Whether the angels could by their natural powers conjecturally attain to a probable knowledge of the intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation, is a question on which theologians differ. Some say no, while others6 hold that the angelic intellect is sufficiently acute to perceive the abstract possibility of the Hypostatic Union. Cardinal De Lugo, who favors the last-mentioned view, readily admits, however, that any such knowledge on the part of an angel would needs be so largely mixed with doubt, as practically to amount to ignorance.7 2 Contr. Nestor., I, 3 (Migne, Cardinal de Lugo (De Myst. InP. G., LXXVI, 112). cam., disp. 1, sect. 1). 8 Serm. in Nativ., 29, IX, 1. Cfr. 7 Dc Lugo, De Myst. Incar., disp. Petavius, De Incarn., Ill, 1. 1, sect. 1, n. 9: ” De hoc tamen 4 Contr. Gent., IV, 27. mysterio ongelus proprio lumine 8 De Incarn., disp. 3, sect. 1. adeo parum cognosceret, ut merit o 6 E. g., Gregory of Valentia (De dicatur ipsutn latuisse at que ideo Incarn., disp. x, qu. 1, ass. 2) and adinventionem fuisse ipsius Dei et novum aliquid in terra creatum.” u8 UNITY IN DUALITY That human reason could not by itself have arrived at a probable knowledge of the intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation, is admitted by all theologians. ft) Is there Scriptural warrant for the assertion that the Incarnation is a mystery in the strict sense of the term? The Vatican Council seems to intimate that there is. In defining the dogma that there are absolute mysteries of faith, it quotes a text from St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians (i Cor. II, 7-9), which refers primarily to the Incarnation. The Apostle expressly speaks of * a wisdom which is hidden in a mystery,9 which none of the princes of this world knew,* in contradistinction to that worldly wisdom which ” the Greeks seek after.” 10 Now these two kinds of wisdom differ both with regard to their object and in principle. The wisdom of God is the supernatural ” spirit of Christ ” which ” spiritualizes ” man, while the natural wisdom of ” the disputer of this world ” 11 does not rise above the level of the ” flesh.” 12 Accordingly, too, these different forms of wisdom must have specifically different sources. In matter of fact the ” wisdom of the world ” is derived from unaided human reason, while the “wisdom of God” has for its author the “Holy Spirit,” who by means of. external revelation and internal enlightenment unfolds to man ” the deep things of God,” 13 and ” reveals” what “hath never entered into the heart [i. e. intellect] of man.”14 To exclude the notion that the “deep things” of which he speaks are hidden to men only as a matter of fact, but not in principle, the Apostle 8 Cfr. Lessius, De Perfect. Mori- 12 1 Cor. II, 14 sqq. busque Divinis, XII, 5. 13 T& fidOy tov Oeov. i Cor. II, 9lap 4v fivarrjplta. 10. 10 1 Cor. I, 22. 14 1 Cor. II, 9, 10. 11 z Cor. I, 20, THE DOGMA AND REASON 119 expressly declares that ” the things that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God” who “searcheth all things ; ” 15 in other words, the mysteries of the Godhead completely transcend the powers of human understanding. As we have already intimated, the Incarnation is a: mystery primarily for this reason that it belongs to the free decrees of God which transcend human prescience.16 The Pauline texts we have just quoted virtually contain the further thought that the interior life of God, and in particular the existence of the Divine Logos, constitutes a supernatural mystery which not even the angelic intellect is able to fathom.17 b) The human mind can no more understand the Hypostatic Union than it can fathom the Blessed Trinity; all attempts ever made in this direction have merely accentuated the absolute indemonstrability of the mystery. It is true that nature offers certain analogies in the shape of substantial syntheses, which aid us to visualize and in a measure to understand the mystery once it is revealed. One such synthesis is, for example, the union of body and soul in man.18 But it needs only a superficial glance to convince us that there is no real parity between any natural synthesis and the Hypostatic Union, Whatever similarities may be noted are offset by nu15 1 Cor. II, 10. take of the texts quoted above, conleCfr. Eph. I, 9; Col. I, 26 sq. suit Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 17 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Vol. IV, 3rd ed.t pp. 39 sq., FreiTrinity, pp. 194 sqq.; Al. Schafer, burg 1909. Erklarung der beiden Brief e an die 18 For other analogues see LesKorinther, pp. 51 sqq., Munster sius, De Perf. Moribusque Divinis, 1903. On the peculiar view which XII, 5. some few exegetes have seen fit to merous and important dissimilarities.19 Those who have spun out these analogies into full-fledged arguments have notoriously all ended in heresy. We need but instance Anton Giinther and his adherents Baltzer and Knoodt.20 The Christology of Giinther savors of Nestorianism, while his teaching on the Trinity is at bottom but a thinly veiled Tritheism.21 Giinther’s fundamental fallacy lies in his misconception of the term “person,” which he wrongly defines as ” a self-conscious substance.” Since Christ possessed both a divine and a human consciousness, it was but natural for this nineteenth-century heretic to ascribe to Him two physical persons, which, he says, by virtue of a purely ” dynamic and formal union ” coalesce into a ” Relationsperson” 22 It was precisely in this that the heresy of Nestorius consisted — fusing 8uo Wooraacw into %v irpoawrov, and conceiving the union of the two natures in Christ as a Ivwaw #caTa ax«W.28 c) Though human reason is unable to form an adequate notion of the nature of the Hypostatic Union, it finds no difficulty in refuting the objections which various pseudo-philosophers have raised against the intrinsic possibility of the Incarnation. a) Priding itself upon its natural powers, the human intellect from Celsus to Pierre Bayle24 has contrived 10 Cfr. Janssens, De Deo-Homine, 28 For a fuller exposition and a Vol. I, pp. 186 sqq. thorough refutation of Gtinther’s 20 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- system consult Kleutgen, Theologie chiridion, n. 1655. der Vorzeit, Vol. Ill, 2nd ed., pp. 21 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 60 sqq., Munster 1870. Trinity, pp. 256 sqq. 24 Cfr. the Dictionnaire Critique, 22 Giinther, Vorschule zur specu- s. v. ” Pyrrhon.” lativen Theologie, 2nd ed., Vol. II, pp. 283 sqq., Wien 1848. THE DOGMA AND REASON 121 many ” arguments ” to show that the Hypostatic Union is impossible and repugnant to right reason. But none of them hold water when subjected to careful scrutiny. For instance : Bayle asserts that if the Divine Logos supplied the human person in Christ, no man can be sure of his own personality. This conclusion is simply preposterous. Are all human beings so many Christs? Manifestly not. There is but one Christ. P) One of the most subtle objections against the dogma of the Incarnation is that advanced by Celsus, viz,: that a Hypostatic Union of Divinity with humanity would involve a change in the eternal Godhead. Let us briefly analyze the underlying fallacy of this specious contention. The dogma of the Hypostatic Union embodies two separate and distinct truths: (1) The Logos began to be what He had not been before, namely, true man; (2) The Logos continued to be what He had been from all eternity, viz.: true God. Does this teaching involve a mutation? To begin with, Celsus* objection strikes deeper than the Incarnation. It involves the general relationship of God to the universe, — Creation, Preservation, the Divine Concursus, and so forth. God created the world in time, without Himself undergoing a change from potentiality to actuality, for He is immutable. The difficulty is considerably enhanced in the case of the Incarnation, because of the permanent and intrinsic relation which the Logos bears to the manhood hypostatically assumed by Him. But the underlying principle is the same. A real change on the part of the Godhead would occur only in the Monophysite hypothesis, viz.: if the two natures were substantially combined, as such, into one nature; in other words, if the union of the two natures were not hypostatic but merely a natural synthesis. This is not, Gbogle

UNITY IN DUALITY however, the meaning of the dogma. A Divine Hypostasis must, even with respect of itself, be conceived as actually infinite in exactly the same manner in which the Divine Nature is infinite. Keeping this in mind, even the unaided human intellect may perceive that the ” power of termination ” possessed by a Divine Hypostasis must likewise be actually infinite, so much so that it may hypostatically terminate not only in its own Divine Nature, but in some created nature or variety of natures outside itself. Celsus’ argument merely proves tnat the only possible kind of union between Godhead and manhood is the Hypostatic Union. But if this be so, is not the Incarnation altogether inconceivable ? No, because the Divine Hypostases are possessed of an infinite capacity in ipsa ratione hypostaseos. On this basis the objection may be solved as follows : In the Incarnation of the Logos God was not drawn down to a mutable creature, but created manhood was elevated to the infinite Hypostasis of the immutable Logos. The change involved in this process consequently does not affect the Aoyos arptTrros,25 but falls solely on Christ’s hypostatically assumed humanity, which by this unutterable union was endowed with a superior dignity and received the stamp of divine consecration. In the words of St. Augustine, ” Non imtnutavit homo Deum, sed sic assumptus est, ut commutaretur in melius et ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius.” 26 y) Another objection is indicated by the question: Did the Divine Logos experience an increase of intrinsic 26 On this term see Newman, Se- 26 This quotation is taken from lect Treatises of St. Athanasius, the great Doctor’s work known as Vol. II, pp. 383 1. LXXXIIJ Quaest., qu. 73. THE DOGMA AND REASON 123 perfection by the hypostatic assumption of a created nature ? The absurdity of this question becomes manifest when we recall the fact that the Logos, as a Divine Person, is the Bearer and Possessor of the Divine Nature, which is incapable of being perfected.27 The Adyo« Ivaapicos cannot be more perfect than the Aoyo« aaapKos, for the simple reason, among others, that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, by assuming human flesh, in no wise changed His identity. God remains the same unchangeably for ever. ” Nihil Mi contulit aut detraxit assumpta pro nostra salute humana natura, quant ipse potius unitione sua glorificavit. Neque minor est Deus Verbum Christo, quia ipse est Christus, neque seipso minor esse potest^ et assumpta came idem mansit Deus sine dubitatione perjectus” writes Maxentius.28 8) It is further objected that by assuming manhood the Logos must have experienced an increase of extrinsic perfection. This objection is similar to the Pantheistic one, which we have already refuted,29 that God plus the universe must spell a higher measure of perfection than God minus the universe. Any and every attempt to add divine and creatural perfections must lead to nought The humanity of Christ and the Divinity of the Logos, if added together, no more result in a higher sum of perfection than the universe plus God. For every creatural perfection, no matter how exalted, is virtually and eminently contained in the perfection of God, and consequently cannot add one jot or tittle to it. Saint Thomas explains this as follows: “In persona com27Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 29 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowobility, Essence, and Attri Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 276 sqq. butes, 188 sqq. 28 Dial, contr. Nest., 1. II. posita [i. e., Christo] quamvis sint plura bona quam in persona simplici [i. e., Verbo], quia est ibi bonum increatum et bonum creatum, tamen persona composita non est maius bonum quam simplex, quia bonum creatum se habet ad bonum increatum sicut punctum ad lineam, quum nulla sit proportio unius ad alterum. Unde sicut lineae additum punctum non facit maius, ita nec bonum creatum additum in persona bono increato facit melius.” 80 2. The Mutual Relationship of Nature and Person. — In the Incarnation, as in the Blessed Trinity, the mystery of faith hinges upon the two fundamental notions of “Nature” and “Person,” or “Nature” and “Hypostasis,” becauses a person is nothing else than a rational hypostasis. For a full explanation of these terms we must refer the reader to our treatise on the Divine Trinity.31 a) In that treatise we showed that the notion of ” Hypostasis ” (and, in the case of rational beings, also that of ” Person ”), besides ” inseity ” and ” integrity” (substantia prima integra), includes, as its chief note, “perseity” (totietas in se), i. e., independent subsistence as a being distinct from all other beings. While the concept of “Nature” (substance, essence) corresponds to the question What? — that of ” Hypostasis ” (Person) corresponds to the question Who? The Fathers and various councils explain the mutual re80 Com. in Quatuor Libros Sent., thes. 33; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Ill, dist. 6, qu. 2, art. 3, ad 1. Vol. Ill, pp. 554 sqq., Paris 1896; For a more detailed refutation of Billuart, De Incarnotione, disp. 1, these objections consult De Lugo, art. 1-2. De Mysterio Incarn., disp. iit sect. 81 Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trin7; Franzclin, De Verbo Incarnato, ity, pp. 220 sqq. NATURE AND PERSON 125 lation of these two notions by saying that where several natures and persons are involved, the persons must be conceived as alius et alius, the natures as aliud et aliud. Thus in the Most Holy Trinity, the Father and the Son are alius et alius, but not aliud et aliud, because, though distinct as Persons, they are absolutely identical in Nature, In Christ, on the other hand, because of His twofold nature, we may distinguish aliud et aliud, but not alius et alius, because He is only one Person. As St. John Damascene82 aptly observes, “Hypostasis non signiiicat quid vel quale aliquid est, sed quis est… . Oportet veto scire quod, quae naturd differunt, aliud et aliud dicuntur, quae autem distinguuntur numero, vid. hypostases, dicuntur alius et alius… . Natura signiiicat quid aliquid sit, hypostasis vero hunc aliquem 88 vel hoc aliquid!’ 84 Two conclusions flow from the explanation which we have given: (1) The heretical principle underlying Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and the heresy of Gtinther, namely that ” There are as many Hypostases (Persons) as there are natures,” must be false from the philosophical no less than from the theological standpoint ; (2) It is not sufficient, either in philosophy or theology, to draw a purely logical distinction 85 between nature and person. b) In the Blessed Trinity there is at least a virtual distinction 36 between person and nature. In man some hold the distinction may even be real.37 There are two opposing theories in regard to this point. 32 Dial., c. 17. StDistinctio rationis ratiocinata* 33 rtvd. s. cum fundament o in re. 24 r6He n. 87 Distinctio realis. tsDistinctio rationis ratiocinantis. a) One of them originated in the sixteenth century, and counts among its adherents such eminent theologians and philosophers as Suarez, Vasquez, De Lugo, Arriaga, and, more recently, Schiffini, Tepe, von der Aa, Fr. Schmid, and Urraburu. These writers maintain that no individual human nature of and by itself possesses personality, i. e., independent subsistence, but there must be superadded to the concrete human nature a peculiar kind of reality in order to constitute it a human person. Thus, for instance, ” this particular man ” becomes a human person only by the addition of a reality which we may call ” being-Peter.” In this hypothesis personality is a metaphysical entity separable from nature. But how are we to conceive of that peculiar entity by which a concrete nature is elevated to the rank of an independent personality? On this point the advocates of the theory differ. Peter Hurtado88 and Quiros ventured the absurd suggestion that personality is a real substance which nature can put on or off like a hat, and which consequently can exist (supported by divine omnipotence) apart from nature. Other divines hold personality to be a ” modal reality,” 89 which admits of a one-sided but not of a mutual separation between nature and person. ” Per potentiam Dei absolutam sine implicatione posset natura singularis conservari absque ulla personalitate/’ says Gregory of Valentia.40 These writers base their chief argument upon the consideration that without some such modal reality, detachable from nature, the dogma that Christ’s manhood is a perfect human nature but no human person, would be unintelligible. They hold that in becoming man the Logos assumed an impersonal humanzsMetaph., disp. 2, sect. 9, n. 50. 40 De Incarn., disp. 1, qu. 4, p. 80 Modus realis, substantialis, sup- 2, opin. 8, obi. 3. positolis, forma hypostafica. NATURE AND PERSON 127 ity — impersonal because devoid of ” hypostatic reality ” — and communicated to it His own Divine Personality. Thus that which was awiroaraTov became ivvTroararov,41 P) A second and more plausible theory is that of Scotus and his school, adopted by Molina, Petavius, Antoine, A. Mayr, Tiphanus, and more recently by Franzelin, Stentrup, Chr. Pesch, and others. These authors hold that the distinction between nature and person in man is not real but virtual, the same concrete object being in one respect nature, and in another, hypostasis or person. The advocates of this theory do not, or at least need not deny that personality in human nature is a real and positive mode, and consequently not a mere negation, as is erroneously held by the Scotists. They merely deny that this positive mode is really distinct and separable from concrete nature. That men are in the habit of circumscribing personality by negative terms (such as, e. g., incommunicability) does not prove that the objective concept of personality is purely negative ; just as little as ” unity ” is a negative concept because we define it as ” indivision.” This theory, which is probably the true one, was originally propounded by Theodore Abucara in the eighth century. “Aliudne” he queries, “est substantia [i. e., natura] aliudne hypostasis? Orthodoxus: Aliud et aliud non tamquam res alia et alia, sed quod aliud significat hypostasis et aliud substantia42 sicut granum tritici dicitur et est turn semen turn fructus, non tamquam res alia et alia, sed aliud significat semen et aliud fructus.” 48 In its application to Christology this theory 41 Wc are not, as was once gen- Leontius von B yeans, pp. 148 sqq., erally supposed, indebted for this Paderborn 1908. terminology to Leontius of Byzan- 42 Note the virtual distinction, tium (d. about 543) ; it dates back 43 Opusc, 28. to the third century. Cfr. Junglas, consistently explains the absence of a human person in Christ, not by subtraction, i. e., by the removal of a real and separable mode of subsistence, but by simply adding human nature (without personality) to the superior Hypostasis of the Logos. Because of its importance we shall have to explain this a little more fully. c) Abstractly, the mutual relationship between Christ’s Divinity and His humanity may be conceived in a fourfold manner. ( i ) Either, person is so united with person that the result is merely one “moral person.” This is the error of Nestorius. (2) Or, nature is blended with nature so as to produce a third being intermediate between the two. This is Monophysitism. (3) Or, the human personality, suppressing the Divine Hypostasis of the Logos, is united with the Divine Nature in such wise as to cause Godhead and manhood to subsist in one purely human hypostasis. This heresy is so preposterous that it has never found a defender. (4) Or, lastly, the Divine Person of the Logos, superseding and displacing the human person of Christ, unites itself with His human nature alone. This is the Catholic dogma of the Hypostatic Union. Why is it that the human nature of Christ, which is like unto ours in everything except sin, is not a human person, but receives its personation from the Logos? This speculative question may be answered as follows: NATURE AND PERSON 129 a) The distinction between nature and person in man being merely virtual, Christ’s humanity loses its connatural personality by being assumed into and absorbed by the Divine Logos. In becoming the property and possession of the Person of the Logos, the manhood of Jesus Christ, by virtue of the Hypostatic Union, loses its perseitas, i. e., its independent existence. Though remaining a substantia prima et integra (i. e., a nature), it is no longer a substantia tota in se (i. e., an hypostasis), for the reason that it has become a quasi-constitutive element of a higher hypostasis. Tiphanus,44 Franzelin,45 and Chr. Pesch 46 base this explanation on sundry Patristic texts. But these texts either accentuate the complete consubstantiality of Christ with man,47 or lay stress on the Christological axiom : * Quod assumptum non est, non est sanatutn,* 48 and therefore are not to the point, because the opponents of the peculiar theory we are here considering do not assert that ” hypostatic reality ” forms a part of human nature ; they merely define it as a personifying modus substantialis, which by its inmost nature is incapable of being assumed into the Divine Hypostasis of the Logos.49 A more effective argument for this theory can be drawn from the fact that it had three very ancient defenders in Rusticus Diaconus,50 Theodore Abucara,51 and St. Maximus Confessor, and that the 44 De Hypostasi et Persona, c. 29. Three Chapters was a deacon of &De Verbo Incarnato, thes. 31. the Roman Church and a nephew toPraelect. Dogmat., Vol. IV, pp. of Pope Vigilius. He flourished 55 sqq. about the year 550. 47 V. supra, p. 39 sqq. 61 On Theodore Abucara, who 48 V. Soteriology. was a contemporary of St John Da49Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. mascene, cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator III, pp. 498 sqq. Literarius Theol. Cat hoi. , Vol. I, CO This stubborn defender of the ed. 3a, col. 647 sq. r UNITY IN DUALITY opposite doctrine, as one of its chief defenders admits, is a comparatively modern invention.52 Theodore Abucara clearly teaches: ” Non satis est compositam esse naturatn cum proprietatibus ad generationetn hypostasis, sed oportet concurrere ad hoc et non esse partem; quia igitur pars Christi est assumptum corpus animatum [i. e., humana natura], idcirco non est hypostasis, sed hypostaticum.” 58 As regards the later Scholastics, they unanimously maintain that the humanity of Christ would promptly reassume the character of a human person if, and as soon as, it were released from the Hypostatic Union.54 Not one of them intimates that in this fictitious hypothesis the human nature would require a special and real form of subsistence in order to enable it to become a human person after its elimination from the Logos. P) The attitude of St. Thomas in this matter is rather uncertain. Both parties to the dispute, i. e., those who assume a real and those who assert a purely virtual distinction between nature and person, appeal with equal confidence to his great authority. St. Thomas held with Peter Lombard and his master Albertus Magnus that * Separatio dat utrique partium totalitatem et in continuis dat etiam utrique esse in actu. 02… scholastica disputatione non tnultis abhinc annis adinventum est.** P. Vasquez, S. J., De Inearn., disp. 41, c. 4. szOpusc, 28 (Migne, P. G., XCVII, 1578). 54 This is admittedly the teaching of Peter Lombard, Hugh and Richard of St Victor, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, and of Scotus and his school. “Si Christus deponeret humanitatem,” says e. g. Albert the Great, “id quod deponeret erit substantia rationalis naturae individua, ergo erit persona. Si autem quaeratur, quid confer ai ei personality em quam prius non habuit, dicendum quod singularity quam prius non habuit sive incommunicabilitas, ut alii dicunt; nam proprie singularity facit personam in rationali natura.” (Com, in Quatuor Libros Sententiarumt III, dist. 5, art 12). Other references in Tiphanus, De Hypostasi et Persona, c 6. NATURE AND PERSON 131 Unde supposito quod [Verbum] hominetn deponeret, subsisteret homo ille per se in natura rationali et ex hoc ipso acciperet rationem personae.”™ He furthermore lays it down as an axiom that Christ’s manhood has no human personality, not on account of some in-, herent defect, but in consequence of having superadded to it something which transcends human nature.56 In those passages of his writings where he speaks of the ” destruction of personality ” in Christ,57 St. Thomas seems to employ the term ” destruction ” in a metaphorical, not in its strict and literal sense. Thus he argues against the proposition: “Persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis” which was falsely attributed to Pope Innocent III : 58 ” Consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat, sed impeditionem eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet; et pro tanto dicitur persona ’ consumpsisse ’ personam, licet improprie, quia persona divina sud unione impedivit, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet.” 59 d) It may be objected that Christ’s sacred humanity would not be perfect if it lacked the SUCI Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., Ill, dist. 5, qu. 3, art. 3. 66 Cfr. S. Theol., 3a, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 2: “Naturae assumptae nen deest propria personalitas propter defectum alicuius quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed propter additionem alicuius quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam.” Additional texts apud Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, thes. 30. 57 See the references in Tepe’s Instit. Theol., Vol. Ill, pp. 481 sqq. 68 Its real author was Faustus of Reji, one of the most influential bishops of Southern Gaul between 450 and 500. The passage occurs in his work De Spiritu Sonet o, II, 4. On Faustus of Reji and his teaching cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 600 sqq. 69 S. Theol., 3a, qu. 4, art 2, ad 3. For further information on this subtle problem see Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, thes. 31, Coroll. 1. L. Janssens {De Deo-Homine, I: Christologia, pp. 626 sqq.) puts his own construction upon the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. UNITY IN DUALITY preme prerogative of personality. But this objection is beside the point. Christ’s human nature is a person through the divine personality of the Logos, and it is a far higher prerogative for a created nature to subsist in a Divine Person than in its own personality. Natura assumpta in Christo eo ipso est nobilior says St. Bonaventure, “quod in nobiliori persona stabilitur; unde ordinatio ad dignius, quamvis auferat rationem suppositions [i. e.y hypostaseos propriae], non tamen aufert dignitatis proprietatem/’ 60 3. Why the Incarnation of the Logos Does Not Involve the Incarnation of the Whole Trinity. — As there is but a virtual distinction between each Divine Hypostasis and the Divine Essence,61 and the latter is therefore identical with the Father and the Holy Ghost in precisely the same sense in which it is identical with the Son, it might seem that the Incarnation of the Son necessarily involves the Incarnation of the Father and the Holy Ghost. The subjoined observations will serve to remove this difficulty. a) It is an article of faith that the substantial and physical union of Godhead and manhood in Christ is strictly hypostatic, i. e., the Godhead is not united with the manhood immediately and formally, as nature with nature, but only in a mediate and indirect manner 60 Comment, in Quatuor Libros qu. a, Cfr. St Thomas, S. Theol., Sententiarum, III, disk 5, art 2, 3a, qu. 2, art 2. 91 V. supra, p. 125. INCARNATION AND THE TRINITY 133 through the Person of the Logos. Rusticus Diaconus expresses it thus: * Non Deus Verbum per divinam naturam, sed divina natura per Dei Verbi personam unita dicitur carni62 If the relation were reversed, that is to say, if the manhood of Christ were formally united with the nature of the Logos and not with His Person, there would result an impossible commingling of both natures or an equally impossible transformation of the one into the other. If, therefore, considering the terminus of the Incarnation, we ask : ” Which of the Three Divine Persons became man ? ” the answer is : ” Neither the Father nor the Holy Ghost, but solely the Son of God or Logos.” John I, 14 : * Et Verbum caro factum est — And the Word was made flesh. The only heretics who ever denied this dogma were the Sabellians and Patripassianists. All the official creeds and the older ecumenical councils unanimously inculcate it.68 Durandus holds that the union of Christ’s manhood with the Divine Logos was effected primarily by an absolute attribute common to all three Divine Persons, namely, the absolute self-existence of the Trinity, and only secondarily by the personality of the Logos as such.64 This theory is out of joint with the dogmatic teaching of the Church. Were it true, the Incarnation would be primarily an Incarnation of the whole Trinity, and only secondarily of the Son. The Sixth Council of Toledo (A. D. 675) implicitly condemned this view when it defined: ” Incarnationem quoque huius Filii wContr. Acephal. naturae divinae secundum seipsam, 63 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, sed rations per son ae, in qua consiqu. 3, art. 21 “Esse assumptionis deratur: et ideo pritno quidem et principium convenit naturae divinae propriissime persona dicitur assusecundum seipsam, quia eius virtute mere,’ assumptio facta est; sed esse ter- «4 Comment, in Quatuor Libres minum assumptionis non convenit Sent., Ill, dist. 1, qu. 5, n. 10. UNITY IN DUALITY Dei tota Trinitas operasse [scil. operata esse] credenda est [scil. efhcienter], quia inseparabilia sunt opera Tri~ nitatis [ad extra]. Solus tamen Filius formam servi accepit in singularitate personae [i. e., terminative], non in unitate divinae naturae, in id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune Trinitati”** b) Regarded actively, i. e., as an external operation of God (opus ad extra), the Incarnation, though specially appropriated to the Holy Ghost,66 must have for its efficient cause the entire Trinity or the Divine Essence as such. The Three Divine Persons conjointly created the manhood of Christ, they preserve it in its being and operation, and concur with all its creatural actions. As the Incarnate Word is immanent in the Father and the Holy Ghost by virtue of the Trinitarian Perichoresis,67 so the Father and the Holy Ghost are in Christ by virtue of the Hypostatic Union. This presence transcends the mode by which the omnipresent God is in all His creatures, and is also superior to the manner of His indwelling in the souls of the just. It is a very special kind of immanence.68 Cfr. John X, 30 sqq. : “Ego et Pater unum sumus… . Pater in me est et ego in Patre — I and the Father are one … the Father is in me, and I in the Father.,, John XIV, 9 sq. : ” Qui videt me, videt et Patrem… . Non creditis quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est? — He that seeth me seeth the Father also. … Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?“69 65 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 284. Cfr. Tcpc, Instit. Theol., Vol. Ill, pp. 524 sqq.; Billuart, De Incarn., diss. 6, art 2. 66 * Concept us de Spiritu Sancto. (On the Divine Appropriations see Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 244 sqq.) 67 For an explanation of the Trinitarian Perichoresis cfr. PohlePreuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 281 sqq. 68 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 281 sqq. 69 The rather obscure passage of St. Cyril of Alexandria (In Ioa., INCARNATION AND THE TRINITY 135 c) In this connection theologians are wont to discuss another speculative problem, namely, whether or not the Father or the Holy Ghost might have become man instead of the Son. St. Anselm appears to deny the possibility of such an event, for this reason, among others, that the Incarnation of either one of the other two Persons would lead to inextricable confusion in the use of the name ” Son.” His argument substantially is that, had the Father become man, He would have been constrained to appear as ” Ulius hominis,” which would have been repugnant to His personal character as Father.70 And the same is true of the Holy Ghost. The Schoolmen preferred to adopt the view of St. Thomas, who says that the Father and the Holy Ghost could have become incarnate as well as the Son, and solves the abovequoted objection as follows: ” Filiatio temporalis, qua Christus dicitur Ulius hominis, non constituit personam ipsius sicut filiatio aeterna, sed est quiddam consequens nativitatem temporalem: unde si per hunc modum nomen filiationis ad Patrem vel Spiritum Sanctum transferretur, nulla sequeretur confusio personarum.” 71 The problem assumes a more complicated aspect if formulated thus : Could the Three Divine Persons together become incarnate in one human nature, in such wise that this human nature would be a three-fold Divine Person, vis.: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? The question here is not whether the Three Divine Hypostases could become so united in one human nature as to XI) : ” carnem absque confusione sis. For a more elaborate treatment venisse in unionetn cum Verbo et of this subject see Franzelin, De per ipsutn cum Patre, relative vi- Verbo Incarnato, thes. 32. delicet, non physice Ual oV airov 70 De Fide Trinit. et de Incarn. Tpbs rbv Taripa, ax€TlK

i36 UNITY IN DUALITY constitute but one Divine Person. This would entail the Sabellian absurdity that ” the Father is the Son.” 72 What we wish to ascertain is whether the Three Divine Persons could assume one and the same human nature as three separate and distinct Hypostases. St. Bonaventure thinks that this hypothesis could be ” reasonably defended.” 78 Not so the later Scotists, who held that the question, thus formulated, involves an intrinsic contradiction. St. Thomas solved the problem on the principle that, ” as the Three Divine Persons can without contradiction subsist in one Divine Nature, so they can also stibsist in one human nature.” 74 Another still more difficult problem is: Could the Divine Logos either simultaneously or successively assume one or more human natures in addition to the one He already possesses? In other words: Could the Logos become incarnate repeatedly, say, for instance, on different planets? In view of what we have said 75 about the infinite range of a Divine Hypostasis, we are constrained to answer this question in the affirmative. To assert that a Divine Person can assume only one human nature, would be equivalent to denying God’s omnipotence and infinity. Therefore the Scholastics teach with St. Thomas: * Potentia divinae personae est infinita, nec potest limitari ad aliquid creatum. Unde non est dicen72* P lures personas assume re unam eandemque naturam [in una persona] nec est possibile nec est intelligibilef says St. Bonaventure (Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., Ill, dist. i, qu. 3, art. i). 73 Cfr. L. Janssens, De DeoHomine, I, pp. 230 sqq. 74 5”. Theol., 3a, qu. 3, art. 6: ” Tres personae possunt subsistere in una natura divina; ergo etiam possunt subsistere in una natura humana, ita scil. quod sit una natura humana a tribus personis as sump t a.” Whence it follows: “Est autem talis divinarum personarum conditio, quod una earum non excludit aliam a communione eiusdem naturae, sed solum a communione eiusdem personae… . Sic ergo non est impossible divinis personis, ut duae vel tres assumant unam humanam naturam.” 75 Supra, pp. 121 sq. CHRIST’S “DOUBLE EXISTENCE ” 137 dum quod persona divina ita assumpserit unam naturam humanam, ut non potuerit [simul] assumere aliam. Videretur enim ex hoc sequi quod personalitas divinae naturae esset ita comprehensa per unam naturam humanam, quod ad eius personalitatem alia assumi non possit, quod est impossibile” 76 4. The Controversy Regarding the “Double Existence” of Christ. — This controversy hinges on the question whether the distinction between an individual substance (or nature) and its existence is real or only logical. a) Not a few eminent philosophers and theologians hold that the distinction is purely logical, because ” reality” and “existence” are merely different terms for the same thing. The Thomists maintain that there is a real distinction. Between the two states designated as ” possibility ” and ” existence,” they say, we can conceive a third which is intermediate and may be called “actuality,” inasmuch as a possible being transferred from the state of mere possibility to that of actuality is not yet existent, but requires the accession of the actus existendiy — a separable entity by which a thing receives its ” formal existence.” To illustrate the theory by an example: Peter, who is a creature, does not receive his existence through the fact that he is created, i. e., a creature, but by virtue of a supervening forma existentiae. It is one of the fundamental axioms of the Thomist school that there are in every creature three really dis76 5”. Theol., 3a, qu. 3, art. 7. eventuality cfr. De Lugo, De Myst, Cfr. L. Janssens, De Deo-Homine, Incarn., disp. 13, sect. 3; on the I, pp. 22i sqq. On the mode of whole subject, Billuart, De Incarn., predication appropriate to such an diss. 6, art. 4. tinct stages of being, to wit : ( i ) Esse essentiae or physical essence, (2) esse subsistence or hypostasis, and (3) esse existentiae or existence, each of which flows successively from the other by way of emanation. This peculiar theory has given rise to the question: Is there but one existence in Christ, i. e., that of the Divine Logos ? or are there two existences, a divine and a human? Cardinal Cajetan, Capreolus, Medina, Billuart, Gonet, and other Thomists maintain that the sacred humanity of Christ, being deprived of its connatural existence as a human person, derives its existence solely from the Divine Logos, who displaces and supplies the created existence of manhood by His Divine Existence in the same manner in which He displaces and supplies the missing human personality by His Divine Person.77 This view has been adopted by some able theologians who are not otherwise adherents of the Thomist system (e. g., the Jesuits Billot and Terrien), and it deserves to be treated with respect, because it is apt to create a sublime conception of the Hypostatic Union.78 For those who hold that concrete reality and existence are objectively identical, the question is, of course, meaningless. If a thing exists by the very fact of its being concretely actual, it is metaphysically impossible to assume that the sacred humanity of Christ is deprived of its 77 Cfr. Gonet, disp. 8, art. 2, n. 33: ” Dico Verbum non solum subsistentiam, sed etiam existentiam in humanitate Christi suppler e, subindeque Mam non per existentiam ere at am et sibi propriam, sed dumtax at per divinam et increatam exist ere.” 78 E. Commer speaks of it thus: ” Vere profunda doctrina et miranda, quia vera et propria Christi humanitas optime servatur, dum ipse Christus et in persona et in exist en tia ita pure divinus illustratur, ut omnes eius actiones at que operae divinum incarnationis mysterium probent, quo humana natura perfecta perfecte quoque Dei facta atque intime deificata videatur, quod solum Christum servatorem adorandum decet.* (De Iesu Puero Nato, p. 10, Vindobonae 1901.) CHRIST’S * DOUBLE EXISTENCE proper creatural existence, and that this is supplied by the uncreated existence of the Logos.79 b) But there is involved in this debate a theological problem which would remain unsolved even were we to admit the Thomistic view that in Christ, qua man, existence and reality differ really and objectively. This theological question is, whether or not the sacred manhood of our Lord is de facto deprived of its human existence and exists solely by virtue of the divine existence proper to the Logos. Gregory of Valentia, Toletus, Suarez, Vasquez, Tanner, Franzelin, Stentrup, Chr. Pesch, Tepe, and most theologians of the Scotist persuasion hold that it can be shown on strictly theological grounds that the sacred humanity of Christ in the Hypostatic Union does not exist per existentiam divinam, but retains its proper human existence. They argue as follows : a) It has been defined by various councils that, apart from a human personality, the sacred humanity of Christ 79 The underlying metaphysical cirelli, De Distinctione inter Actuproblem is more frilly discussed by atam Essentiam Exist entiamque EnM. Limbourg, S. J., De Distinctione tie Creati Inter cedents, Naples 1906; Essentiae ab Existentia, Ratisbonae John Rickaby, S. J., General Meta1883; Urraburu, S. J., Ontologia, physics (Stonyhurst Series), pp. 27 pp. 704 sqq., Vallisoleti 1891; Al- sqq., 59 sqq. Fr. Rickaby (ibid., p. phons Lehmen, S. J., Lehrbuch der 28) gives quotations to show that Philosophie auf aristotelisch-schola- the problem of essence and existence stischer Grundlage, Vol. I, 2nd ed., is not a subtlety peculiar to Schopp. 334 sqq., Freiburg 1904; A. lasticism, but was hotly discussed Rittler, Wesenheit und Dasein in by authors of various philosophical den Geschopfen nach der Lehre des schools (

I4o UNITY IN DUALITY lacks none of the proper attributes of man, 80 and that the union between Godhead and manhood was formally consummated solely in the Person of the Logos.81 It seems impossible to square the Thomistic theory with these dogmatic definitions. The sacred humanity of our Lord would not be perfecta humanitas indiminute et sine deminoratione, were it deprived of its own proper existence, for it would then lack an essential property of human nature ; besides, a union consummated in the divine existence would not be purely hypostatic but at the same time an unio secundum divinam existentiam.2 Holding as they do, in common with the theologians of other schools, that the Three Divine Persons do not exist by a ” threefold relative existence,” but by one absolute existence common to all,88 the Thomists cannot escape the force of this argument. ” Dico, non dari in divinis tres exist entias relativas, realiter inter se et virtualiter ab existentia absoluta essentiae distinctas,” says, e. g., Gonet.84 But if the union of Christ’s manhood with His Godhead were consummated in the absolute existence of the Triune God, then the entire Trinity would become incarnate, 80 Cfr. Concilium Choice don. (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 148) : ” Nusquam sub I at & naturarutn differentia propter unitionem magisque salvd proprietate utriusque naturae/’ Cone. Later an. a. 640 sub Martino I (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 262) : ” Si quis secundum sanctos Patres non confitetur proprie et secundum veritatem naturales proprietates deitatis et humanitatis indiminute in eo {Christo} et sine deminoratione salvatas, condemnatus sit.’ 81 Cfr. Synod. Tolet. XI, a. 675 (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchir., n. 284): In id quod est proprium Filii, non quod commune Trinitati. 82 Cfr. Ysambert, De Incarn., qu. 17, disp. 1, art. 2: ” Verbum divinum suppler e exist en tiam humanitatis nihil est aliud quam unionem humanitatis cum Verbo fuisse factam in existentia.” 83 That the Father has this absolute existence from Himself, while the Son has it by generation from the Father, and the Holy Ghost by spiration from both the others, is irrelevant to the argument here under consideration. 84 Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., tr. VI, disp. 3, art. 6, n. 169. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, qu. 17, art. 2, ad 3 : * Tres personae non habent nisi unum esse [•’. e., exist ere].* CHRIST’S ” DOUBLE EXISTENCE and we should no longer have a strictly Hypostatic Union, but a mere natural synthesis. Gonet and Billuart tried to obviate this difficulty by the remark that the Hypostatic Union is consummated in the absolute existence of the Trinity merely mediate et secundaria. But this is an evasion. All the absolute attributes of God, His wisdom, omnipotence, immensity, etc., could be similarly limited. If the uncreated supplies the created existence, it must supply it in precisely the same manner in which the Divine Personality of the Logos supplies the human personality of the Godman, i. e.y primarily and immediately. No other mode is conceivable. Durandus contended that the sacred humanity of Christ was ” primarily and immediately ” united with the ” absolute subsistence of the Trinity,” but only ” secondarily and mediately” with the Hypostasis of the Logos.85 Billuart effectively refuted this theory as follows: “Si Verbum terminaret naturam hutnanam formaliter et proxime per subsistentiam communem et a&solutam, Pater eft Spiritus forent incarnati non minus quam Filius. At qui falsum cansequens. Erg a et antecedens. Prob. sequela. Quod convenit alicui personae Trinitatis ratione alicuius attributi absoluti et communis, convenit toti Trinitati. Sic quia creatio, conservatio, gubernatio, imo et ipsa actio unitiva incarnationis conveniunt uni personae, ratione omnipotentiae conveniunt omnibus.”89 By substituting ” exist entia” for ” subsistentia” in the above argument, it can be effectively turned against Billuart’s own position. Billot attempts to solve the difficulty as follows: “Esse quidem est unum in divinis sicut omnia absoluta, sed tribus distinctis modis relativis habetur, ita ut esse Patris personale qua « V. supra, p. 133. se De Incarn., diss. 6, art. 2. UNITY IN DUALITY tale non sit esse personate Filii nec Spiritus Sancti; est ergo FUius idem esse [i. e., existere] quod Pater et Spiritus Sanctus; sed cum alia relatione”1 But this explanation, too, is unsatisfactory. For the principle upon which it rests could be applied to the Essence and to all the absolute attributes of God with the same force with which it is applied to His existence. Furthermore it gives rise to an awkward dilemma: Either the concept of the divine relation of Filiation (filiatio divina), as such, includes or it does not include existence. If it does not include it, the created existence (which is alleged to be lacking) cannot be ” supplied ” by the divine existence peculiar to the Logos. If the concept of divine Filiation does include existence, we are forced to assume ” three relative existences,” which is repugnant to the common teaching of theologians.88 f$) The Fathers scarcely anticipated the pivotal point at issue in the Scholastic controversy which we are considering. Like the early councils, however, they laid special emphasis on the doctrine that the Divine Logos assumed a human nature (not person) with all the specific determinations and attributes which human nature possessed before the Fall. Thus St. John of Damascus says: ” Neque enim Deus Verbum quidquam eorum, quae quum nos initio rerum fingeret naturae nostrae inseruit, non assumptum omisit, sed omnia assumpsit, puta corpus et animam intelligentem rationabilemque cum eorum proprietatibus.” 89 One of these properties of human nature is human (i. e., created) existence, and consequently this mode of ex87 De Verbo Jncarnato, p. 98, 4th 89 De Fide Orth., Ill, 6. For ed.f Rome 1904. additional Patristic texts we must 88Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol, Vol. refer the student to Petavius, De III, pp. 528 sqq., Paris 1896. Incarn., V, 6. CHRIST’S ” DOUBLE EXISTENCE ” 143 istence must have formed part of the sacred humanity of Jesus Christ.90 Some of the Fathers expressly ascribe a human existence to the sacred manhood of our Lord. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria91 draws a clear-cut distinction between the proper (1. e., divine) existence of the Logos,92 derived by eternal generation from the Father, and His (human) existence in the flesh.08 Billuart,94 in his controversy with Suarez and Henno, quotes St. Sophronius against this teaching as follows: “In Mo itaque [Verbo], et non per semetipsam habuit [natura humana] existentiam unam; cum conceptione quippe Verbi haec ad subsistendutn prolata sunt.” 95 But this translation does not render the Greek text accurately. The correct translation, as given by Hardouin,96 is as follows: ” Simul enim caro, simul Dei Verbi caro … in illo enim et non in se [seorsum] obtinuit [caro] existentiam; 97 una cum 98 conceptione quippe Verbi haec [i. e., corpus et anima = humana natura] producta sunt ad existentiam et unita sunt Mi secundum hypostasin eo ipso momento, quo producta sunt ad existentiam recUiter veram et indivisam.” So far from advocating the Thomistic theory, St. Sophronius virtually rejects it by attributing a separate created existence to Christ’s manhood.99 In the twelfth century the view which we defend was maintained by Euthymius Zigabenus, a Basilian monk, who flourished during the reign of the Emperor Alexius Comnenus (1081-1118). * Unde de Christo unam hyooCfr. Leo I, Serm., 63: * Nihil assumpto divinum, nihil assutnenti dee st humanum.” «i Adv. Nestor., I (Migne, P. G., LXXVI, 19). 02 r^v islav Giraptiv. os aapKLK^v Gtraptiv, 04 De Incarn., diss. 17, art. 2. 05 Synod. Oecum. VI. Act., 1 1. 06 Condi., t. Ill, p. 1268. CirapZtv, »8 dfia. 00 Cfr. Franzelin, De Verbo In< earn., pp. 305 sqq. postasin personalem praedicamus,” he says, ” eas vero [hypostases], quae existentiam significant, duas afHrmare licet, ne alterutram naturam sine existentia esse dicamus; nam hypostasin, quae existentiam signxdcat, in omni natura invenimus, personalem vero non in omni” 100 Both parties to this controversy invoke the authority of St. Thomas. In spite of the learned treatise of J. B. Terrien, S. J.,101 it still remains a matter of dispute whether or not the Angelic Doctor taught that there is a real distinction between essence and existence.102 It is a most difficult undertaking, at any rate, to put a ” Thomistic ” construction upon such passages as these : ” Sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi. Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sCd inquantum est temporaliter homo factum, quod esse etsi non sit accidental, quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, … non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium.” 10Z “Esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae; nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse, quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum!f 104 100 PanopU, tit. 16. Cfr. Chr. Verbi cum Humanitate Amplissime Pesch, Praelect. Dogm., Vol. IV, p. Declarata, Paris 1894. 66, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1909. On Eu- 102 Cfr. A. Lehmen, Lehrbuch der thymius Zigabenus (more correctly Philosophic Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 388, Zigadenus or Zygadenus) cfr. Hur- Freiburg 1904. ter, Nomenclator Liter arius Theo- 103 De Unione Verbi, art. 4. logiae Cath., t. II, 2nd ed., col. 12, 104 Op. cit., ad 1. ’ Some more Innsbruck 1906. texts of the same tenor are quoted 101 S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctrina by Suarez, De Incarn., disp. 36, Sincera de Unione Hypostatica sect. 2, and by Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, thes. 34. HYPOSTASIS CHRISTI COMPOSITA” 145 5. The Phrase “Hypostasis Christi Composite”— May we speak of the Hypostasis of our Lord as composite? Tiphanus vehemently denounced this phrase as “dangerous.” 105 Nevertheless, it was unhesitatingly employed not only by the later Scholastics but also by the Fathers of the Church and several councils since the fifth century.106 St. Bona venture’s remark: “Quoniam verbum compositionis calumniabile est, ideo doctores praesentis temporis sensum … retinent, declinantes vocabulum compositionis/’ 107 merely proves that the expression “Hypostasis Christi composite/’ like St. Cyril’s formula “Una natura Verbi incarnata,” 108 is open to misconstruction. There is no doubt that it may be used in a perfectly orthodox sense. The term Hypostasis Christi may be taken either in a material or in a formal sense. Materially it is synonymous with ” Person of Christ ” (i. e., Logos). The Person of the Logos, of course, like the Person of the Father and that of the Holy Ghost, is absolutely simple. In its formal sense Hypostasis Christi means Hypostasis Christus, i. e., Christ as such, the Incarnate Word, and in this case it is quite correct to speak of a composite Hypostasis. Tiphanus himself admitted the orthodoxy of the proposition : * Christus est cotnpositus/’ and consequently was guilty of inconsistency in decrying the phrase * Hypostasis Christi composita ” as inaccurate. ioe Cfr. Franzelin, De Verbo In- 108 V. supra, p. 108 sqq. carnato, thes. 36. 105 Hypostasi et Persona, c. 65-66. 107 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., Ill, dist. 6, art. 1, qu. 2. i46 UNITY IN DUALITY Composition is the putting together of several parts or ingredients to form one whole. In the case of creatures the ingredients thus combined are ” parts ” in the strict sense of the word, because they complement and intrinsically perfect one another and the totum which they constitute. In this sense, of course, there can be no composition in Christ, who, as the Divine Logos, is incapable of being perfected ab extra. Consequently, the humanity of Christ, though perfected and deified by its assumption into the Divine Logos, cannot be conceived strictly as a component part (compars) or ingredient of the Logos, or of the totum which it forms together with the Logos.109 For this reason theologians usually designate the sacred humanity of our Redeemer as quasirpars or conceive it per modum partis, i. e., as a component part in a purely figurative sense. Hence the theological axiom: * Christus est unutn ex pluribus, non totum ex partibus.* 110 Readings: — Clemens, Die spekulative Theologie Anton Gunthers, Koln 1853. — * J. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. Ill, pp. 60 sqq., Miinster 1870. — F. Abert, Die Einheit des Seins in Christus nach der Lehre des hi. Thomas, Ratisbon 1889. — *F. Schmid, Quaest. Selectae ex Theol. Dogmat., qu. 5, Paderborn 1891. — J. B. Terrien, S. J., S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctrina Sincera de Unione Hypostatica cum Humanitate Amplissime Declarata, Paris 1894. — St. Thomas, Quaest. Disput., De Unione Verbi (ed. Paris., 1883, t. II, pp. 532 sqq.)— WilhelmScannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 91 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1901. 100 V. supra, p. 12a sqq. Franzelin, De Verbo Incarnato, 110 Cfr. L. Janssens, De Deo- thes. 36. H omine, Vol. I, pp. 147 sqq.;