The Continued Existence of the Created Universe: Divine Preservation and Concurrence

Chapter II: Divine

CHAPTER II THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE CREATED UNIVERSE, OR DIVINE God, having produced out of nothing the various substances that constitute the created universe, with all their properties and powers, continues to influence them, ( I ) by preserving them in their being,1 and (2) by concurring in their operations.2 We shall consider the divine Preservation of the universe and God’s Concurrence with His creatures in two separate Sections. l Conservatio in esse, 2 Concursus in operando. 61 SECTION i DIVINE PRESERVATION i. The Nature of Divine Preservation. — All created beings are contingent and absolutely dependent on the creative First Cause. It follows that, once created, they cannot continue in substantial existence without the co-operation of the Creator. A created being never for a moment ceases to be an ens ab alio* and therefore forever depends upon the preservative influence of God. A sudden withdrawal of that influence would result in the inevitable annihilation of the creature. Consequently divine Preservation is as indispensable for the continued existence of the cosmos as Creation was for its beginning.4 In this sense the preservation of the universe is sometimes called “continued creation.” 3 ” The fact that a creature actu- between the creative and the preally exists, does not exist neces- servative action of God, has been sarily, but depends on an external justly rejected by all theological cause as much for its continuous schools. Cfr. St. Thom., 5”. Theol., as for its initial existence.’* (Wil- ia, qu. 104, art. 2, ad 4. — On helm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Henry of Ghent (Doctor Solemnis) Theology, Vol. I, p. 364.) see Turner, History of Philosophy, 4 The peculiar theory advanced pp. 384 sqq.; on Peter d’Auriol by Henry of Ghent and Aureolus, (Aureolus), ibid., pp. 403 sq. that there is a specific difference 62 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 63 This does not mean that all created beings sink back into nothingness at every moment of their existence, to be each time promptly recreated by God, as Bayle scoffingly insinuated.6 Divine preservation must not be conceived as intermittent, but as the continued action of God. The power which sustains the universe is an incommunicable attribute of God in the same sense as the creative power which called it into being. What we have so far said is sufficient to show the falsity of the systems that have been at various times devised in respect of divine Preservation. First and above all we must note that the divine Preservation of the cosmos is not merely negative. ” It is not enough for God not to destroy His creatures, He must exercise some positive influence on them.” 6 Preservation must be conceived as a positive divine influence directed to the very substance of a creature, and by which the creature is enabled to continue its existence.7 Like Creation, Preservation, entitatively considered, is an eternal and necessary act; terminatively, however, it is temporal and free.

2. The Teaching of Revelation. — Though never formally defined as an article of faith, the doctrine of the divine Preservation of the universe is undoubtedly contained in the sources of 5 If Bayle’s opinion were true, justly observes B. Boedder, S. J. (Natural Theology, p. 354, 2nd ed., London 1899), “there would be properly no preservation at all, but only renewal by divine creation of interrupted existences.” 6 Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, p. 363. 7 This last-mentioned point must be strongly emphasized against certain modern theologians (e. g.t Berlage and Klee), who postulate the Divine Preservation only for dissoluble compound substances (organisms), but hold that the socalled incorruptible and simple substances (the elements, pure spirits) preserve themselves. Revelation. The Roman Catechism declares that, unless preserved by God’s Providence, the universe would instantly return to its original nothingness.8 a) Holy Scripture clearly enforces the necessity of divine Preservation, as distinct from Creation. Wisd. XI, 26: “Quomodo posset aliquid permanere (/^v), nisi tu voluisses, aut quod a te vocatum non esset, conservaretur? — How could any thing endure, if thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by thee?” If this preservative influence were withdrawn, all living beings would perish. Ps. CM, 29: “Auferes spiritum eorum, et deficient et in pulverem suum revertentur — Thou shalt take away their breath, and they shall fail, and shall return to their dust.” Holy Scripture describes divine Preservation either actively as an “upholding* or keeping together, or passively as the indwelling of all things in God. Heb. I, 2 sq.: Per quern fecit et saecula, … pqptansque9 omnia verbo virtutis suae — By whom also he made the world … upholding all things by the word of his power.” Col. I, 16 sq.: “Omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt … et omnia in ipso con8 Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. ii, qu. 19. “Nisi conditis rebus perpetua eius [Dei] providentia adesset, atque eadem vi, qua ab initio constitutae sunt, Mas conservaret, statim ad nihilum reciderent. 9

THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS 65 stant 10 — All things were created by him and in him . and by him all things consist.* 11 b) The teaching of the Fathers on the whole conforms to the Scripture texts just quoted. Origen commentates on Acts XVII, 28 as follows: ” In what manner then shall we live and move and be in God, unless with His power He grasps and holds together the universe?“12 St. Chrysostom observes: “To hold the universe together is no smaller matter than to have created it. Nay, if we be allowed to marvel, it is something even greater. For while the act of Creation produced beings, the act of Preservation sustains them, lest they return to nothingness.” 13 St. Augustine remarks: ” The world would scarcely endure even for one single moment, if God were to withdraw His governance from it.” 14 We will close the Patristic argument with a passage from the writings of St. Gregory the Great: ” Cuncta ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi earn auctor omnium regiminis manu teneret — All things were made out of nothing, and their essence would tend to return to nothing, did not the author of all sustain them by his governance.” 15 i<>tA trdvra iv abr

c) It may be set down as a certain theological conclusion that in point of fact God will never actually withdraw His preserving influence either from the universe as a whole, or from any of its constituent parts. He will forever sustain the substance of His Creation. With regard to spiritual substances, their eternal duration (immortality) is an ethical postulate based upon God’s wisdom, sanctity, and fidelity. As to material substances (not, however, their combinations) we have positive assurance that they will also endure forever, Cfr. Wisd. I, 14: * Creavit Deus, ut essent [i. e., permanerent] omnia — He created all things that they might be.* 16 Transubstantiation proves nothing against this; for though bread and wine disappear in the conversion, they are not properly annihilated. The same quantity of natural substance is restored when the species become corrupted.17 Readings: — *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 130, 131, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 361 sqq.); Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 272-273, 2nd ed., Mainz 1888; Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. 10-11; St. Thorn., Contr. Gent, III, 65 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 236 sqq.); Idem, De Potent, qu. 5; Petav., De Deo, VIII, 2; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 348 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899; L. J. Walker, S. J., art. 44 Providence,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII. Patristic texts will be found in Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 658 sqq., Oenip. 1878. 16 Cfr. also Ps. CIII, 5; CXLV, 6. 17 For a detailed treatment of this point we must refer the student to the treatise on the Blessed Eucharist, SECTION 2 DIVINE CO-OPERATION OR CONCURRENCE i. Definition of the Term. — The causality of God extends to the operations (operari) of His creatures as well as to their being (esse). He co-operates in their operation by preserving their substance and energy. But His co-operation is more than mediate. We hold with Catholic theologians generally, against Durandus,1 that God lends His immediate physical co-operation or Concursus to each and every creatural act. This particular function of is called concursus divinus generalis, in contradistinction to the special assistance granted in the order of supernatural grace. Two extremes must be avoided in defining the divine Concursus. First, all creatural operations are not attributable solely to God. This is the error of the socalled Occasionalists, who assert that the causae secundae are not true causes.2 Secondly, we must not exclude the divine causality altogether by ascribing all causal influence to the creature. The First Cause actually col Comment, in Quatuor Libros Occasionalism, see J. L. Perrier, Sent., II, dist. 1, qu. 5. The Revival of Scholastic PhiloS’ - 2 For a brief summary of the ophy, pp. 70 sq„ New York 1909. considerations usually urged against 67 operates with the secondary causes,8 though this co-operation is not a cooperatio in the strict sense of the term; that is, God does not posit one part of the effect, and the creature the other, but the same effect is fully and completely wrought by the First Cause, and just as fully and completely by the second causes. ” When one and the same effect is attributed to a natural cause and to the divine power,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, ” this does not mean that the effect is produced partly by God and partly by the natural agent. The whole effect is produced by both, though in different ways, just as the same effect is produced wholly by the instrument and wholly also by the principal cause.” * The right relation between Causa prima and causa secunda demands that the creatural be subordinated to the divine principle in such wise that the effect produced by both derives its physical entity from God more than the creature.5 As regards sin, we must distinguish between its material and its formal cause, that is, between the physical entity of the sinful act (entitas peccati), and its inherent malice (malitia peccati). God lends His cooperation solely to the act as such; the malice inherent in it, or, in other words, the sinning creature’s inclination 3 ” To signify that all capabilities of creatures for action must be reduced to divine creation and preservation, and that the exercise of these capabilities can never take place but with dependence upon divine volition, Scholastics say that God concurs with His creatures in action as the first cause, whilst the creatures are second causes.” (Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 395 sq.) iContr. Gent., Ill, 70: ” Patet quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti attribuitur, quasi partim a Deo et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum, sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento et principali agenti etiam totus.” (Cfr. Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 242, London 1905.) 5 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 105, art. 5. towards evil, is due entirely to the exercise of its freewill.6

2. The Divine Concursus Demonstrated from Revelation. — The doctrine of the divine Concursus is not strictly a revealed dogma. But it is a certain theological conclusion, as appears from the fact that it is held by all theological schools.7 We quote the Roman Catechism as of special weight in this matter: “Non solum autem Deus universa, quae sunt, providentia sua tuetur at que administrat: verum etiam, quae moventur et agunt aliquid, intimd virtute ad motum atque actionem ita impellit, ut, quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat tamen, quum eius occultissima vis ad singula pertineat, et quemadmodum Sapiens testatur, ‘attingat a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter! Quare ab Apostolo dictum est, quum apud Athenienses annuntiaret Deum, quern ignorant es colebant: ‘Non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum; in ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus’ — Not only does God by His Providence protect and govern all things that exist, but by His intimate power He also impels to motion and action whatever things move and act, and this in such manner that, although He ex6 God’s predetermination, in the ural Theology, p. 372.) Cfr. St. words of Fr. Boedder, ” causes the Thomas, De Malo, qu. 3, art. 2. free choice which is sinful, but He 7 The isolated opposition of Dadoes not cause it as sinful.” {Nat- randus must be styled foolhardy. DIVINE CONCURRENCE eludes not, He yet prevents, the agency of secondary causes; for His most secret influence extends to all things, and as the Wise Man testifies, ‘reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly/ Wherefore the Apostle, when announcing to the Athenians the God, whom not knowing they adored, said: ‘He is not far from every one of us, for in Him we live, and move, and be/ ” 8 a) The Scriptural argument offers some difficulties. In selecting probatory texts we must be careful to choose only such as do not, on the face of them, refer to the supernatural aid of grace or to the purely mediate co-operation of God. For this reason, e. g., i Cor. XII, 6 is unavailable. This text runs as follows: ” Divisiones operationum sunt, idem veto Deus, qui operatur omnia [opera] in omnibus [operantibus] — And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all.” St. Paul here speaks of supernatural co-operation on the part of God.9 Equally unavailing for our present argument is Job X, 8 sqq.: ” Manus fecerunt tuae [Domini] me et plasmaverunt me totum in circuitu, … pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me — Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me wholly round about… . Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.” As the plastic power of the womb is undoubtedly due 8Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. a, qu. 22. 9 It should be noted, however, that the phrase 6 ivepywv v6.vra iv iraci, because of the general terms in which it is couched, is most probably meant to include man’s natural acts. to the creative and preservative causality of God, this text would not lose its force even if it did not refer to His immediate co-operation. There is another series of Scriptural texts so worded as to be equally applicable to the Preservation of the universe and to the divine Concursus with which we are here concerned. For instance, John V, 17: Pater meus usque mo do operatur et ego 0 per or — My Father worketh until now, and I work. Still more to the point is Is. XXVI, 12: ” Domine, dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra operatus es nobis — Lord, thou wilt give us peace, for thou hast wrought all our works for us.” Here ” our works * are attributed to God. Cfr. also Acts XVII, 25 • * Quum ipse det omnibus vitam 10 et inspirationem 11 et omnia 12 — Seeing it is he who giveth to all life, and breath, and all things.” Probably the most conclusive text is Acts XVII, 28, cited by the Tridentine Catechism: “In ipso enim vivimus, movemur et sumus — For in him we live, and move, and are.” The Apostle here emphasizes the fact that we are dependent upon the divine co-operation for our existence as well as our life and operation. b) The Fathers of the Church regarded this as a truth both natural and revealed. Their teaching clearly appears from their polemical writings against the Pelagians. St. Augustine censures those ” qui arbitrentur, tantummodo mundum ipsum factum a Deo, cetera iam fieri ab ipso mundo, Deum autem nihil operari. Contra quos profertur ilia sententia Domini: Pater meus usquemodo operatur.” 18 The doctrinal position of the Pelagians is aptly hit off in St. Jerome’s dialogue between Crito10 fo^r. i2T4 ir&vra. U Trvoiiv 6=3 breath. 13 In Gen. ad Lit., V, 20. DIVINE CONCURRENCE bulus and Atticus.14 Critobulus, who speaks for the Pelagian heretics, objects that, ” If we need God’s aid in everything we do, we cannot put a pen to paper, or keep silence, or speak, or sit, or stand, or walk about, or run, or eat, or fast, or weep, or laugh, etc., unless God lends us His assistance.,, Atticus, who defends the Catholic view, replies that it is quite evident that we can do none of these things except by the aid of God.15 Gregory the Great clearly teaches both the Preservation and the divine Concursus: ” Omnia, quae creata sunt, per se nec subsistere valent nec moveri, sed infantum subsistunt, inquantum ut esse debeant acceperunt, infantum moventur, inquantum occulto instinctu disponuntur — Created things, of themselves, can neither continue to exist nor move; they subsist only in so far as they have received the power of subsistence, and they move only in so far as they are disposed thereunto by a hidden instinct.” 16

3. The Controversy Between Molinism and Thomism. — The famous controversy between the Molinists and the Thomists, which we have already sketched in our volume on God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes/7 sharply reasserts itself in discussing the relation of the concurring First Cause to the operation of the secondary causes, especially in regard to the free acts of rational creatures. While both 14 Dial, contr. Pelag., I, n. 2. 15 * Iuxta meum sensum non posse perspicuum est.* Cfr. St. Jerome’s Ep. ad Ctesiph. 16 Regarding the consensus of the Schoolmen on this point see Sten* trup, De Deo Uno, thes. 82. 17 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 383 sqq., St. Louis 191 1. THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 73 schools agree in upholding the necessity of the divine Concurrence in all human acts, including those which are free, and even those which are sinful, they differ widely in regard to its measure and mode. a) The Molinistic theory may be outlined thus. The divine Concurrence postulates two efficient causes (namely, the First Cause and a secondary cause), which by their harmonious co-operation produce the whole effect. The question arises: How is the free act of the will produced by this double cause? Liberty of choice is essentially conditioned by an absolutely free self-determination on the part of the will, and hence it is evident that God, while remaining the First Cause, must so shape His concurrence that the liberty of the creature remains intact. ” Albeit the First Cause exerts the strongest influence upon the effect,” says St/Thomas, ” that influence is nevertheless determined and specified by the proximate cause.” 18 Hence the divine Concursus must comprise a twofold act: an offer of co-operation, and actual co-operation. The former is called concursus oblatus, the latter, concursus collatus. The concursus oblatus does not as yet produce a determined act of the free* will, but is of its nature indifferent, equivocal, and hypothetical, though at the same time necessary, because free volition cannot operate of itself and independently of the First Cause. By seizing, as it were, and leaning on the proffered arm of God, the human will is enabled to get its bearing according to the full extent of the active indifference which constitutes its freedom, and to act according to its good pleasure. 18 De Potent., qu. i, art. 4, ad 3. Did God proffer only a particular concursus along certain definite lines, the choice of the will would by that very fact be determined and its freedom destroyed. By Concursus collatus or exhibitus we understand the actual bestowal of divine help for the performance of a specific act which the will freely posits, and which God by virtue of the scientia media foresees with absolute certainty from everlasting. This particular concursus is by its very nature precisely as definite, univocal, and absolute as the free determination of the will. It consists in God’s physically positing the selfsame act to which the free will has determined itself. The will’s self-determination precedes the divine causality as a condition precedes that which it conditions, not, however, as a cause precedes its effect. It follows that the concursus collatus, taken in the sense explained, is and must be strictly simultaneous.19 b) Thomism 20 postulates what is technically known as the concursus praevius, that is, a co-operation on the part of God which not only co-produces the free act of the creature, but as a praemotio physica causally predetermines it, and formally applies the will, which is of itself indifferent, to the free act According to this much-debated theory the free-will of the creature is predetermined by God physically and ad unutn before it determines itself. Concursus praevius and praemotio physica, therefore, are merely different names for one and the same thing. 19 For further information on this question see Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu, I, 14 sqq.; Hontheim, Ins tit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 770 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Schiffini, Disput. Metoph. Specialis, Vol. II, pp. 33i sqq., August. Taurinor. 1888; B. Boedder, Natural Theology, PP« 355 8QQ*> 2nd ed., London 1899. 20 So called on the plea that it is the doctrine of St. Thomas; the Molinists claim that the Saint is not rightly interpreted by those who impute to him this teaching. Cfr. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 371 sqq., 439 sqq. \ THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY % Gonet defines physical pr emotion as follows: “Actio Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum ilia praemotione coniungere”21 Let us analyze this definition. Physical premotion is a determination, not merely an indifferent, manifold, and hypothetical offer of co-operation like the concursus oblatus of the Molinists. It immediately and irresistibly (insuperabili virtute) determines the free will ad unum, after the fashion of some transient quality, designed, in the words of Alvarez, to communicate to the will and to all secondary causes the ultimate complement of the actus primus.22 Physical premotion is, more specifically, a predetermination, for the reason that both with regard to causality and nature it precedes the exercise of free will on the part of the creature. It is called physical, in order to distinguish it from every species of moral determination (such as, e. g., a counsel, command, petition), and also to emphasize the absolute effectiveness and irresistibility of the divine impulse. For, as it is metaphysically impossible for the human will to act at all without being predetermined, so, too, it is metaphysically impossible for the will not to act when it is predetermined, or to perform an act other than that to which it is predetermined. This predetermination does not, however, destroy freedom of choice, because God predetermines the will not only with regard to the substance of the act to be performed, but also in respect of its mode, that is, He predetermines the will to act 21 Gonet, Clyp. Thotnist., disp. 9, art. 5, 1 1. 22 Alvarez, De Aux.t III, disp. x8, n. 18, ad 1: ”… ut confer at voluntati et omnibus causis secundis ultimum complementum act Us primu” 76 DIVINE CONCURRENCE freely. Needless to say, none but an omnipotent First Cause can so predetermine free-will as to cause it to copredetermine itself, and, consequently, to act with full liberty. Therefore, say the Thomists, physical premotion does not destroy free-will, but postulates and confirms it.28 c) This is not the place to enter into a minute criticism of the two systems. To conform fully to the demands of right reason, Molinism must meet the objection that ” free-will, by predetermining itself, forces the divine First Cause into inadmissible co-ordination.” It is more important to guard the majesty and primacy of the divine First Cause, than to preserve the freedom of the human will. Molinism overcomes this objection by explaining that God depends on free-will merely as on a condition, and that the divine causality is far and away superior to that of the creature.24 That the First Cause should accommodate and conditionally subordinate itself to the nature and properties of the individual free creature, is not derogatory to the infinite dignity and sovereignty of God, any more than that God should make the execution of His holy Will dependent on a condition which the creature is free either to posit or not. Having bound Himself by a solemn promise to reward His creatures for the good they do, God cannot violate their free-will, but owes it to His own wisdom, sanctity, 23 Cfr. Zigliara, Theologia Naturalis, Lyon 1876, pp. 380 sqq. 24 ” Pritno,” says Suarez, ’ causa prima altior est et nobilior tnagisque independenti modo influit in effecturn, Secundo causa prima respicit per se primo actionem Mam sub quadam universaliori ratione; nam causa prima influit in quemlibet effectum vel actionem ex eo praecise, quod aliquid entitatis participate causa autem secunda semper influit sub aliqua posteriori magisque determinata ratione entis. Unde fit tertio, ut influxus causae primae ex se et ex suo genere dicatur etiam prior subsistendi consequential nam influxus causae primae absolute non pendet a causa secunda, sed quantum est ex suo genere, potest esse sine ilia, non vero e converso.” Metaphys., disp. 22, sect. 3, n. 10. THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 77 and justice to preserve it, to foster it, and to give it full sway. This is not derogatory to His dignity, nor does it imply self-abasement; it is simply a mystery of the divine omnipotence.25 The Molinistic charge that Thomism destroys freewill and makes God the author of sin, will be duly considered in the treatise on Grace. Another objection against Thomism is that the concursus praevius, being neither immediatus nor simultaneus, cannot properly be called a concursus ad actum. Nature and Revelation agree that a free act of the creatural will requires an immediate and simultaneous concurrence on the part of God. The Thomistic concursus to all appearances possesses neither the one nor the other of these qualifications. It is not per se simultaneus, because it is praevius, and it is not immediatus, because it is primarily directed to the efficient cause, i. e., the actus primus, and not to the effect as such, L e., the actus secundus. Cardinal Zigliara tries to evade this difficulty by pointing out that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of the inHuxus praevius.2* It is indeed quite true that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of the inHuxus praevius, — but does not the theory of which the learned Cardinal is an advocate, demand that it must always be so? Duly considered, the concursus praevius, as such, is not really a concursus at all, it is merely a praecursus. As Liberatore convincingly argues: “Si divinus concursus in re aliqua consisteret actioni creaturarum praevia, huius vi Deus in actionem non immediate inHueret, sed mediate, nimirum media re ilia praevia, ad quam eius operatio proxime termina26 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 26 TheoL Naturalis, p. 384, Lyon Knotvability, Essence, and Attri- 1876. butes, pp. 440, 45 s sqq. tur. Ut igitur salvetur Dei concur sus immediatus, necesse est ut in ipsa actione creaturarum concipiatur.” 27 Readings: — *Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu; *Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, cap. 10, Oeniponte 1878; Idem, (more briefly), Synopsis De Deo Uno, pp. 286 sqq., Oeniponte 1895; Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas de Doctnna Praemotionis Physicae, Paris 1886; J. Pecci, Lehre des hi. Thomas fiber den EinHuss Gottes auf die Handlungen der vernunftigen Gesch’opfe und iiber die Scientia Media, Paderborn 1888; F. G. Feldner, O. P., Die Lehre des hi. Thomas iiber die Will ens freiheit der vernunftigen Wesen, Graz 1890; Frins, S. J., De Cooperatione Dei cum Omni Natura Creata, prcesertim Libera, Paris 1892; L. de San, S. J., De Deo Uno, 1. 1: De Mente S. Thomae circa Prae deter minationes Physicas, Louvain 1804; I. Jeiler, O. F. M., S. Bonaventurae Principia de Concursu Dei Generali ad Aciiones Causarum Secundarum Collecta et S. Thomae Doctrind ConHrmata, Quaracchi 1897. 27 Instit. Philos., Vol. II, n. 66, Naples 1 88 1. For a more complete treatment of these subtleties see Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, pp. 676 sqq., Oeniponte 1878. The student is also referred to the works cited under ” Readings ’ and to the treatise on Grace, which is to appear later as a separate volume of this series.