Dogmatic Anthropology §1: The Nature of Man
Theological note: de fide (unity of race — Humani Generis; soul as form — Vienne 1311; immortality — Lateran V)
Adam's body and soul were created directly by God — a fairly certain teaching confirmed by Genesis 2:7; atheistic Darwinism (man in soul and body from the brute) is heretical; theistic evolution of the body (Mivart) is repugnant to Scripture. The unity of the human race from one pair of progenitors (Adam and Eve) is Catholic doctrine, supported by Genesis, Acts 17:26, and Paul; Pre-Adamism and Co-Adamism are erroneous. Man is composed of exactly two essential constituents — body and spiritual soul (Dichotomy): de fide from the Council of Vienne (1311), which defined the rational soul as per se and essentially the form of the body, confirmed by Leo X (Fifth Lateran, 1512); Trichotomy (Gnostics, Apollinaris) is condemned. The immortality of the soul is de fide, defined by the Fifth Lateran Council (1512) against Averroism and Pomponazzi. The origin of individual souls: Pre-existentism is heretical (condemned at Constantinople 543, Braga 561); Generationism (Traducianism) is rejected as incompatible with the soul's spirituality; Creationism — each soul is immediately created by God — is theologically certain.
Chapter II: Dogmatic Anthropology
§1: The Nature of Man
CHAPTER II DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY Anthropology, as a branch of dogmatic theology, partly coincides with the philosophical discipline of the same name, and partly with psychology. Its object is to determine the natural basis for the supernatural endowment of mankind in Adam, which was forfeited by original sin. Hence in this Chapter of our treatise we shall consider: (i) The nature of man, (2) The Supernatural in man, and (3) Man’s defection from the Supernatural (Original Sin). General Readings: — St. Thorn., S. Theol, ia, qu. 75 sqq., and in connection therewith the treatises De Anitna by Toletus, Suarez, and Ruvius; also Kleutgen, Die Philosophic der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 453 sqq., Minister 1878. — Card. Gotti, De Deo Creatore, tract. 10. — Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis Creaturis, thes. 25-29, Romae 1910. — *Card. Mazzella, De Deo Creante, ed. 2a, disp. 3 sqq., Romae 1880. — T. Pesch, Instit. Psychologies secundum Principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3 vols., Friburgi 1897-8. — J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 1892. — W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty” pp. 272 sqq., London 1897. — H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism and Evolution, St. Louis 1906; Fr. Aveling, art. ” Man ” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX; E. Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1910. On the history of the various dogmas involved, cfr. A. Stockl, Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, 2 vols., 124 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 125 Wiirzburg 1858-9. — *Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vols. I and II, Freiburg 1892-5. — E. Klebba, Die Anthropologic des hi. Irenaus, Miinster 1895. — *G- Esser, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, Paderborn 1893. — F. Hilt, Des hi. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen, systematisch dargestellt, Koln 1890.
SECTION i THE NATURE OF MAN The subject-matter of this Section may be treated under four subdivisions, viz.: (i) The origin of man and the unity of the human race; (2) The essential constitution of human nature and the relation of soul to body; (3) The immortality of the human soul; and (4) The origin of individual souls. The first two of the subsequent Articles regard man as a whole, that is to say, as composed of soul and body; the last two deal with the soul alone (Dogmatic Psychology). Such incidental questions as the probable age of the human race belong to fundamental theology or apologetics.
Article 1: The Origin of Man and the Unity of the Human Race
THE ORIGIN OF MAN AND THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE God directly created Adam and Eve, from whom all other human beings are descended by way of propagation. Holy Scripture lays particular stress on the truth that the entire human 126 race is descended from a single pair of progenitors, and thus forms but one family. Thesis I: The body of the first man as well as his soul were created immediately by God. This thesis may be technically qualified as “sententia satis certa” Proof. There is no need of entering upon a refutation of the obsolete heretical contention of the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, that Adam was created by a subordinate Demiurge, or by the author of evil. The modern antithesis of Christian Anthropology is atheistic Darwinism, which teaches that in soul and body alike man is descended from the brute, the human soul being merely a more highly developed form of the brute soul.1 This teaching is as heretical as it is absurd. The modified Darwinism defended by St. George Mivart, who holds that the body of Adam developed from the animal kingdom, whereas his spiritual soul was infused immediately by the Creator must likewise be rejected; for while not directly heretical, it is repugnant to the letter of Sacred Scripture and to Christian sentiment.2 a) The creation of man occurred towards the l Cfr. H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism, pp. 39 sqq., St. Louis 1906; E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, pp. 49 sqq., London 1909. 2 Cfr. W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., pp. 15 sqq., London 1899. end of the Hexaemeron, immediately prior to the Creator’s day of rest. The Bible contains two separate accounts of it (Gen. I, 26 sqq., and Gen. II, 7), both of which represent Almighty God as personally creating man. o) The Creator proceeds with great solemnity in this act. Gen. I, 26 sq.: ” And he said: let us make man to our image and likeness … and God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.” This text, be it remarked in passing, excludes the Platonic error, which was espoused by certain ancient rabbis, that Adam was a hermaphrodite. The distinction of sexes is immediately from God. As God took a direct hand in the creation of material and irrational beings, there can be no doubt that He personally created Adam, “the crown of creation,” whose material body from the moment of its origin was to be animated by a soul endowed with sanctifying grace. From the irrational brute to man was indeed a farther cry than from inanimate matter to plant, or from plant to brute, and hence if the immediate operation of the Creator was required for the latter, it was even more urgently demanded for the former. That God created the soul of Adam out of nothing and personally fashioned his body, becomes still clearer from Gen. II, 7: “And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” These words, taken in their natural and obvious sense, represent the creative act of God as one, though divided into two momenta, viz.: formation and breathing. Did the Creator employ the services of the Angels THE ORIGIN OF MAN 129 in preparing the * slime of the earth ” ? The assumption cannot be positively disproved. But even if He did employ the Angels as His agents, God Himself was the sole causa principalis in the formation of the human body.8 P) The creation of Eve furnishes a decisive argument against the evolutionist hypothesis. It is quite inconceivable, and at the same time repugnant to the spirit of divine Revelation, that woman should have had a sublimer origin than man. Eve was fashioned immediately by God from a rib which He had taken from Adam.4 Cardinal Cajetan’s allegorical interpretation of this text has been unanimously rejected by theologians as fanciful and unwarranted. St. Paul says: ” Non enim vir ex muliere est, sed mulier ex viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum — For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man.” 5 If Eve had not sprung bodily from Adam, he could not have exclaimed: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman {virago), because she was taken out of man (quoniam de viro sumpta est).“6 If the sumptio de viro was an immediate act of God, so, a fortiori, was the formatio de Unto terrae; and hence Adam’s body, like his soul, must have come directly from the hands of the Creator.7 3 ” It was necessary,” says St. Thomas, ” that the first human body should be fashioned immediately by God … though possibly the Angels rendered some assistance, as they will also do at the resurrection by gathering up the dust.” (S. TheoL, ia, qu. 91, art. 2.) 4 Gen. II, 21 sqq. 5 1 Cor. XI, 8 sq. 6 Gen. II, 23. 7 Hummelauer, Comment, %n Gen., pp. 129 sqq., Paris 1895. b) The Patristic teaching on this subject is quite unanimous. Not a single one of the Fathers can be quoted in favor of Mivart’s hypothesis. We shall confine ourselves to a few specimen quotations. Gregory of Nyssa writes: ” If it were simply written: ‘He created/ you would be free to think that man was made in the same manner as the brute animals, the monsters, plants and herbs. In order to make you see that you have nothing in common with the beasts of the field, Moses describes God’s artistic procedure in creating man thus: ’ God took dust of the earth.’ Then he relates what God did; then he tells us how God did it. He took dust of the earth and with His own hands formed man.” 8 John of Damascus, who exalted man’s dignity to the extent of calling him a “little god” (iwcpoOeos), deems it quite natural and proper that the body of the first man should have been immediately created by God. ” Thus God created man with His hands: He formed his body out of earth, but gave him the soul by breathing.” 9 To show the propriety of such direct intervention on the part of the Almighty, St. John Chrysostom compares man to a king, whom God Himself wished to induct into the created universe as his palace.10 Tertullian hails man as ” ingenii divini curam, manuum Dei operant, molitionis suae regent, liberalitatis suae heredem.” 11 It is one of this author’s favorite sayings that Adam bore a bodily resemblance to the ” second Adam,” i. e., Christ, and that the Creator fashioned the body of the first man after 8 Orat. 2 (Migne, P.G., XLIV, 10 Horn, in Gen., 8, n. 2. 279). 11 De Resurrect. Carnis, c 9. 9 Ve Fide Orth., II, 12. THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 131 the pattern of Jesus.12 The Fathers and Patristic writers generally love to descant on the great dignity of Eve because she was taken from Adam’s side. Eve, they say, did not spring from the head of Adam, which would have signified that she should rule over him; nor from his feet, that she might be his slave; but from his side, that she might be loved by her husband, thus symbolizing the procession of the Church from the side of Christ.18 Such utterances are as incompatible with the views of Mivart 14 as they are with crude Darwinism in its application to man.15 Thesis II: All mankind is decended from one pair of progenitors, Adam and Eve. Proof. The unity of the human race, though not yet formally defined, is a Catholic doctrine. The dogmatic commission of the Vatican Council drew up the following canon: Si quis universum genus humanum ab uno protoparente Adam ortum esse negaverit, anathema sit. 16 Heresies opposed to this teaching are Pre-Adamism and Co-Adamism. The PreAdamites claim that there were men before Adam; the 12 Op. cit., c 6: * Quodcunque enim limns exprimebatur, Christus cogitabatur homo futurus. is ” Dormit Adam, ut fiat Eva; moritur Christus, ut fiat ecclesia. Dormienti Adae fit Eva de latere; mortuo Christo lancea percutitur lotus, ut profluant sacramenta, quibus formatur ecclesia.’* (Aug., Tract, in loa., 9, n. 10.) Cfr. Cone. Viennense, apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 480. 14 On the Genesis of Species, pp. 277 sqq., London 1871; Lessons from Nature, pp. 177 sqq., London 1876. 15 Cfr. A. Jakob, Der Mensch, die Krone der Schopfung, Freiburg 1900; O. Mohnike, Affe und Urmensch, Munster 1888; J. Diebolder, Darwins Grundprinzip der Abstammungslehre kritisch beleuchtet, 2nd cd., Freiburg 1891; E. Dennert, At the Deathbed of Darwinism, Burlington, la., 1904; W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., London 1899; E. Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1910. 16 In Martin’s Collectio Document., p. 30, Paderb. 1873. Co-Adamites, that other human beings co-existed with Adam and Eve. Pre-Adamism was reduced to a theological system by the French Calvinist Isaac Peyrere,17 who later became a Catholic and abjured his error before Pope Alexander VII. It has been revamped in modern times with much scientific acumen by Professor Winchell.18 The defense of Christian monogenism against the objections of infidel scientists is a task which we must leave to apologetics. The dogmatic argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows: a) The Bible does not permit us to doubt that all men without exception — including such widely divergent races as the negroes of Australasia, the Chinese, and the aborigines of the South Sea Islands — are descended from the same progenitors. This unity of descent sufficiently guarantees the unity of the human race, which would remain a fact even if the so-called Neandertal race constituted a new zoological species, as is asserted by such eminent authorities as Schwalbe and Klaatsch.19 Dogmatic theology is not concerned with zoological distinctions. The purpose of the Mosaic narrative is simply to describe the origin of the universe, including man. We have in Gen. I, 26 sqq. and II, 4 sqq., as it Systema Theologicum ex Prae- erroneous guesswork,” cfr. P. De adamitarum Hypothesi, 1655. Roo, History of America Before 18 Preadamites, or A Demonstra- Columbus, Vol. I, pp. 14 sqq., PhilHon of the Existence of Men Be- adelphia 1900. fore Adam, Chicago 1890. On the 19 Cfr. E. Wasmann, The Berlin main theses of this work, which is Discussion of the Problem of Evo”almost as replete with facts and lution, pp. 71 sqq. science as with suppositions and THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 133 it were, the original charter of the human race. The very fact that God, when He was about to create man, debated with Himself — “Let us make man,” — shows that a new and very important link still remained to be inserted in the chain of created beings. Moreover, Gen. II, 57 expressly tells us: “There was not a man to till the earth … and the Lord God formed man,” i. e., man as a species and as the first individual of that species. With equal certainty we know from Revelation that Eve was the first woman. Gen. II, 20: * Adae vero non inveniebatur adiutor similis eius — But for Adam there was not found a helper like himself.* Had any other human beings existed at that time (Pre-Adamites or Co-Adamites), Eve would not have been the first woman. Her very name ” Eve ” is intelligible only on the assumption that she is the proto-mother of mankind: “Vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Eva, eo quod mater esset cunctorum viventium — Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living.” 20 This is confirmed by various other Scriptural texts. Wisd. X, 1: “[Adamus] primus formatus est a Deo pater orbis terrarum, cum solus esset creatus — Adam was first formed by God the father of the world, when he was created alone.” Christ Himself says, Matth. XIX, 4: “Qui fecit hominem ab initio, masculum et foeminam fecit eos — He who made man from the beginning, made them male and female.” St. Paul repeats the same truth, Acts 20 Gen. Ill, 20. XVII, 26: ” Fecit que [Deus] ex uno omne genus hominum 21 inhabitare super universam faciem terrae — He hath made of one all mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth.” 22 b) Peyrere himself admitted that his theory was opposed to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers and to the many conciliar definitions which assert the universality of original sin and of the Redemption. ” I confess,” he says in a letter to Philotimus, ” that I was not unaware of the fact that my hypothesis [asserting the existence of Pre-Adamites] was entirely foreign to the opinion of the holy Fathers and to the teaching of orthodox councils; and that the whole fabric of doctrine concerning the fall and redemption of man was based by the Fathers and councils on the hypothesis [sic!] that Adam was the first man.” 28 The Fathers often make the common descent of all men from one pair of progenitors the text of inspiring reflections. Lactantius, e. g., dwells on the utter wickedness of hatred, which, he says, is repugnant to the blood relationship that binds all human beings together as members of one family.24 St. Ambrose and others demonstrate the unity of humankind from the manner in which our first parents were created.25 Lastly, the 21 i£ Ms irav idvos dvOptinrtav. 22 For a refutation of certain specious objections drawn from Sacred Scripture consult Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 251 sq. 2ZEpist. ad Philotimum. 24 ” Si ab uno homine, quern Deus finxit, omnes orimur, ergo consanguinei sumus, et ideo maximum scelus putandum est, odisse hominem vel nocentem.” (Instit., 1. 6.) 25 ” Non de eadem terra, de qua plasmatus est Adam, sed de ipsius costa facta est mulier, ut sciremus, unam in viro et muliere esse naturam, unum fontem generis humani,” (De Paradiso, c. 10, n. 48.) THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 135 dogma of the universality of original sin, and the consequent duty for all men of whatever race to receive Baptism, as well as the dogma of the Redemption of all through Jesus Christ, presuppose common descent from Adam. c) Pre-Adamism is heretical only when it culminates in Co-Adamism, because the assertion that certain post-Adamic races had a pre-Adamic origin involves a direct denial of the universality of original sin and of the Redemption. Fabre d’Envieu26 held that human beings existed upon this earth long before the Biblical Adam, but that they were totally extinct when God created our first parents. While this airy hypothesis is not directly repugnant to the dogma of the universality of original sin and the Redemption of all men through Jesus Christ, it is difficult to reconcile with the Mosaic narrative. Nor is there need of any such gratuitous assumption, so long as science has not discovered the ” tertiary man ” — the ” missing link ” which alone could give us the certainty that hundreds of thousands of years ago there lived upon this earth human beings whose traces became entirely obliterated in the later geological strata, only to re-appear in the glacial epoch. Modern man is no doubt genetically related to the diluvial man of the so-called interglacial period. His descent from Adam is Catholic teaching, and it naturally implies that all the different races of men, including the North American Indians and the Esquimos, are members of the Adamitic family.27 The early Christians regarded the assumption 26 Les Origines de la Terre et dt 27 On the ” tertiary man,” cfr. VHomme, 1878, J. Ranke, Der Mensch, Vol. II, of antipodes, i. e., men who live diametrically opposite each other, as repugnant to revealed religion. This hypothesis was in consequence proscribed until it became scientifically established. We know now that the unity of the human race is sufficiently safeguarded by the assumption that the remotest corners of the earth were peopled from one common centre of migration. St. Augustine found this problem a very thorny one. Lactantius brushed it aside with misdirected sarcasm.28 Readings: — H. Liiken, Die Stiftungsurkunde des Menschengeschlechtes oder die mosaische Schopfungsgeschichte, Freiburg 1876. — St. George Mivart, On the Genesis of Species, London 1871. — Rauch, Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes, Augsburg 1873. — J. Ranke, Der Mensch, 2 vols., 3d ed., Leipzig 191 1. — *C. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung u. seine Enmicklung, 3d ed., Paderborn 1910. — Lepicier, De Prima Hominis Formatione, Romae 1910. — Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, 9th ed., II, 1, 5ter Vortrag, Freiburg 1906. — Fr. Kaulen, Die Sprachverwirrung zu Babel, Mainz 1861. — *A. Giesswein, Die Hauptprobleme der Sprachwissenschaft, Freiburg 1892. — J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 1892. — E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, London 1909. — W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., London 1899.
Article 2: The Essential Constituents of Man and Their Mutual Relationship
THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF MAN AND In proceeding to consider the composite nature of man, we shall have to answer two separate and distinct pp. 456 sqq., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900. On the North American Indians, see De Roo, History of America Before Columbus, Philadelphia 1900. 28 On the moot decision- of Pope Zacharias against Bishop Vigilius of Salzburg, who was a contemporary of St. Boniface (cfr. Baronius, Annales, ad annum 748), see Pohle, Die Sternentuelten und ihre Betaohner, 6th ed., pp. 523 sqq., Koln 1910. questions, viz.: (1) Of how many essential elements does human nature consist? and (2) How are these elements mutually related? To these questions the Church replies: (1) Man is composed of two essential constituents, body and soul. This teaching is called Dichotomy, or Dualism. (2) The rational soul constitutes the essential form of the body, and the two are substantially united in one nature. That these philosophical questions have an important dogmatic bearing is evident from the fact that Jesus Christ was true man as well as very God. By finding a correct solution for them we shall obtain accurate theological notions on the substantiality, individuality, and spirituality of the human soul. This will obviate the necessity of entering into a separate discussion of these points. As regards free-will, which is unquestionably a natural endowment of the soul, its existence flows as a corollary from the dogmatic teaching of the Church (to be expounded presently) that original sin did not destroy man’s natural freedom of choice. Thesis I: Man consists of but two essential constituents, viz.: a body and a spiritual soul. This proposition is strictly de fide. Proof. All philosophical and theological systems that assume more than two constituents have been condemned as heretical. Aside from the Platonic theory that there are two or even three souls in the human body,1 the error under 1 Father Rickaby, by the way, thinks that the traditional idea of Plato’s teaching on this head does him an injustice. ” The passage, v> Timaeus, 6oc-7oa, describing how * the mortal kind of soul/ with its two divisions, was allocated in the body by inferior deities, after the consideration was in ancient times held chiefly by the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, and later by Apollinaris. The Gnostics believed that man has a threefold soul: irvevfm, ipvxrj* fa7!* wh^e the Manichaeans thought that the two eternal principles of good and evil, which are essentially opposed to each other, met in Adam, when his soul, which was an emanation from the good principle, was imprisoned in the body by the evil one.2 Apollinaris, on his part, made the trichotomy of vous, ifn)^,
tomy to the rank of a dogma and condemned Trichotomy as heretical: “Veteri et Novo Testamento unam animam rationalem et intellectualem 4 habere hominem docente . . .in tantum impietatis quidam … devenerunt, ut duas eum habere animas impudenter do gmatizare … pertentent. Itaque sancta haec et universalis synodus … talis impietatis inventores … magna voce anathematizat… . Si autem quis contraria gerere praesumpserit, … anathema sit — Both the Old and the New Testament teach that man has one rational and intellectual soul … [nevertheless] some have been impious enough to assert, quite impudently, that man has two souls. This sacred and ecumenical Council … vehemently anathematizes the inventors of such impiety. … If any one shall presume to act contrary to this definition, let him be anathema.,, 5 a) Sacred Scripture is quite positive in its teaching that man is composed of but two elements, a material body and a spiritual soul. Gen. II, 7: (
of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life [i e., the soul], and man [i. e., the synthesis of body and soul] became a living soul.” “Breath of life” (spiraculum vitae) in this context does not mean an independent animal or plant soul, but the spiritual soul. This is obvious from the fact that the sacred writer sets out with the express purpose of describing the origin of the first man {animal rationale). The man thus dichotomically constituted is identical with the one described in Gen. I, 27 sqq., who, created to God’s own image, is commanded to “rule over all living creatures,” which can only mean that he is to hold sway as an intelligent and free being. Hence spiraculum vitae is synonymous with anima rationalis. In Eccles. XII, 7 man is resolved into his constituent elements, and again there are but two: “Et revertatur pulvis [corpus] in t err am suam, unde erat, et spiritus [anima spiritualis] redeat ad Deum, qui dedit ilium — And let the dust [the body] return to its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit [the spiritual soul] return to God, who gave it.” None but an immortal soul — immortal because spiritual — can “return to God.” 6 While Sacred Scripture occasionally draws a distinction between “sour’ (anima, foxy* an(l “spirit” « Compare Luke XXIII, 46: my spirit” with John XII, 27: Father, into thy hands I commend ” Now is my soul troubled.” MAN’S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS 141 (spiritus, irvevfia, nn ), it nowhere countenances the theory that man has two souls. Seemingly discordant passages must be explained either by a poetic parallelism, as in the Psalms, or as a juxtaposition of the higher and lower soul-life, or, lastly, by a desire to differentiate between the pneumatic supernatural life and the merely natural life in man. Under one or other of these aspects it is easy to interpret such texts as Luke I, 46 sq.: “Magnificat anima mea Dominum, et exultavit spiritus meus in Deo, salutari meo — My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour; ” Heb. IV, 12: ” Usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus 7 — Unto the division of the soul and the spirit; ” 1 Cor. II, 14 sq.: ” Animalis homo 8 non percipit ea, quae sunt Spiritus Dei … spiritualis autem 9 iudicat omnia — But the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God; … but the spiritual man judgeth all things.” The attempt to bolster Giinther’s psychology by Scriptural texts has proved utterly futile. b) The Fathers are all strict dichotomists because they consistently refer to the “soul” as the principle of thought. It must be observed that the word ” soul ” (anima, foxv) is a relative, whereas ” spirit ” is an absolute term. To identify ” spirit ” and ” soul,” therefore, is tantamount to asserting the existence of but one life-principle in human nature, viz.: the spiritual soul. Thus St. Athanasius says: ” The body of man is called body and not soul, and the soul of man is called soul and not body. The one is a correlative of the other, i. e., the vvevtiaros. » b 8h TrvcvfiartKbs. spirit of the body.” 10 Even before St. Athanasius, St. Justin Martyr, who had been unjustly charged with Trichotomy, taught quite positively: Tt ydp coriv 6 avOpwTTOs aAA’ rj to Ik i/rvxrjs kcli o-wftaros ctuvcotos f
seu intellective* non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus — Whosoever shall pertinaciously presume to assert, defend or teach, that the rational or intellectual soul is not per se and essentially the form of the human body, shall be considered a heretic.” 13 This important dogmatic definition, couched in strictly Scholastic terminology, contains the following heads of doctrine: (1) Human nature has but two essential constituents, namely, the anima rationalis and the corpus humanum.1* (2) The rational soul ” informs/’ i. e., animates and quickens the human body as its true and real forma; and that (a) per se, not through the instrumentality of a second (sensitive or vegetative) soul, and (b) essentially (per essentia™ suatn), not through some accidental influence (as, for instance, by a mere dynamic commingling of spiritual energy with the faculties of the body). (3) The spiritual soul is consequently the true form of the body — forma corporis, forma substantialis corporis, not a mere forma accidentalis se”u assistens. (4) It follows as an obvious corollary that man’s vegetative and sensitive life is derived from his spiritual soul, which is virtually vegetative and sensitive. Pope Leo X solemnly approved the Viennese definition at the Fifth Lateran Council, A. D. 1512.15 13 Denzinger-Bannwart’, Enchiri- 14 Dichotomy. dion, n. 481. On this dogmatic defi- 15 Sess. VIII, ConstiU * Apostolici nition cfr. W. Lescher, The Evolu- regiminis.* Hon of the Body, 2nd ed., pp. 8 sq., London 1899.
The misrepresentations of Giinther and his school were repeatedly condemned by Pius IX, who, on the one hand, insisted: ” Noscimus, iisdem libris laedi catholicam sententiam ac doctrinam de homine, qui corpore et anima ita absolvatur, ut anima eaque rationalis sit vera per se atque immediata corporis forma,” and on the other hand declared: “Sententiam quae unum in homine ponit vitae principium: animam scilicet rationalem, a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sensum accipiat, … cum Ecclesiae dogmate ita videri coniunctam, ut huius sit legitima solaque vera interpretatio nec proinde sine err ore in fide possit negari”19 a) According to Holy Scripture, man is constituted a “living being” (anima vivens, n’nT = ens vivum) by the union of the limus terrae (i. e., body) with the spiraculum vitae (L e., spiritual soul). Consequently, his whole life (vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), must flow from the spiritual soul, which vivifies the body by a process of “information” in the true and proper sense of the word. Ezechiel’s vision of the resurrection of dry bones (Ezech. XXXVII, 4 sqq.) illustrates this truth. “Ossa arida, audite verbum Domini… . Dabo super vos nervos et succrescere faciam super vos carnesy et … dabo vobis spiritum et vivetis et scietis, quia ego sum Dominus — Ye dry bones, hear the 16 Breve ” Eximiam tuam” ad Card, de Geissel, Archiep. Colon., 15 Junii 1857; Epist. ” Dolor e hand mediocri ” ad Episc. Vratisl. (Breslau) d. 30 Apr. i860. For a trenchant refutation of GCinther’s erroneous teaching see Oswald, Schopfungslehre, pp. 176 sqq., Paderborn 1885. word of the Lord … I will lay sinews upon you, and will cause flesh to grow over you, and … I will give you spirit, and you shall live, and you shall know that I am the Lord.” To understand this sublime prosopopeia we must observe that the Sacred Writer enumerates only two essential constituents of man, viz.: the body (sinews, bones, flesh) and the spirit (spiritus). The spirit revivifies the body by entering into the bones, consequently all life comes from the spiritual soul. This would be impossible if both factors did not coalesce into an tmurn per se by a substantial synthesis of nature. b) The teaching of the Fathers was brought out most clearly in connection with the Christological heresy of Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea.17 It is worth while to recall Augustine’s drastic dictum against the Apollinarists: ” Animam irrationalem eum [scil. Christum] habere voluerunt, rationalem negaverunt; dederunt ei animam pecoris, subtraxerunt hominis — They attribute to Him [Christ] an irrational, but they deny Him a rational soul; they grant Him the soul of a brute, but they deny Him the soul of a man.” 18 Augustine himself held that the human body derives its life from the soul: ” Ab anima [scil. rationali] corpori sensus et vita.* 19 How the Fathers conceived the 17 Died A. D. 390. dr. J. F. 18 Tract, in loa., 47, 9. Sollier’s article on * Appollinarian- 10 De Civ. Dei, XXI, 3, 2. ism ” in Vol. I of the Catholic Encyclopedia. mutual relationship of these two constituent elements appears from their favorite comparison of the union of soul and body in man to the Hypostatic Union of the divine with the human nature in Christ. This simile has found its way into the Athanasian Creed: ” Nam sicut anima rationalis • et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus — For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.” There is an important Christological axiom: ” Verbum assumpsit carnem mediant e anima” (the Word assumed flesh by means of the soul), of which the Fathers made frequent use against Arianism and Apollinarianism. Only by assuming a rational soul, they argued, was the Divine Logos able to take bodily flesh into the Hypostatic Union; for soulless flesh, or flesh animated merely by a brute soul (i/mxy aAoyos), would not have been becoming to the Godhead, nor would it have met the requirements of the Redemption. Only flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essential form constitutes man; similarly the human nature of Christ is constituted only by human flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essential form.20 After the outbreak of the Arian and Apollinarian controversy the Fathers never wearied of insisting on the ” rationality of the flesh,” 21 not, of course, in the sense of a hylozoistic Panpsychism, as advocated many centuries later by Spinoza, but in consonance with the dogmatic definition of Vienne, which, despite its Scholastic phraseology, may be said to flow from Divine Revelation rather than from philosophy. 20 See the dogmatic treatise on of Alexandria),
c) Later theologians have warmly discussed the incidental question, whether the definition of the Council of Vienne can be used as an argument in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine of Hylomorphism as developed by the Scholastics. This philosophic theory holds that all bodies are composed of a substantial form and primordial matter (forma substantiate et materia prima). Is the Vienne definition to be taken as a dogmatic indication that the spiritual soul is immediately united with primordial matter (materia prima, fay ^rq) rather than with an organized body? a) St. Thomas distinctly teaches that the spiritual soul is not only the forma corporis, but the unica forma corporis — the sole form of the body.22 He conceives the compositum humanum as consisting not of body and soul, but of primordial matter and soul, because it is the spiritual soul which renders the body materia secunda, i. e., constitutes it a body, and thereby gives it its esse corporis. The Scotists, on the other hand, hold that the body is first constituted by a separate forma corporeitatis, and subsequently receives the intellectual soul as its essential form. In order to obtain an unum per se as the result of this synthesis, the Scotists conceive the forma corporeitatis to be an imperfect, subordinate form, which 22 ” Dicendum est, quod nulla alia forma substantialis est ’ in homine nisi sola anima intellectiva, et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores fortnas, et facit ipsa sola, quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt.” S. Thedl., la, qu. 76, art. 4. offers no obstacle to the substantial completion of the whole by the spiritual soul. It is in this sense that Scotus teaches: ” Anima est principium formale, quo vivum est vivum… . Est anima immediatum principium formale essendi et immediatum principium operandi,” 28 so that “una forma rationalis dat esse triplex, scil. vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum” 24 But the esse corporis is not immediately communicated by the soul; it is derived from the forma corporeitatis, which is distinct from the soul. This explains the Scotist conclusion that the body retains its forma corporeitatis after death, whereas the Thomists are compelled to invent a new form for the dead body, which they call forma cadaverica. Neither of the two systems is free from logical difficulties. The whole question properly belongs to the sphere of philosophy. p) It would be absurd to say that the Church has raised Hylomorphism to the rank of a dogma and condemned in advance the fundamental principles of modern physics and chemistry as heretical. The Council of Vienne did not mean to affirm the existence of primordial matter. Nor did it intend to deny the existence of a forma corporeitatis in man. We know that the Thomistic doctrine was anything but popular among the theologians of that age. Moreover, the Viennese definition was drawn up by Scotist theologians, who cannot have intended to persuade the Council to condemn a pet theory of their own school and order. ” That the Council did not harbor any such purpose,” says Schell, ” is proved by the unquestioned orthodoxy of the Scotist and allied schools.” 25 The Jesuit Schiffini, 23 Comment, in Quatuor Libros 25 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 287, Sent., II, dist. 16, qu. 1. Paderborn 1890. 24 De Rer. Princ, qu. 11, art. 2. who defends the Thomistic doctrine with great zeal and acumen, finds himself constrained to counsel moderation in this controversy and to warn theologians against drawing hasty conclusions.26 So long, therefore, as the Church permits modern scientific Atomism and the Scotistic system to be taught without let or hindrance, so long will the definition of Vienne be sufficiently safeguarded by saying that the spiritual soul animates the human body (not: primordial matter) as its immediate essential form.27 We are confirmed in this view by the sharp disapproval expressed by Pope Pius IX (June 5, 1876) of any and every extreme interpretation of the papal and conciliar definitions against the opponents of the Thomistic system.28 The most that can be said in favor of the latter is that ” by laying a sharper emphasis upon the union of body and soul in one essence, it embodies a deeper and more consistent conception of the Church’s teaching, and thereby more emphatically accentuates the direct fusion of the soul with the innermost essence of the body, the utter dependency of the body upon the soul, and the intrinsic perfectioning and unification of the body, as such, by the soul. However, this teaching is hard to understand because of its profundity, and difficult to handle because 29* An vero* he writes, ” legitime consecutione inde colligatur vel existentia primae materiae, prout haec intelligitur in doctrina scholastica, praesertim D. Thomae, vel sententia eiusdem Aquinatis de unitate formae substantiate in eodem corpore, complures quidem rationali discursu id deducunt, sed minitne did potest quasi ab Ecclesia definitum, nec oppositum censuram aliquant theologicam meretur, quamdiu Ecclesiae iudicio res ulterius determinata non fuerit. Quare prudentiae limites excederet ac temeritatis merito argueretur is, qui in rebus eiusmodi propriam sententiam sic propugnaret, ut ceteros contra sentientes quasi violatae religionis vel sublestae fidei viros traduceret.” Disp. Metaphys. Spec, Vol. I, ed. P» 395 » Aug. Taurin. 1893. 27 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. Ill, ed. 3a, 66, Friburgi 1908. 28 For the text of this document see Schiflini, /. c. ISO DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY of its delicacy. Hence it must not be insisted upon too strongly, lest the dogma itself be involved in difficulties insoluble to any but the most subtle minds specially trained for this purpose.” 29 Readings: — Thumann, Bestandteile des Menschen und ihr Verhaltnis zueinander, Bamberg 1846. — Liberatore, Del Composto Umano, 2 vols., Roma 1858. — Morgott, Geist und Natur im Menschen nach der Lehre des hi. Thomas, Eichstatt i860. — Soffner, Dogmat. Begriindung der kirchlichen Lehre von den Bestandteilen des Menschen, Ratisbon 1861. — Vraetz, Spekulative Begriindung der Lehre der kath. Kirche iiber das Wesen der menschlichen Seele, Koln 1865. — *Katschthaler, Zwei Thesen fur das allgemeine Konzil, 2. AbteiL, Ratisbon 1870. — v. Herding, Materie und Form und Begriff der Seele bet Aristoteles, Bonn 1871. — *Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis in DeHniendo Dogmate Unionis Animae Humanae cum Cor pore, Romae 1878. — Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 295-296, Mainz 1887. — E. Rolfes, Die substantiale Form und der Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1896. — T. Pesch, S. J., Seele und Leib als zwei Bestandteile der einen Menschensubstanz gemass der Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin, Fulda 1893. — W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, London 1899. — M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, pp. 545 sqq., 6th ed., London 1906. — J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: A Treatise on the Human Soul, New York 1898. 20 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. i53» Freiburg 1878. On the whole question cfr. Botalla, La Lettre de M. Czacki et le Thomisme, Paris 1878; Palmieri, De Deo Creante, pp. 769 sqq., Romae 1878; Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis, Romae 1878. On the life and writings of Olivi the student may profitably consult the Archiv fur Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, II, 377 sqq., Ill, 409 sqq., Freiburg 188687, and L. Oliger’s article, ” Olivi, Pierre Jean,” in Vol. XI of the Catholic Encyclopedia THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 151
Article 3: The Immortality of the Human Soul
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL i. and Various Heresies. — There is a threefold immortality: the essential immortality of God, the natural immortality of the soul, and the supernatural immortality of the body. It is an article of faith that the human soul is immortal. That this immortality is natural, i. e., founded on an exigency of human nature, may be said to be Catholic teaching. There are three revealed truths which the Church declares to be demonstrable by philosophical arguments. They are: (1) The existence of God, (2) the spirituality of the soul, and (3) free-will.1 The dogma of the soul’s immortality is based on its simplicity and spirituality. Whether this truth is philosophically demonstrable or not is a question that the Church has left open out of consideration for the Scotists. In every age there have been men who denied the immortality of the soul; these the Church has always treated as heretics. a) We have it on the authority of Eusebius2 and St. Augustine8 that, as early as the third century, there existed in Arabia a sect called Hypnopsychites,4 who held that the soul slept, i. e. temporarily ceased to exist 1 Deer. Congr. S. Indicts 1855: Knowability, Essence, and Attri” Ratio cinatio Dei existentiam, ani- butes, pp. 30 sqq. mae spiritualitatem, hominis liber- 2 Hist. Eccles., VI, 37. tat em cum certitudine probare po- 3 De Haeres., 83. test.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Cod: His 4 From Cirvos faxy* soul-sleep.
after death, until the resurrection of the flesh. Nicephorus Callistus5 relates how at an Arabian Council held in 247, Origen combated this heresy with such convincing eloquence that all who had espoused it returned to the pale of the Church. The theory of a ” soul-sleep ” does not directly contravene the dogma of immortality, especially if it confines itself to the assertion that the soul survives after a fashion in a dreamy, semi-conscious state. This attenuated Hypnopsychism was combated by Tertullian in his treatise De Anima. He raises the question: * What will happen during the time that we are in the nether world? Shall we sleep?* and answers it as follows: * The soul never sleeps, not even in this lif e.* 6 Another, still more radical sect is mentioned by St. John Damascene. Its adherents were called ©^ro^ma, because they believed that the souls of men, like those of brutes, cease to exist at death. b) The question of the immortality of the human soul entered upon a new phase when, towards the close of the fifteenth century, paganizing humanists of the stamp of Pietro Pomponazzi alleged that the soul is by nature necessarily mortal. Abul Ibn Roschd, commonly called Averroes, denied that there are individual rational souls. There is, he said, one universal impersonal and objective over-soul (intellectus universalis), which, by illuminating the inferior souls of individuals, enables mankind to par5 Hist,, V, 23, was advocated by Aphraates, A. D. oDe Anima, c. 58. Among the 336. Syrians the theory of the soul-sleep ticipate perennially in the great eternal truths. “This doctrine involves the extinction of the individual consciousness and the impersonality of life after death: human individuals die, but humanity is immortal in the eternity of the objective, universal intelligence.” 7 Against this heresy the Fifth Council of the Lateran, under Pope Leo X (A. D. 1512), defined: “Cum … diebus nostris … (nonnulli ausi sint dicere) de natura … animae rationalis, quod mortalis sit aut unica in cunctis hominibus, … sacro approbate Concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes, animam intellectivam mortalem esse aut unicam in cunctis hominibus — As … in our days (some have dared to assert) concerning the nature of the rational soul, that it is mortal, or that there is but one soul in all men, … with the approval of the sacred Council we condemn and reprobate all who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal or is but one in all men.” 8 The decree proceeds as follows: “Cum ilia [scil. anima intellectiva] non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in generali… . Viennensi Concilio … continetur; 9 verum et immortalis, et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine 7 De Wulf-Coffey, History of in Denzinger-Bannwart’s EnchiriMedieval Philosophy, pp. 233 sqQ«> dion, n. 738. London 1909. 9 See supra, pp. 142 sq. 8 Constit. ” Apost, regim.,” quoted 11 singulariter [i. e., individuals er] multiplicabilis et multiplicata et multiplicanda sit/’ An analysis of this dogmatic definition, and of the reasoning by which it is supported, gives us the following points of view: (1) This definition condemns two distinct heresies: (a) That the spiritual soul is mortal, and (b) that there exists but one universal soul in all men. Consequently, the contradictory proposition, that the spiritual soul is immortal and individual, is an article of faith. (2) The individuality of the soul is a necessary postulate of personal immortality, and is therefore specially emphasized, first by reference to the dogmatic definition of Vienne concerning the forma corporis, and again by reference to the individual origin of each human soul in the process of generation. (3) By the immortality of the soul Leo X and the Fifth Council of the Lateran understand that physical indestructibility (incorruptibilitas) which flows as a logical corollary from its nature as a spiritual substance. For this reason the dogmatic definition quoted above begins with the statement that the condemned errors concern the ” nature of the rational soul ” (natura animae rationalis). Unlike the bodily immortality of our first parents in Paradise, the immortality of the soul therefore is not a pure grace. The above-quoted definition is the most important and the clearest pronouncement ever made by the Church on the subject of the natural immortality of the soul. c) In modern times Materialism and emanatistic deny the natural immortality of the soul as well as its spirituality and individuality. Materialism asserts that nothing is immortal except force and matter,10 10 Buchner. while ascribes immortality solely to the impersonal Absolute, of which it holds each individual man to be merely a part. The Vatican Council contented itself with condemning Materialism and in globo and re-affirrriing the spirituality of the soul, which forms the philosophical basis of its natural immortality.11 2. from Revelation. — The demonstration of the immortality of the soul properly belongs to Eschatology. However, as this doctrine forms so important and fundamental a part of our faith, we cannot pass it over in the present treatise. a) Most non-Catholics hold that the Old Testament Jews did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and that this doctrine is the result of a slow and laborious evolution. We admit that the idea of temporal reward and punishment in the present life had a far stronger attraction for the Jews than retribution in the life beyond. Yet it is entirely wrong to say, as so many Rationalist critics do, that the Old Testament contains no trace of belief in the immortality of the soul. To begin with the Protoevangelium or prophecy of Paradise, — its promise 11 Cone. Vatican., Sess. Ill, cap. 1: ” Ac deinde [condtdit Deus] human am [creaturam] quasi comtnunem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam — And afterwards [God created] the human [creature], as partaking, in a sense, of both, consisting of spirit and body.” Cfr. Cone. IV. Lateran. 1215, quoted supra, p. 27. of redemption through the seed of the Woman who was to crush the head of the ancient Serpent, would be utterly meaningless if the souls of men ceased to exist after death. The Patriarchs looked upon this present life as a pilgrimage 12 and spoke of death as “going to the fathers.” 18 By clearly distinguishing between “going to the fathers,” or “being gathered to their people,” and burial in a common sepulchre,14 Moses indirectly asserted the survival of the soul in the world beyond. Such phrases as: “I will go down to sheol” 15 and “You will bring down my gray hairs with sorrow unto sheol,” 16 do not refer to the grave, but to the “nether world” (4V) considered as the abode of departed souls. In confirmation of His teaching on the resurrection of the flesh, Jesus, arguing with the Sadducees, quotes Exod. Ill, 6: “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob,” and adds by way of explanation: “He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.” 17 Personal immortality could not be more plainly taught than in this exclamation of the pious Job: 18 “I shall see my God, whom I 12 Gen. XLVII, 9; cfr. Heb. XI, 13 sqq. is Gen. XV, is; XXV, 8; XXXV, 29; XLIX, 12. 14 Gen. XXV, 8 sq.; XXXV, 29; XLIX, 32, etc is Gen. XXXVII, 35. ie Gen. XLIV, 29; cfr. also Gen. XLII, 38. uMatth. XXII, 32. 18 Job XIX, 26 sq. myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another.” The so-called Sapiential Books of the Old Testament are especially rich in proofs for the immortality of the soul. Cf r. Wisd. Ill, 2 sqq.: “Visi sunt [iusti] oculis insipientium mori, … Mi autem sunt in pace, … spes illorum immortalitate plena est — In the sight of the unwise they [the souls of the just] seemed to die, … but they are in peace… . Their hope is full of immortality.” Wisd. IV, 7: “Iustus si morte praeoccupatus fuerit, in refrigerio erit — The just man, if he be prevented with death, shall be in rest.” The ghost of Samuel said to Saul: “Why hast thou disturbed my rest, that I should be brought up?“19 These and similar texts represent immortality as a natural endowment of the soul and not as a gratuitous gift of grace. This follows from the fact, recorded in Gen. I, 26, that the spiritual soul of man was created to the likeness of God. The soul is an image God, not because it is the principle of vegetative and sensitive life (which is perishable), but because, being an imperishable, indestructible spirit, it resembles the infinite and immortal spirit of Yahweh. 19 1 Kings XXVIII, is. It has been asserted that Ecclesiastes III, 19 is incompatible with the doctrine of immortality, because it puts the death of man on the same plane with the extinction of the brute beast: ” Unus interitus est hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio — The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal.” But the context clearly shows that the Sacred Writer does not mean by this comparison to deny the immortality of the human soul. His purpose is to emphasize the mortality of the body, and to remind man that he who once aspired to equality with God was in punishment for his presumption reduced to the level of perishable beasts.20 Nor is this train of thought disturbed by the sceptical question: ” Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursutn, et si spiritus iumentorum descendat deorsum? — Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend downward?“21 For a little later Ecclesiastes himself insists on the immortality of the soul: ” Revert atur pulvis in t err am suam, unde erat; et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit ilium — The dust return into its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, who gave it.” 22 Assuredly it will not do to interpret Eccles. Ill, 21 as implying denial or doubt of a truth so clearly taught in Eccles. XII, 7. How, then, are we to understand this difficult text? Exegetes have suggested different interpretations. Some think that the Sacred Writer wished to adapt himself to the mind of the average person, who can perceive no essential difference between the symptoms of agony in man and beast. Gietmann 23 holds that the hagiographer simply desired to 20 Gen. Ill, 22. 23 Comment, in Eccles, et Cant, 21 Eccles. Ill, 21. Canticor., pp. 172 sqq., Paris 1890. 22 Eccles. XII, 7.
intimate the uncertainty of man’s fate in the world beyond, because three verses farther up he speaks of the judgment of God, and no man knows, before that judgment has been pronounced, whether he will enjoy everlasting bliss or be condemned to suffer eternal punishment in hell. Thus interpreted the text furnishes a new proof for the doctrine of immortality. Other exegetes, among them Comely,24 think Eccles. Ill, 21 is meant to censure the carelessness of men in regard to their future destiny. In this hypothesis the question would mean: ” Who payeth the slightest attention to whether the spirit of man tends upward and the spirit of the beast downward?” It is quite obvious that the Jews before Christ could not have had such well-defined ideas about the other world as we Christians have, who know that we are destined to enjoy the beatific vision in Heaven. This fact sufficiently accounts for their gloomy conception of sheol or the nether world. The New Testament teaching on immortality is so explicit that not even the Rationalists venture to dispute it. Hence it will be sufficient for our purpose to cite the Saviour’s famous dictum: “Nolite timer e eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere, sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam — Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell.” 25 24 Introd. in Utriusque Test. Libr. 25 Matth. X, 28. For the teachSacros, Vol. II, pp. 179 sqq., Paris ing of St. Paul see 1 Cor. XV, 1 1887. sqq.; Heb. XI, 13 sqq. A more i6o DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY b) Since the immortality of the soul is the very foundation stone of ethics and of the entire supernatural order of salvation, it goes without saying that this truth was unanimously taught, philosophically investigated, and scientifically developed by the Fathers. The unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus professes: * Immortalis anima habitat in corpore mortali — The immortal soul dwells in a mortal body.* 26 St. Irenaeus gives this philosophical reason for the immortality of the soul: ” Incompositus est enim et simplex spiritus, qui resolvi non potest — For the spirit [soul] is incomposite and simple, and [therefore] cannot be resolved.”27 Tertullian,28 Gregory of Nyssa,29 and Ambrose80 express themselves in similar language. St. Augustine, as is well known, wrote a special treatise ” On the Immortality of the Soul.” Some ancient writers (e. g., the author of the third pseudo-Clementine homily),81 are suspected of having held that God annihilates the souls of the wicked. Their utterances must be read with caution. Some of them are undoubtedly susceptible of an orthodox interpretation. St. Justin Martyr, for instance, in writing: * Neque immortalis anima dicenda est; nam si immortalis, etiam profecto ingenita [increata] est* 82 plainly did not mean to deny that the soul is endowed with natural immortality,38 but had in mind that essential detailed treatment of the subject 28 De Testim. An., c. 4 sq. in F. Schmid, Der Unsterblichkeits- 20 Or. Catech., c 8. und Auferstehungsglaube in der 30 De Bono Mortis, c. 9. Bibel, Brixen 1902. 31 Cfr. Migne, P.G., II, 115. 26 On the Letter to Diognetus 82 Dial. c. Try ph., c. 5. Migne, cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, P.G., VI, 486. pp. 68 sq. 33 Natural immortality implies 27 Adv. Haeres., V, 7, 1. that the nature of a being js §uch immortality which belongs to God alone. Of course the creature is immortal in quite a different sense than the Creator.84 Readings: — B. Schafer, Neue Untersuchungen iiber das Buck Kohelet, Freiburg 1870. — L. Schutz, Vernunftbeweis fiir die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Paderborn 1874. — J. Knabenbauer, Das Zeugnis des Menschengeschlechtes fiir die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Freiburg 1878. — E. Melzer, Die Unsterblichkeit auf Grund der Schopfungslehre, Neisse 1896. — Fell-Villing, The Immortality of the Human Soul Philosophically Explained, London 1906. — *W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 10th ed., Paderborn 1909. — Ph. Kneib, Die Beweise fiir die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus allgemeinen psychologischen Tatsachen, Freiburg 1903. — F. C. Kempson, The Future Life and Modern Difficulties, London 1907. — Piat, Destinee de VHomme, Paris 1898. — Elbe, Future Life in the Light of Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science, London 1907. — M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 525 sqq., London and New York 1906. — Idem, art. ” Immortality ” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. — For a comparatively complete bibliography of the subject cfr. Alger, The Destiny of the Soul. A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, 14th ed., New York 1889.
Article 4: Origin of the Soul
ORIGIN OF THE SOUL Unlike their progenitor, the children of Adam do not owe their existence to a creative act of God in the strict sense of the term. The race propagates itself by sexual generation in accordance with the divine as to have no inherent tendency to death, so that it will not die or cease to exist, unless God withdraws His conservation. Cfr. S. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, p. 334. 34 Cfr. 1 Tim. VI, 16: * Qui solus habet immortalitatem — Who only hath immortality.* For the philosophical arguments see St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., II, 79 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 152 sqq.). Cfr. Ph. Kneib, Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bewiesen ans dent hoheren Erkennen und Wollen, Wien 1900, command ” Increase and multiply.” The question arises — How does the individual human soul come into being? This problem is of interest alike to the philosopher and the theologian. Three different attempts have been made to solve it. The theory of Pre-existence holds that all souls exist prior to the creation of their respective bodies, in which they are enclosed as in a prison. Generationism (which in its crude form is called Traducianism) asserts that the souls of children, like their bodies, are produced by the parents. Creationism teaches that each human soul is created by God and immediately united with the material product of parental generation. Thesis I: The theory of Pre-existence, which asserts that the individual soul exists prior to its union with the body, is heretical. This proposition obviously embodies an article of faith. Proof. The soul may be conceived as preexisting either in a state of sin, for the atonement of which it is incarcerated in the body; 1 or as merely slumbering in a state of innocence or indifference.2 Both assumptions, more especially the first, are opposed to the express teaching of Revelation. a) A spirit incarcerated in a material body would be in a state of violent and unnatural compulsion. Hence the first of the aforesaid l This notion was derived from 2 This was the belief of the PrisFlato and held by Origen. cillianists and some other heretics. theories implicitly denies the substantial unity of human nature,8 in fact it degrades it by representing the union of body and soul as accidental, after the manner of demoniacal possession. Holy Scripture expressly teaches that man as he proceeded from the hand of God, like all other products of the creative act, was “good,” and that he became bad through sin.4 Hence it must be received as a revealed truth that the soul of Adam at the moment when his body was formed, was perfectly pure and sinless, and that it was breathed into the material body simultaneously with its creation. Consequently the soul cannot have been affected by some previous catastrophe. The same is true of Adam’s progeny. St. Paul, in speaking of Esau and Jacob, says: ” Cum nondum nati fuissent aut aliquid boni egissent aut mali, … non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est ei: quia maior serviet minori — When the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, … not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her [Rebecca]: The elder shall serve the younger.” 5 The Origenistic doctrine of Pre-existence was condemned by the Church at a very early date as incompatible with Revelation. A Council held in Constantinople, A. D. 543,® pronounced anathema against those who ” assert the fabulous pre-existence of 8 As defined by the Council of Vienne; v. supra, p. 142 sq. 4Cfr. Gen. I, 31; Rom. V, 12 sqq. 5 Rom. IX, 1 1 sq. • This Council must not be confounded with the Fifth General Council of Constantinople, A. D. 553; cfr. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, Vol. II, pp. 790 sqq., Freiburg 1875. souls, and the doctrine of the Apocatastasis, which logically flows therefrom.” Against the Priscillianists, who shared the error of Origen, the Council of Braga, A. D. 561, defined: “Si quis animas hutnanas dicit prius in coelesti habitatione peccasse et pro hoc in corpora humana in terram deiectas, sicut Priscillianus dicit, anathema sit — If any one shall say, as doth Priscillian, that the souls of men sinned in their celestial habitations, and in punishment therefor were cast into human bodies on earth, let him be anathema.” 7 b) The milder form of this heresy, which asserts that the souls of men pre-existed in a state of moral innocence, is likewise repugnant to Catholic dogma. Nemesius 8 supported it by the threadbare argument that God rested after the sixth day, and now no longer creates souls out of nothing. But, as St. Augustine pointed out, “these opinions, which attribute to the human soul a meritorious life and condition previous to its union with the flesh, have already been condemned by the Catholic Church, not only in the case of some ancient heretics, … but also more recently in the instance of the Priscillianists.,, 9 7 See Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 236. On the doctrine of the iiroKariffTaais, cfr. P. Batiffol in the Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v.; On Origen’s teaching on this point, see J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, Engl, tr., Vol. I, pp. 280 sq., St. Louis 19 10. 8 De Nat. Horn., c. 2. This popular work of Nemesius, who was Bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, about the end of the fourth century, may be considered as the first complete and systematic treatise on anthropology. It was translated into English (The Nature of Man) by George Wither, London 1636. Cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 98; Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 223. *De Anima et eius Origine, I, 7: ” Haec dogmata, quibus PRE-EXISTENTISM Pope Leo the Great, in his dogmatic Epistle to Turribius, Bishop of Astorga, branded the preexistence theory in all its forms as heretical. “Decirno autem capitulo referuntur [Priscillianistae] asserere, animas quae humanis corporibus inseruntur, fuisse sine corpore et in coelesti habitatione peccasse… . Quam impietatis fabulam ex multorum sibi erroribus contexuerunt; sed omnes eos catholica fides a corpore suae unitatis abscidit, constanter praedicans atque veraciter, quod animae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur corporibus y non fuere — In the tenth chapter the Priscillianists are reported as asserting, that the souls which are planted in human bodies were without a body and sinned in their celestial habitation… . This impious fable they have made up from the errors of many; but all of these the Catholic faith has cut off from the body of its unity, constantly and truthfully proclaiming that the human souls had no existence prior to the time when they were breathed into their respective bodies.” This manifestly includes the modern form of Pre-existentism taught by Kant and Schelling. It is scarcely necessary to add that Metempsychosis, socalled, or the theory of the transmigration of souls, which may be classified as an offshoot of the theory putatur anitna ante carnem habuisse ali quern s tat urn bonum et meritum bonum, si forte nescis, in antiquis haereticis et recentius in Priscillianistis iam catholica damnavit Ecclesia.” 166 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY of Pre-existence,10 is equally repugnant to right reason and Revelation. The same may be said of the so-called Involution theory, according to which the souls of all men were implicitly contained in the soul of Adam, which is successively split up, as it were, and divided among his descendants.11 Thesis II: Generationism, both in its crude and in its refined form, must be unconditionally rejected. This proposition is theologically certain. Proof, a) Generationism in its crude form is called Traducianism (from tradux, cutting, slip). Traducianism holds that the soul is produced immediately from the male sperm {semen corporate), and that children are as it were “cuttings” or “slips” detached from the souls of their parents. This opinion was defended in the East by Apollinaris, and in the West, apparently, by Tertullian.12 Tertullian appears to teach that the germ of a new soul disengages itself from the souls of the begetting parents, as a ” slip from the stem of Adam.” 18 But as 10 The Transmigration theory seems to be almost co-eval with history. There are traces of it among the early Egyptians, and it was and is almost universal among the Hindus. To a large extent it swayed the philosophies of Greece in the days of Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus. Cfr. J. Gibbons, Theories of the Transmigration of Souls, London 1907; J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 2nd ed„ pp. 276 sqq., New York 1904; Dowd, The Soul, its Powers, Migrations, and Transmigrations, San Francisco 1888. 11 This theory is sometimes called Panspermy. 12 We say apparently, because the peculiar sense in which Tertullian uses the word ” body ” makes it difficult to arrive at a just evaluation of his teaching. 13 Cfr. De Anima, c. 19: ” Anima velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta an incorporeal soul cannot possibly proceed from a corporeal principle, this theory degrades man to the level of the beast. The brute soul, being entirely merged in matter, can be produced by generation out of the potency of matter; but the soul of man, which is a simple spiritual substance, does not produce material germs from which a new spiritual soul could sprout. Tertullian tries to improve his case by distinguishing between humor and color seminis, deriving the soul from the former and the body from the latter. But the very suggestion that flesh might possibly beget spirit is essentially materialistic. No wonder Tertullian has been frequently reckoned among the Materialists.14 Lactantius’s refutation of Traducianism still retains its full force: ” Illud quoque venire in quaestionem potest, utrumne anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Sed ego in eo iure ab ancipiti vindico: … corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis animus non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili [i. e. spirituali] nihil potest descenders At que serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subiacet, … ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo Patre — The question may also arise, Is the soul engendered by the father, or by the mother, or by both? I think that it is engendered by neither. … A body may be produced from a body, since something is contributed from both; but a soul cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can depart from a thin and intangible [i. e., spiritual] substance. Therefore the manner of the production of et genitalibus foeminae foveis cum 14 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His omni sua paratura pullulabit tarn Knowability, Essence and Attriintellectu quam sensu.” butes, p. 294.
souls belongs to God alone… . From this it is evident that souls are not given by parents, but by one and the same God, the Father of all.” 16 The attitude of the Church is sufficiently indicated by a decision of Pope Benedict XII in the matter of reunion (A. D. 1342). When the Armenians were asked to condemn the proposition that ” the human soul is propagated from father to son, as body is propagated by body, or one angel by another,” 16 their bishops assured the Pope that ” this error, that the soul of man is propagated from the soul of the father, as body is propagated from body, … was always proscribed in the Armenian Church, and shall be accursed.” 17 b) Generationism in its refined form is far less repugnant to Catholic teaching than the crude Traducianism of which we have been speaking, though the two systems do not seem to differ much in principle. The chief distinction is that refined Generationism recognizes the spirituality of the soul by postulating a kind of spiritual semen (semen spirituale), which, however, from the purely philosophical point of view, is an impossible chimera. The unequivocal bias of some Patristic writers 18 in favor of Generationism has done much to weaken the ecclesi15 De Opif. Dei ad Demetr., c. 19. 16 ” Quod anima humana filii propagatur ab anima patris sui, sicut corpus a corpore et angelus etiam unus ab alio.’* Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 533; cfr. Raynald., Annal. Eccles. ad a. 1341, n. 50. 17 ” Hie error, quod anima hominis propagetur ab anima patris sui, sicut corpus a corpore … semper fuit excommunicato in ecclesia Armeniorum, et maledictus sit.” (Martene, Vet. Monum., t. VII, p. 319.) 18 Especially Theodore Abucara (Opusc. 35), Macarius (Horn. 30, n. 1), and Gregory Nyssen {De Opif. Horn., c. 29). GENERATIONISM 169 astical tradition and to retard the complete triumph of Creationism, which is after all the only tenable system. For eight full centuries (from the time of St. Augustine to Peter Lombard) the question of the origin ot the human soul was treated with much hesitation and uncertainty. It remained for St. Thomas Aquinas to pave the way for a general adoption of Creationism. Generationism had obtained currency by the high authority of St. Augustine, whose sole reason for hesitating to place himself squarely on Creationist ground was that this system had been ostentatiously espoused by the Pelagians in attacking the doctrine of original sin. The Pelagians argued as follows: Nothing unclean can come from the hand of God; therefore the souls of children, created by Him directly out of nothing, cannot be tainted with original sin. Unable to solve this subtle objection, Augustine inclined to the theory that the souls of children are not immediately created by God, but engendered by their parents. He believed in the possibility of a semen incorporeum, from which, he says, the soul in a manner incomprehensible to us, originates in the act of parental generation,- — which accounts for the transmission of original sin.19 But Augustine was no decided adherent of the Generationist theory. Indeed he never quite overcame his doubts as to its correctness. On more than one occasion he humbly confessed his ignorance of the true solution of the problem.20 In his epistolary correspondence 10 E p. ad Optat., 190: Incorporeum semen animae sua quadam occulta et invisibili via seorsum a patre currens in matrem» 12 20 * Libentius disco quam dicot ne and earn docere, quod nescio,* he says in his work Contr. Iulian., V, 4. with St. Jerome, who was a determined Creationist, he frankly declares that he would like to espouse Creationism, if he could only make sure that it was compatible with the dogma of original sin.21 It follows that St. Augustine cannot be quoted as a traditional witness either for or against Creationism. c) The authority of this great Doctor was sufficient to keep his doubts and misgivings alive for many centuries.22 The Venerable Moneta28 and St. Thomas Aquinas finally broke the spell. St. Thomas did not hesitate to condemn Generationism as “heretical.”24 His immediate predecessors (e. g., Peter Lombard25 and Albert the Great26), though decided champions of Creationism, had not dared to express themselves quite so vigorously. It was no doubt premature on the part of St. Thomas to brand Generationism as a heresy; yet no one can fail to perceive that even in its mildest form this theory is incompatible with the dogma of the simplicity and spirituality of the soul.27 21 ” Unde ilia de novarum anytnarum creatione sententia, si hanc fidem fundatissimam [peccati originalis] non oppugnat, sit et mea; si oppugnat, non sit tua… . Ecce volo, ut ilia sententia etiam mea sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.” Ep. 166, 25, ad S. Hieron. 22 Cfr. the writings of his pupil Fulgentius (De Verit. Praedest. et Grat., Ill, 1 8) and those of St. Gregory the Great (Ep. 53 ad Secundin.). 23 In his Sutnma contra Catharos et Waldenses, II, 4. On Moneta Cremonensis, a Dominican writer of the thirteenth century (-f- 1235), cfr. Hurter, Notnenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, t. II, 2nd. ed., col. 267 sq., Oeniponte 1906. 24 Cfr. S. Thorn., 5. Theol., xa, qu. xi8, art. 2: * Haereticum est dicere, quod anitna intellectiva traducatur cum semine.* 25 Lib. Sent., II, dist. 17, qu. 3. 26 S. Theol., p. 2, qu. 72, memb. 3. 27 Cfr. S. Thorn., Contr. Gent., II, 86: ” Ridiculum est dicere aliquant intellectualem substantiam vel per divisionem corporis dividi vel etiam ab aliqua virtute corporis produci. Sed anima humana est quaedam intellectualis substantia… . Non igitur potest diet, quod dividatur per divisionem seminis neque quod producatur in esse a virtute activa, quae est in semine; et sic nullo modo per seminis traduction nem anima humana incipit esse — It is ridiculous to say that any subsistent intelligence is either divided d) Creationism held full sway in the theological schools of the Middle Ages, but in modern times timorous attempts have been made to revive the apparently defunct system of Generationism. Hermes, Klee, and Oischinger endeavored to restore it at least to the rank of a probable opinion. But can a proposition that involves a contradiction in terms be defended as probable? Frohschammer, who remodeled the ancient theory by raising the act of parental generation to the dignity of a secondary creation, barely managed to escape one contradiction only to fall into another, namely, that God’s creative power is communicable to creatures.28 Rosmini29 held that the Creator transforms the sensitive soul, which the child receives by generation from his parents, into an intellective soul by permitting it to catch a glimpse of the ” idea of being.” This is an utterly fantastic theory. If it were true, all brute souls could by means of this simple expedient be transformed into human souls. Generationism can no longer be upheld; its fate is sealed for good. Thesis III: The origin of the human soul can be explained only by an immediate act of creation. This proposition is “theologically certain.” Proof, a) It is difficult to draw a cogent proof for Creationism from Sacred Scripture, because Sacred Scripture does not tell us whether the creation of the soul by division of the body or produced by any corporeal power. But the soul is a subsistent intelligence. Therefore it can neither be divided by the separation of the semen from the body, nor produced by any active power in the same. And thus the division of the semen can in no wise be the cause of the soul commencing to be.” (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 164.) 28 Supra, pp. 54 sqq. 20 Prop, a Leone XIII. damn., 20. is an immediate (creatio ex nihilo) or only a mediate act (concursus) of God. There are, however, certain Biblical texts which seem to favor the Creationist view. Thus St. Jerome comments on Eccles. XII, 7 as follows: ” Ex quo satis ridendi sunt, qui putant, anitnas cum corporibus seri et non a Deo, sed a corporum parentibus generari. Cum enim caro revertatur in terram et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit Ulum, manifestum est, Deum pattern esse animarum, non homines — Hence those are surely to be laughed at who believe that the souls of men are begotten with their bodies, and are generated not by God but by the parents of their bodies. For since the flesh reverts to dust and the spirit returns to God, who has given it, manifestly the Father of souls is God, not men.” According to 2 Mach. VII, 22 sq. the mother of the seven brethren said to them: ” Neque enim ego spiritum et animam donavi vobis, et vitam et singulorum membra non ego ipsa compegi, sed enim mundi Creator — I neither gave you breath, nor soul, nor life, neither did I frame the limbs of every one of you, but the Creator of the world.” St. Paul calls attention to the sharp antithesis between the ” Father of spirits ” and ” the fathers of the flesh.” ” Patres quidem carnis nostrae,” he says (Heb. XII, 9) /’ eruditiores ha~ buimus et reverebamur eos; non multo magis obtemperabimus Patri spirituum et vivemus? — We have had fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced them: shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, and live? ” To judge from this text, the Apostle favored the opinion that the souls of men are created immediately by God.80 80 Cf r. Estius* commentary on this text. b) After what has been said above the readef will not be astonished to learn that the argument from Tradition is fraught with peculiar difficulties. Not as if Creationism had at any time in the Church’s history lacked numerous and determined defenders. St. Jerome’s statement: “The majority of western Christians hold that soul is born from soul in the same manner as body is born from body/’ 31 is no doubt exaggerated, for we know that Generationism in its pronounced form really had but one, or at most two champions in the West, viz.: Tertullian, and later, perhaps, Rufinus. Nor were conditions much different in the East.82 But the fact that this important and all but self-evident truth was for eight centuries obscured by doubt and contradiction, is sufficient to show that Creationism cannot be regarded as a dogma in the strict sense of the word. c) In view of these facts Cardinal Norisius insisted against Bellarmine,33 that the lack of a true ecclesiastical Tradition in support of the Creationist system leaves modern theologians free to adopt the doubting attitude of St. Augustine. ” Evanescit” he says, * ecclesiastica traditio, ex qua creatio animarum deductturf 84 What are we to think of this assertion ? 81 Ep., 126: Maximum partem Occidentalium autumare, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima.’ 82 Kleutgen has collected numerous Patristic texts from writers of both the East and the West, and published them in the Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, Innsbruck 1883, pp. 196 sqq. 33 De Amiss. Grat., IV, n. 84 V indie. August., c. 4, § 3. A careful study of the facts shows that Creationism was always implicitly contained in the Church’s belief, and immediately upon its revival assumed all the characteristics of a real and true Tradition, which it had in fact already possessed before the time of St. Augustine. From A. D. 400 to A. D. 1200 Creationism had as many determined champions throughout the world as Generationism had staunch opponents. These critical centuries were not a period of positive, much less of dogmatic affirmation, but of hesitancy and problematic assumption. If we enquire into the deeper causes of the prevailing doubts, we find that they were based not upon the lack of an Apostolic Tradition, but on the apparent impossibility of reconciling the transmission of original sin with the absolute purity of the divine act of Creation. As soon as this difficulty had been cleared away by the Schoolmen, and theologians began to realize the far-reaching implications of the dogma of the spirituality of the soul, the traditional consensus revived with all the marks of a true ecclesiastical Tradition. d) We may point to certain ecclesiastical decisions as so many landmarks in the history of Creationism. In his dogmatic Epistle Pope Leo the Great (+461) speaks of the breathing of souls into their bodies: * Animae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur corporibus, non fuerunt* 85 Considering that the Mosaic narrative likewise describes the infusion of Adam’s soul into his body as ” itispirare spiraculum vitae,” 86 we cannot escape the conclusion that Leo the Great em85 Cfr. supra, p. 165. 86 Gen. II, 7. ployed spirare not as synonymous with generare, but in the sense of a creatio ex nihilo. Strangely enough, the famous dogmatic Epistle of Pope Anastasius II to the Bishops of Gaul, discovered about forty years ago by Fr. Maassen in a seventh-century codex, now preserved at Darmstadt, has hitherto almost entirely escaped the notice of Catholic theologians. Anastasius (496-498) upholds Creationism and condemns Generationism (in its crude form) as a “nova haeresis!’ Z1 Basing his judgment on reports received from the Bishop of Aries regarding the propaganda carried on by certain champions of Generationism, who seem to have shared Tertullian’s views on the origin of the human soul, the Pope sharply inveighs “contra haeresim, … quod humano generi parentes, ut ex materiali faece tradunt corpora, ita etiam vitalis animae spiritum tribuant.” He exhorts the mistaken champions of this theory to accept the ” sound doctrine ” of Creationism: ” Sanae igitur doctrinae acquiescant, quod ille indat anitnas, qui vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam sint* In the course of his instruction Anastasius solemnly declares: Ego absens corpore, spiritu vero praesens, vobiscum ita redargui volo, qui in novam haeresim prorupisse dicuntur, ut a parentibus anitnas tradi generi humano adserant, quernadmodum ex faece materiali corpus infunditur.” The only thing the parents transmit, besides the body, is original sin: “Quod ab illis [scil. parentibus] nihil aliud potest tradi quam … culpa poenaque peccati, quam per traducem secuta progenies evidenter ostendit, ut pravi homines distortique nascantur” Recalling Is. LVII, 16: ” Nonne omnem -datum ego feci? ” the Pope asks with a show of astonishment: ” Quomodo isti 87 The text of his letter will be Pontif. Genuinae, t. I, pp. 634 sqq., found in A. Thiel, Epist. Romanor. Brunsbergae 1868. novi haeretici a parentibus dicunt factum et non a Deo, sicut ipse testatur? Aut sibi volunt potius credi quant Deo omnipotenti? ” He proceeds to point out other Scriptural texts,88 which the Bishops would find effective against the new heresy, and closes his letter with an ardent appeal for the purity of Catholic doctrine: ” Nos veto inter multas diversasque occupationes haec interim per indicem titulum significasse sufHciat, ut vos velut conministri mei vocem sequentes meam in hoc pugnare debeatis, ne quid catholicae ecclesiae … foeditas ulla nascatur” The solemn tenor of this epistle might lead one to regard it as an infallible ex cathedra pronouncement. But the concluding phrase plainly idicates that the Pontiff merely wished to give instruction, not to decide the controversy. The fact that the letter soon fell into desuetude is sufficient evidence that Creationism was not generally received as an article of faith at the close of the fifth century. It was not even so regarded in the fourteenth century, when Pope Benedict XII (A. D. 1342) required the Armenians to abjure Generationism.89 Creationism is also taught, at least by implication, in Leo X’s dogmatic Bull ” Apostolici regiminis,” issued on the occasion of the Fifth Lateran Council, A. D. 1512. This Pope says among other things: ” Anima intellectiva … immor talis et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata et multiplicanda” This can only mean that each rational soul is ” infused * into, i. e. created in, its own body. For the soul is either * infused ” by God or by 88 Gen. IV, 25; Ex. IV, n. and importance of Pope Benedict’s 80 Fr. Kleutgen, S. J., was the demand. (Zeitschrift fiir kath. Thefirst in 1883 to point out the scope ologie, 1883). CREATIONISM 177 the parents: — if by God, ” infusion ” is equivalent to creation; if by the parents, ” infusion ” either means creation out of nothing, or generation. It cannot mean creation out of nothing, because God alone has power to create. Nor can it mean generation, because the Pope does not say: anima infunditur Miis, but: infunditur corporibus, a phrase which indicates that the act of infusion is not performed by the parents, and therefore differs from the act of sexual generation. It should be noted that in the Bull under consideration Leo X employs the theological terminology of his time. It was quite usual at that period to say: Ammae hominum infundendo creantur et creando infunduntur0 Lastly, the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary rests squarely upon Creationism. Both the Apostolic Constitution of Alexander VII known as ” Sollicitudo ” and Pius IX’s dogmatic Bull ” Ineffabilem” expressly declare that “The soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary was from the first moment of its creation and infusion into the body … free from all taint of original sin.” Creationism, therefore, is not merely the doctrine of some particular school, but a theologically certain truth, which no Catholic can deny without temerity.41 There remains the subordinate question: When is the soul created or infused into the body ? The medieval theologians generally followed the physiological teaching of Aristotle, who held that the human embryo during 40 Cfr. Albert. Magnus, Comment, ments for this thesis, and the soluin Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist, tion of various objections raised 17; O. Zehetbauer, Animae Hu- against it, we may refer the student manae Infundendo Creantur et to Oswald, Schopfungslehre, pp. 221 Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii sqq., Paderborn 1885; G. B. Tepe, 1893. Instit. TheoL, Vol. II, pp. 486 sqq., 41 For the philosophical argu- Paris 1895. the early history of its existence passes through a series of transitional stages in which it is successively informed by the vegetative, the sentient, and, finally, by the rational soul.42 To-day the opinion prevails that the rational soul is created and infused at the moment of conception.43 Readings: — Oswald, Schopfungslehre, 2nd ed., §§ 12-13, Paderborn 1893. — O. Zehetbauer, Animae Humanae Infundendo Creantur et Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii 1893. — Galassi, Sull’ Origine delV Anima Umana, Bologna 1888. — *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 151, Freiburg 1878. — C. Gutberlet, Der Kampf um die Seele, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Mainz 19x53. — M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 572 sqq., London and New York 1905. — J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy, The Soul, New York 1898. — St. George Mivart, Origin of Human Reason, London 1889. — D. Mercier, La Psychologie, Vol. II, Ch. 2, Louvain 1905. 42Cfr. S. Thorn., S. Theol., ia, qu. 118, art. 2, ad 2, and in elucidation thereof Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 657; Maher, Psychology, pp. 575 sq.; Harper, Metaphysics of the Schools, Vol. II. pp. 553 »qq. 43 Cfr. Jos. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, Vol. I, 2nd ed„ Rome 1906. On the doctrine of Lotze and Ladd cfr. Maher, Psychology, pp. 576 sqq.