The Biblical Names of God; The Essence of God in Its Relation to His Attributes

Part II: The Divine Essence

Having demonstrated the knowableness of God, we proceed to inquire into His Essence.

Our knowledge of the Divine Essence is gained from attributive notions. A more perfect mode of apprehension is impossible on account of the defectiveness of our cognitive faculties, which enable us to perceive God only in an abstractive and analogical manner. But His infinite perfection offers us a supereminent equivalent for an infinite number of separate perfections, which the human mind can grasp. While in the creature, existence, essence, and attributes are separate and distinct entities, in God they are all identical (Existence = Essence = Attributes). To define the Divine Essence scientifically, therefore, we must try to discover among God’s many attributes the one which is the root and principle of all the rest. This particular attribute is Aseity or Self-existence. As the names applied to God in Holy Scripture afford us valuable indications for determining the Divine Essence, we shall begin by studying the substantive names of God in the Bible.

Chapter I: The Biblical Names of God

Section 1: The “Seven Holy Names of God” in the Old Testament

1. Preliminary Observations. — We scarcely need to premise that in speaking of names, or nouns, a distinction lies between proper and common nouns (nomen proprium — nomen commune s. appellativum). Since God does not belong to any species, and since there are no other individuals like Him, He cannot strictly speaking be designated either by a proper or a common noun (hence the predicates ἀνώνυμος, ἄρρητος, ineffabilis). Consequently the names attributed to God in Holy Scripture are not to be taken as adequately expressing His essence or nature; they are merely imperfect, inadequate, analogical appellations.

Scheeben¹ has ingeniously divided the so-called “seven holy names” of God in the Old Testament into three classes, of which the first (containing three names) elucidates the relation of God ad extra, i.e., to man; while the third (comprising also three names) sets off the “three aspects of His intrinsic perfection.” In the center of both groups stands Yahweh, which is essentially a proper name, because it expresses the Divine Essence, and which is related to the other six names as a cause to its effects.

2. The Three Classes of Divine Names. — As we have already explained, the proper name of God, describing His Essence, is יהוה (Yahweh). The three aspects of His intrinsic perfection are denoted by שַׁדַּי (Schadai), the Strong, Mighty; עֶלְיוֹן (Elyon), the High, Sublime, the Most High; and קָדוֹשׁ (Kadosch), the Holy. God’s relation ad extra is characterized by אֵל (El), the Strong; אֱלֹהִים (Elohim, He who is worthy of veneration); and אֲדֹנָי (Adonai), Commander, Lord.

a) God Himself revealed to Moses the Tetragrammaton ineffabile (יהוה) as the proper name signifying His Divine Essence.² Owing to a misunderstanding of Lev. XXIV, 16: “Qui pronuntiaverit [= blasphemaverit] nomen Domini, morte moriatur — He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die,” the Jews did not dare to pronounce the “Four Letters” (τετραγράμματον), and in consequence it long remained uncertain whether the Tetragrammaton was to be pronounced “Jehovah” (a word still in use), or “Yihve,” or “Yehave,” or “Yahweh.” In the Jewish synagogues יהוה was always pronounced Adonai, according to the Rabbinical precept: “Dixit Deus: non legor, sed scribor. Scribor et legor Adonai.”³ This uncertainty as to the proper pronunciation of יהוה explains the interesting fact that the Tetragrammaton found its way even into Greek Bible codices, where it was changed by ignorant copyists into ΠΙΠΙ (= Pipi). To indicate that יהוה was always to be pronounced אֲדֹנָי (Adonai), it was written with the vowel signs of the latter word, thus: יְהֹוָה (chateph-patach being altered into shwa mobile). This gave rise — probably no earlier than the sixteenth century — to the wrong pronunciation “Jehova.” Today it seems pretty certain that the word must be written יַהְוֶה and pronounced Yahweh.

More important than the question of its grammatical form, is the meaning of the Tetragrammaton. Its root is undoubtedly הוה, an older form of היה, i.e., to be. Hence יהוה means: He Who Is. God Himself attached this meaning to the word when he replied to Moses who had asked Him for His name: “I am who am.”⁴ It is therefore God’s proper name, denoting His very essence, and can never, even catachrestically, be applied to other beings besides Himself, e.g., to false gods.⁵ Exegetes have often discussed the question, whether the Tetragrammaton was known to the antediluvian Patriarchs and to Abraham, or whether it was first revealed to Moses. In attempting to solve this problem, we must distinguish carefully between the word as a vocal sound, and its meaning. The pre-Mosaic origin of the word is probable: (1) from the archaic verbal root הוה, to be, from which was formed יהוה (the root is not היה, to be, which was in use in Moses’ time); (2) from the use of the Divine Name among the Patriarchs;⁶ (3) from the pre-Mosaic verbal compounds with יהוה (abbreviated יָהּ), like Abja, Achja, Jochabed, Morja, etc. The assumption of a prolepsis does not appear to be justified in view of the fact that the name occurs 150 times in Genesis and that Moses introduces himself to the Israelites as one sent by Yahweh.⁷ It is quite certain that the Tetragrammaton in its deeper meaning and full sense (as a nomen proprium) was first revealed to Moses. Cfr. Ex. VI, 3: “Ego יהוה et apparui Abraham et Isaac et Iacob ut אֵל שַׁדַּי, sed (quoad) nomen meum יהוה non notus fui illis.” This fact is well established and cannot be affected by Delitzsch’s theory⁸ that the name of God was familiar to the ancient Babylonians.

b) Among the names of the third class, which, as we have said, express the intrinsic (transcendental) perfection of God, שַׁדַּי (Schadai), usually enforced by the article הַשַּׁדַּי or אֵל שַׁדַּי, is the most frequent and also the most ancient.⁹ Derived from the etymon שָׁד, i.e., to be violent, employ force, it designates the intrinsic might or power of God, thus: the Allpowerful; Sept., παντοκράτωρ; Vulg., omnipotens (i.e., fortis). — The majesty and sublimity of God find expression in the name עֶלְיוֹן (from עָלָה = ascendit): the Most High; Sept., ὁ ὕψιστος; Vulg., altissimus. — The word קָדוֹשׁ, found chiefly in the Prophets, and among these especially in Isaias, means the Holy One, and denotes the sanctity and purity of the Divine Essence. These three words, although originally adjectives, have been developed into substantive appellations of the Deity and enjoy the prerogative of being applied exclusively to the one true God.

c) The same cannot be said of the first two names of the remaining group, which describe God in His relation to man. The first and most ancient of these, current among all Semitic nations, אֵל (from אוּל, to be strong), i.e., the Strong, the Mighty (Sept., ὁ ἰσχυρός, πρωτοκράτωρ), is sometimes per abusum applied also to pagan gods.¹⁰ When applied to the one true God, it is emphasized thus: הָאֵל (ὁ Θεός), or אֵל חַי (Deus vivus), or אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם (Deus coelorum), or אֱלֹהֵי הָאֱלֹהִים (Deus deorum). אֱלֹהִים occurs over 2500 times, and is probably related to אֵל. Its primary root is supposed to be אָלַה, to be strong; its derived root, אָלָה, to swear, to venerate, to fear. The fundamental meaning of the word, therefore, is power, inasmuch as it strikes fear, or challenges adoration.¹¹ Elohim is a majestic plural, or a veiled indication of the Most Holy Trinity, and by no means represents a rudiment of polytheism. For not only is the word almost invariably construed with the verbal singular, but we must remember that God Himself took special care to preserve Monotheism pure among the Jews. Elohim is quite frequently applied to the false gods of the Gentiles, and likewise to angels and kings, that is to say, to rational beings that reflect the power and adorableness of God.¹² In all such cases, however, אֱלֹהִים is always a true plural.¹³ To describe the true God, it is often combined with appositions such as יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת (Elohim Sabaoth = Dominus exercituum), or Elohim Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. Unlike יהוה, Elohim is consequently not a proper name of God, but rather a nomen appositivum, which sometimes even takes the place of a predicate, e.g., “Yahweh is the Elohim.” A further difference lies in this that Elohim is used preferably to designate the God of nature, while Yahwe more often describes God in His relation to the supernatural order of salvation. — The most significant and most important name of this group is the third, אֲדֹנָי (Adonai), from דִּין, to judge; hence: Judge, Lord (Dominus, ὁ κύριος). In spite of its plural form (= “my lords”; cfr. monsieur, monsignore) Adonai is always singular in meaning and is applied only to the one true God. It is closely related to יהוה, not only because it loans its vowels to that word, but also for the reason that it is to be considered as a quasi-proper name of God.¹⁴

Section 2: The Names Applied to God in the New Testament and in Profane Literature — The Symbolic Appellations

1. The New Testament adopted the nomenclature of the Old by translating the Hebrew names of God as literally as possible into Greek. It did not, however, succeed in adequately rendering the profundity of the Hebrew appellations with their wealth of meaning. We also note that New Testament usage in this regard is characterized by an almost slavish dependence on the Greek Septuagint.

On the whole Θεός (Vulg. Deus) corresponds to the Hebrew El and Elohim, while Yahwe (and also Adonai and Schadai) is generally translated by Κύριος (Vulg. Dominus). Hence it is not too much to say that from the point of view of the comparative science of languages the fact that Christ is constantly called ὁ Κύριος (Lord) is presumptive evidence in favor of His Divinity. On the other hand there comes to the foreground in the New Testament a new name of God, viz.: πατήρ, pater (Father), which is characteristic of the spirit of love and mercy exemplified in the Incarnation. Since, however, this name also occurs repeatedly in the Old Testament,¹⁵ there is no objective reason for accepting the Gnostic theory of a clean-cut opposition between the God of the Old Testament and the God of the New.

2. If we abstract from the old Hellenic ἰή (same as יָהּ, an abbreviation of יהוה), the Indo-Germanic languages have coined altogether different names for the Deity than the Semitic. The derivation of Θεός from θέω (run) or αἴθω (burn) or θεάσθαι (behold), which the Fathers of the Church adopted from Plato,¹⁶ and which was approved by the Schoolmen,¹⁷ is no longer considered probable, since there has been found in the Sanskrit root dyu (div), to shine, shed luster (applied to the firmament), a common verbal stem for all the divine names current among the Aryan nations.¹⁸ Max Müller refers to the discovery of the etymological equation (Sanskrit) Diaus-Pitar = (Greek) Ζεύς-πατήρ = (Latin) Jupiter = (old Nordic) Týr, as “the most important discovery of the nineteenth century,” inasmuch as it proves not only that our own ancestors and the ancestors of Homer and Cicero spoke the same tongue as the nations of India, but also that they all at one time had the same faith and for a while adored the same deity under exactly the same name — “Father of Heaven.”¹⁹

The origin of the Germanic Gott (English God) is far more uncertain; in fact, it has not been cleared up. Some have derived the word from the Sanskrit jat = dyut (shining); others from ghu, to hail; others from the Greek Ἀγαθός (good), while again others have traced it to the Persian khoda (old Persian godata = “ens a se”).²⁰ The Slavic tongues have the name bogu, Polish bog, derived from the Sanskrit root bhag = to apportion, order, venerate.²¹

3. The symbolic names applied to God in Holy Scripture (light, lion, fire, etc.), must be understood metaphorically. To interpret them literally would be heretical.

Adapting itself to man’s way of thinking and speaking, the Bible applies to God many appellations known as anthropomorphic or anthropopathic, which describe Him as if he were a man, attributing to Him eyes, ears, arms, a heart, feet, etc., and purely human emotions such as passions, either concupiscible (as joy, desire, etc.) or irascible (e.g., anger, revenge, hate). That these are metaphors appears clearly from the Scriptural teaching that God is an absolutely invisible spirit, and in particular from the fact that some of the symbols used to describe Him are derived from irrational, lifeless creatures. Thus God is called a “lion,”²² a “fire,”²³ a “sun,”²⁴ a “light,”²⁵ and so forth. St. Thomas Aquinas tells us the purpose of these symbolic appellations: “Nomen leonis dictum de Deo nihil aliud significat, quam quod Deus similiter se habet, ut fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis.”²⁶ The Church has always declared it to be heretical to apply these words literally to God, as did, e.g., the Anthropomorphites of the fifth century.

Readings: — Scholz, Handbuch der Theologie des Alten Bundes, Vol. I, § 25. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 66 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 169 sqq.). — S. J. Hunter, S.J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 40 sqq. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 22. — Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 53 sqq., Friburgi 1903. — Reinke, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Alten Testaments, Münster 1855. — De Lagarde, Bildung der Nomina, Göttingen 1889. — F. Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris 1891 sqq. — J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 42 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904. — Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. “God (in O. T.).” — F. J. Hall, The Being and Attributes of God, pp. 227 sqq., New York 1909. — A. J. Maas, S.J., art. “Jehovah” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 329 sqq.

Chapter II: The Essence of God in Its Relation to His Attributes

When we speak of the essence of a thing, we commonly mean not its physical but its metaphysical entity, as expressed in its definition (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), giving the proximate genus and the specific difference; e.g., “homo est animal rationale.” With the essence thus constituted we contrast the essential properties or attributes of the thing, which emanate from the essence as their ontological principle. As we begin to enquire into the relation that God’s Essence bears to His divine attributes — leaving aside for the nonce the question in what His metaphysical essence consists — we find that such relation must needs depend on the distinction between them. Ontology teaches us that there are two distinct categories of difference, real and logical. The latter can be subdivided into two kinds: virtual (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae s. cum fundamento in re), and purely logical (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis s. pure mentalis). The attempt of the Scotists to construe another distinction, called formalis, intermediary between the real and the virtual, must be looked upon as futile. It is the business of dogmatic theology to ascertain precisely how the Essence of God differs from His attributes.

Section 1: False Theories

Article 1: The Heresy of Gilbert de la Porrée and the Palamites

1. Heretical Realism and the Church. — That well-known champion of extreme Realism, Gilbert de la Porrée,²⁷ taught that there is and needs must be a real distinction between God and Divinity, and between essence and person in God. Opinions differ as to whether Gilbert applied his Realism also to the Essence and the attributes of God. Some writers exonerate him from this charge, while St. Bernard²⁸ declares him guilty. It is certain, at any rate, that the Synod of Rheims, A.D. 1148, in the presence of Pope Eugene III, condemned as heretical the error of the extreme Realists when it decreed: “Credimus et confitemur, simplicem naturam divinitatis esse Deum nec aliquo sensu catholico posse negari quin divinitas sit Deus et Deus divinitas. Si vero dicitur, Deum sapientia sapientem … aeternitate aeternum … esse, credimus nonnisi ea sapientia, quae est ipse Deus, sapientem esse … i. e., seipso sapientem, magnum, aeternum, unum Deum.”²⁹ Gilbert readily submitted to this decision, and also his friend, Otto von Freising.

Two centuries later there arose among the schismatic Greeks the heresy of the Palamites — so called from its author, Gregory Palamas. This heresy two Constantinopolitan synods (A.D. 1341 and 1347) did not blush to proclaim as a schismatic dogma. The quintessence of the Palamite error may be stated as follows: Between the essence (οὐσία) and the activity (ἐνέργεια) of God there is a real distinction, inasmuch as the latter radiates from the former as something inferior, though still, in a sense, divine (θεῖα). God’s different attributes are merely radiations of the Divine Essence, and they solidify as it were by taking on the shape of an uncreated but visible light, which the Blessed in Heaven perceive by means of bodily vision. It is the same light that the disciples beheld on Mount Tabor. Here on earth this heavenly bliss is possible per anticipationem only, as the fruit of severe mortification, in the ἡσυχία, that is, the repose of contemplative prayer. Hence the name Hesychasts; hence also the contemptuous nickname ὀμφαλόψυχοι or Umbilicans, given to these heretics by Barlaam, the learned Abbot of St. Saviour’s at Constantinople.³⁰

2. Heretical Realism Refuted. — Except between the Divine Hypostases, no real distinction can be admitted to exist in the Godhead, because if there were in it any sort of real distinction, the Divine Essence would consist of distinct parts, which is repugnant. St. Bernard of Clairvaux³¹ justly traces this erroneous view to Polytheism: “Multa dicuntur esse in Deo et quidem sane catholiceque, sed multa unum; alioquin si diversa putemus, non quaternitatem habemus, sed centenitatem: habebimus multiplicem Deum.”

The dogma that God’s Essence is absolutely identical with His attributes, is taught, at least by implication, in all those passages of Holy Writ in which the divine attributes are conceived substantively rather than adjectively. Cfr. 1 John IV, 8: “Deus caritas est — God is charity.” John XIV, 6: “Ego sum via et Veritas et vita — I am the way, and the truth, and the life.”³² The Fathers never took these passages for rhetorical figures of speech, but interpreted them literally. Augustine condensed the entire dogmatic teaching of the Church on this subject into one pregnant axiom, viz.: “Deus quod habet, hoc est — God is what He has.”³³ When the Fathers distinguish between Θεός and τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ, they simply mean to emphasize that there is room for a virtual distinction between the Divine Essence and attributes.³⁴

Article 2: The Heresy of Eunomius and the Nominalists

1. Nominalism and the Church. — The Eunomian heresy — that man can form an adequate conception of God here below by means of the ἀγεννησία — paved the way for another error, viz.: that all the names and attributes of God are synonymous; in other words, that the distinction between God’s essence and His attributes is purely logical (distinctio pure mentalis s. rationis ratiocinantis). The medieval Nominalists (Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel) revamped this same error, with this difference that they held that the only ground we have on which to base distinctions between the attributes of God (which are per se synonymous), is the difference in the modes by which God manifests His power ad extra (distinctio cum connotatione effectuum). Both the Eunomians and the later Nominalists insisted that the absolute unity and simplicity of the Divine Essence allowed of no distinctions, not even a virtual one.

That the various names and attributes of God correspond to as many objective aspects of the Divine Substance, and are consequently not synonymous, is vix non de fide.³⁵ It was because he had exaggerated the concept of unity that Master Eckhart had to submit to the condemnation, by Pope John XXII, of the following propositions extracted from his writings: “Deus unus est omnibus modis et secundum omnem rationem, ita ut in ipso non sit invenire aliquam multitudinem in intellectu vel extra intellectum” (prop. 23). “Omnis distinctio est a Deo aliena, neque in natura neque in personis; probatur: quia natura ipsa est una et hoc unum, et quaelibet persona est una et id ipsum unum, quod natura” (prop. 24).³⁶

2. Refutation of Nominalism. — a) Gregory of Nyssa³⁷ already called attention to the many attributes ascribed to God in various parts of the Bible. If the Eunomian hypothesis were correct, he insisted, these attributes would be meaningless and the Sacred Writers guilty of insufferable pleonasms. Basil ridicules the patent absurdities implied in the Eunomian theory as “manifeste insania, ridiculum.” The intrinsic unity and simplicity of God does not justify us in timidly denying all virtual distinctions in the Godhead. Far from infringing on the simplicity of God, the distinctions drawn by the human intellect “rather have their roots in, and grow out of, the unity of the Divine Essence.”³⁸ “Hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet,” says St. Thomas, “quod ea quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt simpliciter et unite.”³⁹ The simplicity of God not only consists, like the simplicity of a mathematical point, in the absence of all composition, but also in an infinite wealth of unnumbered perfections. But since our finite intellect is unable to exhaust this wealth of perfection in one concept, we are compelled to form successively a number of varying attributive notions, which correspond to as many different momenta (not elements) in the Divine Being. It is only by this method that our limited understanding can take account of the plenitude of Divine Perfection.

b) The connotata tentatively suggested by the Nominalists do not make their theory acceptable. For God is called good and wise, not only because He communicates His goodness and wisdom to His creatures, but likewise because He is in Himself really good and wise, regardless of His imitabilitas ad extra.⁴⁰

c) The pernicious conclusions which follow from the teachings of Eunomianism and Nominalism become most glaringly apparent in their treatment of the Most Holy Trinity. For if we hold that there is only a logical distinction (distinctio pure mentalis) between God’s Essence and His attributes, how can there be a virtual distinction between the essential and the notional acts of the intellect and will, such as is postulated in the dogmatic principle: “Pater generat, essentia divina non generat — The Father generates, but the divine Essence does not generate”? Thus we see how the error of Eunomius and the Nominalists logically involves a Sabellian Modalism.

Article 3: The Formalism of the Scotists

1. The Scotist Theory. — “Formalism” plays a very important role in the philosophy and theology of the Scotist school, quite as important as the concept of “praemotio” in the Thomist system. By “Formalism” we understand that peculiar theory which posits distinctions that are neither real nor virtual, but are said to lie midway between these two as “formalitates ex natura rei.” Formal distinctions are not real, because they are related to one another not as object is related to object, but only as “formality” is related to “formality.” At the same time, however, they are more than virtual distinctions, because the various “formalitates” are rooted in the things themselves, independently of the human intellect; that is to say, they are antecedently present in things not merely fundamentaliter, but actu, as e.g. animalitas and rationalitas are present in man before the mind ever draws a distinction between them. Only in this way, say the Scotists, are we able to explain why the various “formalities” postulate each an essentially different note, so that it is necessary to deny their mutual identity (e.g., animalitas non est rationalitas). By applying their Formalism to the Godhead, the Scotists — Scotus himself must perhaps⁴¹ be excepted from this indictment — arrived at the notion that the distinction between the Essence and the attributes of God, and also that between the various divine attributes, while not real, is more than virtual, namely, formal. For inasmuch as the Divine Intellect must be defined differently from the Divine Will, it is possible to deny the one of the other, e.g.: “The intellect is not the will;” “Justice spares not, mercy spares,” etc.⁴²

2. Critical Estimate of Formalism. — Although the Church has never officially pronounced against it, the formal distinction invented by the Scotists must be rejected as hair-splitting, unjustified, and dangerous.

a) It is unjustified because it is an inconceivable hybrid which eludes every attempt of the mind to grasp it. The dichotomy of real and logical distinction has its roots deep down in the very principle of contradiction, for every true distinction must be conceived either as real or as not-real (i.e., existing only in the thinking subject); and therefore it is as impossible to find room for a third member between the two, as it would be to establish an intermediary link between Yes and No.

b) But even if the logical possibility of a formal distinction were, for argument’s sake, conceded, what would theology gain thereby? Would not Formalism lead — though not perhaps so straightway nor so evidently as Realism — to the same end, viz.: the destruction of God’s simplicity? For if, independently of and antecedently to the action of the mind, the justice of God is not His mercy, this proposition, carried to its ultimate logical consequences, can only mean that the attribute of mercy is founded upon a different “reality” in God than the attribute of justice. What the Scotists call a “formalitas” thus ex subjecta materia becomes a reality. Different formalities, therefore, suppose as many varying realities. We will not here inquire into the applicability of Formalism to such creatures as are physically and metaphysically compound; in theology it plainly has no place, because the unique simplicity of the Divine Essence forbids all attempts to dissolve it.

c) Finally, the arguments of the Scotist school, in so far at least as they apply to the dogmatic treatise on the nature and attributes of God, are absolutely unconvincing. For the logical necessity of defining mercy otherwise than justice, or necessity otherwise than liberty, and so forth, only proves that there co-exist in God perfections which, in spite of their concentration in one indivisible monad, offer to the thinking mind a basis for distinguishing separate, nay, even opposite excellencies (= distinctio virtualis). For the same reason the divine attributes cannot be negatived absolutely of one another, or of the Divine Essence, but must be predicated of each other in the same identical sense. St. Augustine exemplifies this truth as follows: “Una ergo eademque res dicitur, sive dicatur aeternus Deus, sive immortalis, sive incorruptibilis, sive immutabilis… . Bonitas etiam atque iustitia, numquid inter se in natura Dei, sicut in eius operibus distant, tamquam duae diversae sint qualitates Dei, una bonitas, alia iustitia? Non utique; sed quae iustitia, ipsa bonitas; et quae bonitas, ipsa beatitudo — It is one and the same thing, therefore, to call God eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or unchangeable… . Or do goodness, again, and righteousness, differ from each other in the nature of God, as they differ in His works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God — goodness one, and righteousness another? Certainly not; but that which is righteousness is also itself goodness; and that which is goodness is also itself blessedness.”⁴³ The younger Scotist school has diluted its Formalism so much that it now approaches the virtual distinction theory of the Thomists. It is not worth while to enter into a more detailed discussion of these subtleties.

Section 2: The Virtual Distinction Between God’s Essence and His Attributes

1. Having rejected the Realistic, the Nominalistic, and the Scotistic theories with regard to the distinction of God’s Essence from His attributes, as well as of these attributes among themselves, there remains but one other, viz.: that which asserts the distinctio virtualis. This is the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, which has become sententia communis. Inasmuch as the extremes, Realism and Nominalism, both lead to heresy, or at least come dangerously near it, Catholic theology must plainly seek a via media. We have seen that Scotistic Formalism cannot claim to be the golden mean. Hence we must adopt the Thomist view, which postulates a virtual distinction between God’s Essence and His attributes. What this means will be reasonably clear to the student who has read the first section of this chapter carefully. The subjoined quotation from St. Thomas⁴⁴ will elucidate the point even better: “Quod Deus excedat intellectum nostrum, est ex parte ipsius Dei propter plenitudinem perfectionis eius, et ex parte intellectus nostri, qui deficienter se habet ad eam comprehendendam. Unde patet, quod pluralitas istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque conceptionem nostri intellectus. Et ideo pluralitati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re, quae Deus est; non quidem pluralitas rei, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit, ut omnes istae conceptiones ei aptentur.”

2. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the Thomistic distinctio virtualis, let us remember that it can be conceived in a twofold manner. Either the objective concept of one perfection, which is (really) identical with its object, excludes that of another, which is also identical with the same object (as e.g. “sensuality” and “rationality” in man), and then we have a distinctio virtualis perfecta s. cum praecisione objectiva. Or the objective concept of one perfection includes the objective concept of the other, either formaliter or radicaliter (as e.g. “sensitive being” and “substance,” the latter being contained formally in the former; or “rational soul” and “intellect,” of which the latter is contained radically in the former), and then the two are related to each other as an “includens” to an “inclusum,” and we have a distinctio virtualis imperfecta s. cum praecisione formali. The distinctio virtualis perfecta, inasmuch as it implies real composition in its object (the notional indifference of the one perfection towards the other being an infallible index of their potentiality), cannot possibly be applied to God, Who is purest actuality (actus purissimus). Hence there must be posited between His Essence and His attributes a distinctio virtualis imperfecta; which means that each separate attribute of God includes within itself formally His Essence, that His Essence includes within itself each separate divine attribute, and, finally, that each separate attribute notionally includes every other attribute.⁴⁵

Readings: — *S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 13, art. 4–5, 12. — Idem, Contra Gent., I, 31–36 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 24 sqq., London 1905). — Suarez, De Div. Sub. eiusque Attrib., I, 10–14. — Petavius, De Deo I, 7–13. — *Gillius, De Essentia Dei, tr. 6, cap. 6 sqq. — *Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit, 1. T., 2. Abh., 3. Hpst. — W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 57 sqq., London 1897. — Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 164 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899.