God's Unity, Simplicity, and Unicity (Monotheism)

Section 2: God’s Unity, Simplicity, and Unicity (or Uniqueness)

The essence of oneness (unum, τὸ ἕν) lies in this that it is intrinsically undivided. Hence the Scholastic definition of unum as “id quod est indivisum in se.” A being which is not merely undivided, but indivisible, possesses simplicity (unitas indivisibilitatis s. simplicitas). Unicity (or uniqueness) differs from both unity and simplicity in that it superadds to the concept one (unum) the further note of “exclusion of all other beings from the possession of some attribute or quality.” Hence uniqueness is no more a transcendental attribute of being, than mathematical unity, which is the principle of numbers or quantity.

As a pure perfection, metaphysical or transcendental unity, raised to infinite power, must be predicable of God both as indivisio and indivisibilitas. Thus understood, the uniqueness of God is plainly a postulate of reason. While created units exist as individuals, the uncreated Being must of necessity be sole and unique.

Hence from the concept of unum there are deducible three additional attributes of God, viz.: His intrinsic unity (unitas Dei); His simplicity (simplicitas); and His uniqueness (unicitas).

Article 1: God’s Intrinsic Unity

1. Preliminary Observations. — The concept of metaphysical (transcendental) unity adds the note of indivision to the general notion of being. Whatever is undivided in itself is One. Consequently, the essence of unity consists in the negation of division. Nevertheless, unity is a positive predicate of being; first, because ens remains the fundamental concept; and secondly, because to deny that there is division is at bottom only a negation of a negation, and therefore an affirmation or position.

a) There is a distinction to be made between things that are undivided. Some are incapable of being divided (indivisible), and therefore simple, while others are composite. Hence, besides unitas indivisionis, we must distinguish two other kinds of unity, viz.: unity of indivisibility (simplicity) and unity of composition (unitas compositionis). The latter may be unitas per se (e.g., a man) or unitas per accidens (e.g., a house). It follows that unity must be co-extensive with being: “Ens et unum convertuntur.” For every being is either simple or composite. If simple, it is indivisible and therefore surely indivisum in se; if composite, it has no being so long as its parts are not united into one, receiving its indivision, i.e., its unity, at the moment when composition sets in.¹

b) Over against this metaphysical unity we have to distinguish sharply between two cognate concepts that do not represent transcendental determinations of being, viz.: mathematical unity, and unicity. Mathematical unity (one), as the “principle of numbers,” has its place in the category of (discreet) quantity, and therefore is not a general determination of being as such. Unicity, on its part, connoting as it does “the exclusion of others from the possession of some perfection,” also belongs to the class of determined beings, although, of course, in their quality of beings, both mathematical unity and unicity embody the notion of metaphysical or transcendental unity.

c) The opposite of one (unum) is many (multa). Over against simple unity as mere indivisio, we have multiplicity as division into parts, unities, or monads. But the contrary of indivisibility or simplicity is not multiplicity (multiplex) — God, though absolutely one, is threefold in person — but composition (compositum). Inasmuch as both division and composition involve imperfection (στέρησις), they are contrasted with unity in a privative manner (as “seeing,” and “blind”). Mathematical unity is related to multiplicity as a part is related to its whole, inasmuch as “one” is both the first in the series of numbers, and likewise one of that series; and this opposition must be conceived as a relative one (e.g., “father” and “son”). And as, finally, the notion of unicity (unicum) directly excludes every species of multiplicity within the same genus, the two concepts are related to each other as contradictories (as “yes” and “no”).

From God every species of multiplicity, as opposed to unity, must be rigorously excluded, so far as His divine nature, substance, or essence is concerned; though in respect of personality, there is a real Trinity. The Divine Essence more particularly excludes every kind of intrinsic division, every species of composition, all multiplicity of like beings. On the other hand, it necessarily includes intrinsic unity, absolute simplicity, and unicity. We shall devote separate articles to the two last-mentioned attributes. Here we have to consider God’s intrinsic unity — an attribute which, it is hardly necessary to remark, is virtually implied in His simplicity.

2. The Dogma of God’s Intrinsic Unity. — In view of the fact that the subjoined propositions merely paraphrase dogmatic definitions of the Church (aseity, simplicity, etc.) they must be received as substantially de fide.

a) If we consider God’s unity in connection with His self-existence, it is plain that He is unus a se. Hence He must be conceived as the primarily One,² or, in the language of the Fathers, as unity itself (ipsa unitas, ἡ μονάς, ἕν). Of course, this unity is not, like abstract being, a vacuous unity devoid of content. It is rather “the smallest kernel of being that can possibly be conceived, and smaller than which nothing can be conceived”; and, on the other hand, because of its plenitude of being it is also “the largest being that can possibly be conceived, and larger than which nothing can be conceived.”³ The description which St. Bernard gives of the divine primordial monas, may be cited here as a gem of both theological and rhetorical exposition: “Est qui est, non quae est… . Purus, simplex, integer, perfectus, … non habens quod ad numerum dividat, non quae colligat ad unum. Unum quippe est, sed non unitum: non partibus constat ut corpus, non affectibus distat ut anima… . Tam simplex est Deus quam unus est. Est autem unus et quomodo aliud nihil, si dici possit, unissimus est… . Quid plus? Unus est etiam sibi: idem est semper et uno modo. Non sic unus est sol, non sic una luna: clamat uterque — ille motibus, ilia et defectibus suis. Deus autem non modo unus sibi, et in se unus est; nihil in se nisi se habet: non ex tempore alterationem habet, non in substantia alteritatem… . Compara huic uni omne quod unum dici potest, et unum non erit.”⁴

b) Inasmuch as God is one in an infinitely higher sense than all created entities, He may be said to be Super-Unity, with which created unities are absolutely incomparable. Concentrated in the very smallest focus, as the minutest possible unity, the super-fulness of His infinitely great and various perfections coalesces into a “super-one monas, which in its simplicity is the most narrowly contracted and therefore the richest and also the purest being.”⁵ From this concept of super-unity, St. Thomas Aquinas⁶ deduces the proposition that God is not only unum, but maxime unum. That is maxime unum, he says, which has the greatest fulness of being and the largest measure of undividedness. Now, God as the actus purus is very being, and as the absolutely simple He is that being which is most undivided in itself; hence He is maxime unum, i.e., one in a supreme and unique sense.⁷

Readings: — Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 177 sqq. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 82. — Picus a Mirandola, De Ente et Uno. — Thomassin, De Deo, II, 1 sq. — Jos. Görres in Sepp’s Leben Jesu, Vol. I (Preface, pp. 18 sqq.), 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1853. — Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 85 sqq. — J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 209 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904.

Article 2: God’s Absolute Simplicity

1. State of the Question. — In treating of the relation of God’s Essence to His attributes,⁸ we drew a virtual distinction between them, basing it on the simplicity of the Divine Nature. This we shall now endeavor to explain more exactly. Since a contrary opposition lies not between the simple and the multiplex, but between the simple and the composite,⁹ we can define simplicity as “the absence of composition.”¹⁰

a) Now, composition is twofold, physical and metaphysical, according as a being contains within itself parts that are really distinct, or parts that are merely notionally or metaphysically distinct. Physically composite beings are those in which there is substantial composition (e.g., of matter and form, body and soul), and also those in which there is a composition of accidents (e.g., substance and accident). Metaphysical compounds are those whose parts (e.g., genus and specific difference), though really identical, are nevertheless represented by objectively distinct concepts. Every compound consists of parts. “Part” signifies “an incomplete being, requiring to be complemented by another.” It follows from what we have so far explained, that the parts which enter into any compound mutually complement and perfect one another, giving completeness to the compound and in their turn receiving completion from the whole.

b) While this conclusion is evidently true of physical compounds, the complementary function of metaphysical parts is not quite so clear, for the reason that in God virtually distinct perfections can easily be mistaken for metaphysical parts. Yet the dogma of the absolute simplicity of God forbids the assumption that there is in the divine Essence any sort of composition, even though it be a mere composition of logically distinct parts. The essential difference between metaphysical and virtual composition lies in this, that the latter is founded on a distinction purely subjective, while the former is based upon truly objective differences. The metaphysical parts of any creature, even though it be the most indivisible of all creatures, an angel, bear the same objective relation to each other which potentiality (potentia) bears to actuality (actus). Hence, where there is objective composition in a being, this is certain proof that such being is contingent. Moreover, in the creature the determinable element (e.g., animal) appears to stand in need of being determined by another (e.g., rationale); while at the same time both these elements are mutually indifferent to such a degree that either can be realized without the other (e.g., brute, angel). In God, on the other hand, there is neither a determinable nor a determining element. He is pure act, and His perfections are anything but mutually indifferent. None of them can exist apart from the others.

2. The Dogma of God’s Absolute Simplicity. — The Fourth Lateran Council (A.D. 1215) defined the Blessed Trinity as “One absolutely simple essence, substance, or nature — una essentia, substantia, seu natura simplex omnino.”¹¹ The Vatican Council as “one … absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance — simplex omnino et incommutabilis substantia spiritualis.”¹²

a) The Bible teaches God’s absolute simplicity (a simplicity which does not even admit of metaphysical composition) in all those passages where it speaks of God’s attributes substantively, that is to say, where it identifies them really with the Divine Essence. Thus God not only “hath life in himself”¹³ but He “is life itself,”¹⁴ and, therefore, is the only one who hath immortality.¹⁵ As God possesses within Himself “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,”¹⁶ so He is wisdom itself,¹⁷ and, therefore, “alone wise.”¹⁸ He is a God of charity, because He has charity; but it is still more correct to say that He “is charity itself,”¹⁹ and, in so far, “alone good.”²⁰ Although He is “full of truth,”²¹ He is more properly “the truth.”²² In a word, according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture, God is purest actuality without any qualification. His attributes are identical with His substance. This is merely another way of saying that God is pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality, and that there is in Him no sort of composition, not even of the kind called metaphysical.²³

b) We proceed to formulate the argument from Tradition.

α) That the simplicity of the Divine Essence is real, can easily be shown to have been the belief of the Christian Church through all the centuries of her existence. Origen mentions it among the earliest dogmas.²⁴ Irenaeus asserts against the Gnostic teaching of emanation that “Deus simplex et non compositus, totus αἴσθησις καὶ totus νοῦς καὶ totus Λόγος.”²⁵ Cyril of Alexandria says this truth is testified to by the whole human race.²⁶ The opposing error is branded by the Fathers in terms so harsh that they must plainly have meant to strike at a heresy: “absurdum et nefarium” (Maximus), “summa impietas” (John of Damascus), “blasphemia” (Athanasius). The Fathers repeatedly employed this dogma as a weapon against the Arians, who, whatever errors they may have taught with regard to the relation existing between God the Father and the Son, never denied the divine simplicity.²⁷

β) The simplicity of God as taught by the Fathers is to be taken not only as a real, but also as a necessary quality, because of the absolute identity between God’s Essence and existence, His attributes and Essence, and between His separate attributes. “Not only as seeing partially, and partially as not seeing, but in His whole substance He is all eye and all hearing and all spirit (ὅλος νοῦς),” says St. Cyril of Jerusalem.²⁸ Hence the Augustinian axiom:²⁹ “Deus quod habet, hoc est,” and its Patristic conversion: “Creatura non est, sed habet sapientiam, etc.” In the words of St. Gregory the Great: “Sapientia Dei est et sapit, nec habet aliud esse, aliud sapere. Servi autem sapientiae [i.e., homines], quum habent vitam, aliud sunt et aliud habent, quippe quibus non est hoc ipsum esse quod vivere.”³⁰ The technical phrase of the Schoolmen, which is so familiar to us, viz.: that God is pure act without any potentiality, dates back to the time of St. Maximus the Confessor, who wrote: “God exists actually, not potentially (ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμει), as if He were originally not wisdom (ἀφροσύνη) and then in reality became reason; therefore He is only pure reason (νοῦν μόνον καθαρόν), possessing cognition not as something additional, but He thinks only through Himself (παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖ).”³¹ Petavius has collected a large number of additional passages from Patristic literature bearing on this subject.³²

c) The philosophical explanation of the dogma must proceed on the assumption that God’s perfect simplicity does not consist merely in His indivisibility (i.e., the absence of parts) — for else the “monads” of Leibnitz, the “Realen” of Herbart, the “atoms” of the chemists, and the “points” of the mathematicians would eo ipso be endowed with supreme perfection — but primarily in the simultaneous plenitude of God’s positive perfections of being. From this point of view the argument by which we prove God’s simplicity from His aseity or self-existence is a most cogent one. St. Thomas³³ luminously formulates it as follows: “In omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius, vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius.” An equally stringent argument is that based upon the absolute causality of God:³⁴ “Omne compositum causam habet; quae enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum, nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, cum sit prima causa efficiens.”

3. Dogmatic Conclusions. — In virtue of His simplicity (which we have proved) there must be excluded from God all manner of composition, and all parts, both physical and metaphysical. We begin with the cruder forms of composition, gradually ascending to the higher ones.

Thesis I: God is not composed of matter and form (ex materia et forma).

Proof. Matter (ὕλη πρώτη) is mere potentiality (δύναμις); but God is pure actuality (ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια), without a trace of potentiality. In the words of St. Thomas: “Deus est actus purus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma.”³⁵ Therefore St. Bernard says: “Ipse sibi forma, ipse sibi essentia est. Non est formatus Deus, forma est. Non est compositus Deus, merum simplex est. Tam simplex Deus, quam unus est.”³⁶ Materialism alone believes in a material God.

Thesis II: God is not composed of substance and accidents (ex substantia et accidentibus).

Proof. It is the function of an accident to perfect the substance in which it inheres, by giving it something which it does not possess of itself. Substance and accident are consequently related to each other in the same manner as the potential is related to its actuation. As ὁ ὤν, God is incapable of being perfected. In other words, while the created substance possesses and supports its properties, which in turn are possessed and supported by their substance (ratio habentis et habiti), God is what He has. Hence there can be no accidents in Him.³⁷

Thesis III: There is in God no composition of faculty and act (ex facultate et actu).

Proof. If God were not immutable actuality from everlasting, there would have taken place, or there would still be taking place within His Essence a transition from potentiality to actuality (a potentia ad actum), and the resulting act would inhere in the Divine Substance after the manner of an accident. This is repugnant to God’s pure actuality and the absence of accidents in His Essence. Consequently, in the words of St. Thomas, “Deus est sua operatio et actio.”³⁸

Thesis IV: There is in God no composition of really distinct activities (ex actu et actu).

Proof. If knowing and willing and transient operation in God were really distinct activities, there would exist in the Divine Essence three acts, none of which would be identical with either of the others. In other words, the Godhead would consist of a real trinity of acts, culminating in some sort of “organic unity,” as Günther taught. To hold this would be to deny the identity of God’s Essence with His attributes, and also His aseity, His absolute perfection, and His infinity. It follows that the divine Nature must exercise its activity in one simple act. There can be no reasonable objection to this thesis so far as it applies to God’s necessary operation ad intra (cognition, volition). It is only when it is applied to God’s free operation ad extra (e.g., creation, sanctification) that difficulties arise. Yet, when we consider the question carefully, we find that creation and sanctification do not add to the perfection of God, but merely to that of the creature. It is not the divine operation as such that undergoes an intrinsic change, but solely the product of this operation. Hence God’s free operation ad extra furnishes no objective reason why His operation and nature should be split up and His simplicity endangered.³⁹

Thesis V: There is in God no composition of subject and essence, or of nature and person (ex subjecto et essentia; ex natura et hypostasi).

Proof. According to the teaching of Aristotle,⁴⁰ it is only in material things that individual determination lies outside of specific determination, so that the production of an individual requires a principle of individuation — the ὕλη πρώτη or materia signata. Of the “pure forms” (angels) St. Thomas asserts⁴¹ that their specific coincides with their individual determination, so that every individual eo ipso constitutes a separate species. Regardless of what one may think of this theory, it is certain that in God individuality (in the sense of singularitas) must coincide absolutely with essence. To assume composition in the Deity, even if it were a merely metaphysical composition of subject and essence, would be to attribute to the Divine Essence potentiality, and consequently to deny its aseity. Therefore Eugene III, at Rheims, in 1148, laid down against Gilbert de la Porrée’s heretical proposition, “Divinitate Deus est, sed divinitas non est Deus,”⁴² the dogmatic declaration: “Ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur, ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi.” Whence it is plain that the Divine Essence absolutely excludes a composition of nature and hypostasis. We are therefore bound to profess, not only “Pater est Deus,” but likewise, “Pater est divinitas” and conversely.⁴³

But how does the mystery of the Blessed Trinity affect the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence? Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though really distinct as Persons, do not subsist in three different natures (Tritheism), but in one and the same divine nature. “Quaelibet trium personarum est illa [summa] res, vid. substantia, essentia s. natura divina.”⁴⁴ We conceive this threefold subsistence of the one “summa res” by drawing a virtual distinction between nature and person — a distinction which does not imply objective composition.⁴⁵ Hence the theological axiom: “In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.”⁴⁶

Thesis VI: There is in God no composition of genus and specific difference (ex genere et differentia).

Proof. A genus (e.g., animal) is something abstract, capable of being determined, and therefore potential. The specific difference (e.g., rationale) lies outside the genus and determines it more nearly, though it does not posit it ex vi notionis. Now, in God there can be neither a determination nor a determinans, because He is actus purus; and therefore each separate divine perfection logically postulates every other divine perfection, because all His perfections are identical among themselves and with His essence and existence. “Ex genere enim habetur quid est res, non autem rem esse; nam per differentias specificas constituitur res in proprio esse. Sed hoc, quod Deus est, est ipsum esse. Impossibile est ergo, quod sit genus.”⁴⁷ As a thing is defined by giving the class (or proximate genus) to which it belongs, and the characteristic (or specific) quality which differentiates it from the other members of the same genus,⁴⁸ it is evident that, strictly speaking, God cannot be defined. Hence the proposition “Deus est ens a se,” while absolutely correct so far as it goes, is no true definition, but merely an analogous substitute for a definition. The undefinable Divine Being has its place above and beyond all genera and categories, because it cannot be univocally subsumed under any common genus with created beings.

Thesis VII: There is in God no composition of essence and existence (ex essentia et existentia).

Proof. The Divine Essence, which exists with metaphysical necessity, cannot be conceived as non-existing. The notion of a merely possible God, or of a God real indeed but objectively composed of essence and existence, involves a contradiction.⁴⁹ For the same reason the Godhead does not even admit of a virtual distinction between essence and existence. The distinction between them is purely logical (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis seu sine fundamento in re).

Readings: — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 72 (summarized in Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 182 sqq.). — Hurter, Compendium Theol. Dogmat., t. II, thes. 82. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 26 sq. — Petavius, De Deo, II, 1–7. — *St. Thom., Contra Gent., I, 16–27 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 14 sqq.). — Lepicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 149 sqq., Parisiis 1902. — Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 92 sqq.

Article 3: God’s Unicity, or Monotheism and its Antitheses: Polytheism and Dualism

1. Monotheism as a Dogma. — Standing as it does at the head of all our creeds,⁵⁰ the belief in God’s unicity (μοναρχία) forms one of the fundamental verities of the Christian faith. In matter of fact Monotheism is the only possible form of Theism. While the Fourth Council of the Lateran professes, in accord with all Christendom, “that there is but one true God,”⁵¹ the Vatican Council formally condemns Atheism, Polytheism, and Dualism, when it defines: “Si quis unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium creatorem et Dominum negaverit, anathema sit — If any one shall deny the one true God, Creator and Lord of things visible and invisible; let him be anathema.”⁵² We are bound to believe not only that there is but one God, but also that there can be no more than one God.

a) Monotheism was the principal, nay, strictly speaking, the only express dogma of the Jewish people under the Old Law, and it had the same fundamental importance for them that the baptismal formula has for us Christians. Organically connected with this fundamental dogma was the basic law of the love of God. The Israelites were to build their world-view theoretically on belief in, and practically on the love of, the one God. Both precepts appear to be dogmatically defined in the famous “Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est; diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.”⁵³ The connection between these two commandments is a causal one: “Because God is one, therefore shalt thou love Him with all thy heart.” Monotheism runs like a golden strand through all the pages of the Old Testament and constitutes its specific mark of distinction, so much so that the Rationalist hypothesis that יהוה is the national God of the Jews, might appear debatable, did not Holy Scripture itself emphasize the fact that God’s numerical unity must be conceived as absolute unicity (μοναρχία), subject to no limitations, either national or theocratic. Is. XLIV, 6: “Ego primus et ego novissimus et [propterea] absque me non est Deus — I am the first and I am the last, and [therefore] there is no God besides me.”⁵⁴

The distinctive fundamental dogma of Christianity in the New Testament is the Trinity, while the basic law of love endures in a higher and transfigured form. But so far from being obscured or impaired by the dogma of the Trinity, Monotheism is confirmed and deepened thereby. The Athanasian Creed insists that the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is impossible except on a Monotheistic basis. The Mosaic שְׁמַע is not abrogated by Christianity; on the contrary, it has become the foundation stone of the Christian dispensation. Mark XII, 29: “Iesus autem respondit ei [scribae], quia primum omnium mandatum (πρώτη πάντων ἐντολή) est: Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est. Diliges etc. — And Jesus answered him [one of the scribes]: The first commandment of all is, Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God,” etc. The real distinction between the three divine Persons does not destroy but postulates unity of divine Nature. Cfr. John XVII, 3: “Haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum (σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν) et quem misisti Iesum Christum — Now this is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.”

Among the Apostles St. Paul is pre-eminently the protagonist of strict Monotheism. The Lystrians in Lycaonia, who offered to sacrifice bulls to him and to his companion Barnabas, he instructs impressively concerning the one true God.⁵⁵ In Athens he preaches the “one unknown God” before the assembled Areopagus.⁵⁶ He proclaims Monotheism as a universal religion which transcends all national and local bounds. Rom. III, 23: “Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles (ἐθνῶν)? Yes, of the Gentiles also.” He forbids, finally, the eating of meat that had been sacrificed to idols, saying: “We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is no God but one.”⁵⁷

b) In constructing the argument from Tradition, we note in the first place the apodictic form in which the Fathers teach Monotheism. Following the lead of Scripture, they deduce the intrinsic contradiction involved in Polytheism, and the absolute necessity of there being but one God, from various middle terms, especially that of aseity, and also that of infinite perfection.

Thus St. Irenaeus⁵⁸ argues: “Si extra ilium est aliquid, iam non omnium est πλήρωμα neque continet omnia; deerit enim πλήρωματι hoc, quod extra eum [esse] dicent — But if there is anything beyond Him, He is not then the Pleroma of all, nor does He contain all. For that which they declare to be beyond Him will be wanting to the Pleroma.” Tertullian⁵⁹ appeals to the soul which is by nature Christian (“anima naturaliter Christiana”), to witness the truth of Monotheism, and he proves its intrinsic necessity from God’s absolute perfection: “Duo ergo summa magna quomodo consistent, cum hoc sit summum magnum par non habere? — How, therefore, can two great Supremes co-exist, when this is the attribute of the Supreme Being, to have no equal?”⁶⁰ Justly, therefore, do the Fathers, having in mind St. Paul’s dictum: “καὶ ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ — You were … without God in this world,”⁶¹ conclude that “Polytheism is at bottom sheer Atheism.”⁶² And Tertullian summarily declares: “Deus, si non unus est, non est — God is not if He is not one.”⁶³

In regard to the teaching of the Scholastics, it will suffice to note that St. Thomas Aquinas in his philosophical Summa⁶⁴ marshals no less than seventeen arguments to prove the necessity of Monotheism. The three chief ones among them, viz.: those based on the simplicity and perfection of God, and on the harmony existing in the created universe, he repeats in his Summa Theologica.⁶⁵ Another author worth reading on the subject is St. Anselm.⁶⁶

2. The Heresy of Polytheism. — By Polytheism we understand the belief in two or more gods. Its wellspring is partly the weakness of the human intellect since the Fall, partly and principally the sinful bias of the human will. Some forms of Polytheism reduce the Absolute to the level of the finite, while others raise the finite to the rank of the divine. All of them flagrantly contradict both reason and Revelation.

a) If it be permissible to draw a distinction between the “pure” and the “applied” concept of God, we may say that the fundamental error of Polytheism consists in applying the concept of God to improper subjects, i.e., to beings which are not and cannot be divine. Cfr. Wisdom XIV, 21: “Incommunicabile nomen [i.e., יהוה] lapidibus et lignis imposuerunt — Men … gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood.” It would be an exaggeration to say that Polytheism is identical with Atheism; for the atheist denies that there is a God, while the polytheist merely transfers the concept of Deity to some creature. But Polytheism involves an intrinsic contradiction and, pushed to its logical conclusions, necessarily leads to Atheism.

b) The rapid spread of Polytheism, especially during the period stretching from Abraham to Christ, calls for an explanation. Since reason is able to produce the strongest arguments against the intrinsic possibility of Polytheism, the enormous propagation of this error can not be sufficiently explained by attributing it to the weakness of the human intellect after the Fall, or to forgetfulness, or to a disinclination to reasoning, or to an enslavement of the intellect by the material things of this world. Its chief source is doubtless the false bias which bends the will of man towards sin. Without the co-operation of sin it is hard to imagine how so many nations could have fallen into gross idolatry. St. Paul in his first Epistle to the Romans⁶⁷ gives a graphic description of the powerful influence of sin, and the Book of Wisdom explains⁶⁸ how idolatry, once it finds lodgment in the human mind, can grow to enormous proportions and eventually plunge the race into dire misfortune and misery. “Infandorum enim idolorum cultus omnis mali causa est, et initium et finis — For the worship of abominable idols is the cause, and the beginning and end of all evil.”⁶⁹ St. Thomas Aquinas⁷⁰ traces Polytheism and idolatry to two principal causes: first, sinful aberrations of the mind, such as image worship, the idolizing of creatures, etc.; and, secondly, the influence of evil spirits (e.g., in the pagan oracles). How often does not Holy Scripture designate idolatry as devil worship?⁷¹ It was only in the fiery furnace of the Babylonian captivity that this impious tendency was extirpated root and branch; after that time we never again hear of the Jews practicing idolatry.⁷²

c) The forms which Polytheism has assumed are manifold. It belongs to the science of comparative religion to distribute them into scientific categories. We will only observe, in a general way, that the classification depends chiefly on whether the Absolute is leveled down to the finite, or whether the finite is deified. The first method was practiced in the East, where the Gnostic and Hindoo systems of religion, with their “emanations,” “aeons,” and “incarnations,” flourished, although the original unity of God was in a manner still retained as the center of emanation. The second method is distinctively Western in origin and character, and exemplified mainly in the Polytheism of the Graeco-Roman world. Since the deification of the creature can give rise to as many divinities as there are classes of created things, Polytheism has had a wide and fertile field for its vagaries. On the lowest plane we find Fetishism,⁷³ which looks for help or punishment to inanimate objects. Related to Fetishism is Idolatry (in the strict sense of the term), which actually worships inanimate objects as symbols of the Deity. Of somewhat higher rank is Sabaism, so-called, which adores the elements, especially the stars. From Sabaism it is but one step to Nature Worship, which pays divine honors to the powers of nature or the animal world (e.g., Animism,⁷⁴ Totemism). The Deification of Man probably had its origin in ancestral and hero worship and developed into the formal apotheosis not only of particular men, but of general attributes of mankind, including vices, which were individualized, e.g., Apollo = god of wisdom; Aphrodite = goddess of love, etc. The most horrid form of Polytheism, and the one most directly opposed to Christian Monotheism, is Devil Worship or the cult of evil spirits (Satanism).⁷⁵

d) Monotheism and Polytheism are logical contraries; hence Polytheism in any guise whatever is not only a grave aberration of human reason, because the natural knowableness of God clearly postulates Monotheism; but also repugnant to Divine Revelation. If Monotheism is a dogma, Polytheism must eo ipso be a heresy. The Bible expressly tells us that it is a heresy. The Book of Wisdom devotes several chapters⁷⁶ to the refutation and condemnation of Polytheism and Idolatry. In fact, Holy Scripture never tires of denouncing Idolatry as foolish and impious, and the pagan deities as “not gods,”⁷⁷ “lies and vanity,”⁷⁸ “wind and vanity,”⁷⁹ airy nothings.⁸⁰

3. The Heresy of Dualism. — Dualism is the theory that there are two absolute and eternal principles. It is traceable to a different psychological source than Polytheism. It originated in a mistaken conception of the problem of evil and is opposed to both reason and Revelation.

a) The Dualism of the Gnostics and Manichaeans, which teaches that there are two divinities, one good and the other evil, is of very ancient origin. As early as the sixteenth century B.C., Zoroaster, the founder of the Perso-Iranian national religion, imagined two divine principles, Ormuzd, the god of light, and Ahriman, the god of darkness — the one the author of all good, the other the principle of all evil, physical and moral. In their never-ending struggle for supremacy now one is victorious, now the other. When in the third century after Christ, Manes (or Mani)⁸¹ introduced the Persian gnosis into the countries of the Western world, which was just then opening its doors to Christianity, even so brilliant a genius as St. Augustine was temporarily seduced by its “eclectic jumble of wild fancies, among which the soberest and strongest dogmas of the Christian creed were sometimes seen to be imbedded.”⁸² Later on, however, he became one of the most powerful opponents of Manichaeism.⁸³

b) That Dualism is repugnant to sound reason appears from an analysis of the notion of “evil.” A principle of evil, taking it — not in the sense of Satanism or Anti-Christianism — but as an absolute being, is a contradiction in terms. “Evil” (malum) merely means privation of being (privatio, στέρησις), i.e., non-being (μὴ ὄν), which, carried to its ultimate limits, must issue in pure nothingness (nihilum, οὐκ ὄν). Now nothingness is no being, least of all absolute being. The case against Dualism may also be argued thus: The good God and His evil anti-god are either equal or they are unequal in power. If they possess equal power, they are mutually destructive, because each is sufficiently potent to paralyze the other, and, therefore, to reduce him to inactivity. If their power is unequal, then the stronger of the two is sure to vanquish and paralyze the weaker. St. Athanasius says beautifully: “To speak of several equally powerful gods, is like speaking of several equally powerless gods.”⁸⁴

c) Dualism is opposed to the Catholic faith because it runs counter to the dogma of Monotheism. But it can also be expressly disproved from Scripture. So far as physical evil (death, pain, suffering) is concerned, we have it on God’s own authority that He is its fundamental principle, just as He is the fount of whatever is good in this world. In the farewell canticle chanted by Moses in the hearing of the whole assembly of Israel, we read: “See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; I will kill and I will make to live: I will strike and I will heal, and there is none that can deliver out of my hand.”⁸⁵ As if to refute Dualism in advance, God declared by the mouth of the prophet Isaias: “I am the Lord, and there is none else: I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil: I the Lord that do all these things.”⁸⁶ With regard to moral evil (sin), we must, of course, hold that God, on account of His absolute sanctity, cannot be considered the author of sin; that, on the contrary, sin has its proximate cause in an abuse of man’s liberty. It is interesting in this connection to note how God assumes the responsibility, e.g., for the hard-heartedness of Pharaoh⁸⁷ in a manner which positively excludes the co-existence with Him of an absolutely evil principle. Of the Fathers of the Church Irenaeus, Tertullian, Augustine, and John of Damascus have written special treatises against Dualism (Manichaeism).⁸⁸

Readings: — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, §§ 151–154. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 25. — Oswald, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, Appendix, pp. 264 sqq. — *C. Krieg, Der Monotheismus der Offenbarung und das Heidenthum, Mainz 1880. — Chr. Pesch, S.J., Gott und Götter, Freiburg 1890. — J. Nikel, Der Monotheismus Israels in der vorexilischen Zeit, Paderborn 1893. — H. Formby, Monotheism, London, s.a. — Driscoll, God, pp. 30 sqq. — E. R. Hull, S.J., Studies in Idolatry, Bombay 1906.