Part I Chapter III §2: Whether the Sacraments are Physical or Moral Causes of Grace
Theological note: sententia probabilior (physical instrumental causality — Thomist position)
How exactly do the sacraments cause grace? Two schools dispute the mode of causality. The Thomist position holds that the sacraments are true physical instrumental causes of grace: as a pen moved by the writer produces writing beyond the pen's own power, so the sacramental rite, moved by God, produces grace beyond the rite's natural power. The Scotist-Suarezian position holds that the sacraments are moral causes: they move God to infuse grace by way of a pact or covenant, but do not themselves physically touch the soul. Pohle assesses physical instrumental causality as the more probable opinion, since it better explains why the sacraments are true causes rather than mere occasions, and better accounts for the Thomistic theology of instrumental causality already operative in the Incarnation.
§2: Whether the Sacraments Are Physical or Moral Causes of Grace
SECTION 2 WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS ARE PHYSICAL OR MORAL CAUSES OF GRACE i. State of the Question. — The Sacraments, as we have shown, produce their effects ex opere operato. But how, in what manner? Is their efficacy physical, or purely moral, or both? a) A moral cause (causa moralis) is one which, through the exercise of some influence operating through the intellect or emotions (a command, counsel, request) determines a rational being to action. The death of our Saviour was such a cause, in so far as it moved God to have mercy on humanity. Let it not be objected that the effective intercession of one person for another, such as that of the crucified Redeemer for us, is a final rather than an efficient cause, because it constitutes a true motive to attain a desired end. Every moral cause operates because of its presence (quia est), whereas a final cause operates in order that something else may come into being (ut sit). The passion and death of Christ being the “meritorious cause of justification,“1 is certainly not the physical cause of our salvation ; but, on the other hand, it is more than a final cause, and consequently, it is the true moral cause of justification. A physical cause (causa physica) is one which by its l Cone. Trident., Sess. VII, cap. y. 143
action produces an immediate effect, as when a carpenter makes a table. Both physical and moral causes are either principal (causa principalis) or instrumental (causa instrutnentalis). What a saw is in the hands of a carpenter, that, mutatis mutandis, an ambassador is in the hands of his government. Carpenter and government are principal, saw and ambassador instrumental causes. A cause, no matter whether physical or moral, principal or instrumental, is both really and logically distinct from a condition. A condition, even though it be indispensable (conditio sine qua non)9 is merely something that is required in order that something else may exist, but it has no part in producing its effects. A cause is also distinct from a mere occasion (occasio, causa occasionalis) , i. e. a conjunction which facilitates an effect, but is not necessary to its production.2 b) In applying these metaphysical concepts to the Sacraments, we must first of all guard against the false notion (unjustly attributed by Dom. Soto to Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and other Scholastic theologians), that the Sacraments are merely a conditio sine qua non, or the occasion, of sanctifying grace. To say that the Sacraments are merely the condition or occasion of the bestowal of sanctifying grace involves a practical denial of the dogma that they produce their effects ex opere operato, and destroys the essential distinction between the Sacraments of the Old and those 2 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., General Metaphysics, pp. 339 sqq. (Stonyhurst Scries).
MANNER OF OPERATION 145 of the New Law. The principle that the Sacraments are true signa efficacia must be so firmly upheld that, if it were demonstrated that as moral causes they would be no more than mere ” conditiones” or ” occasiones,” we should prefer to admit that their efficacy is physical, even though this theory involves some difficulties. For this reason it is of the greatest importance to prove that the sacramental signs are at least true moral causes of grace (Thesis I). In the case of some of the Sacraments, their moral operation is perhaps supplemented by a physical influence. This is true especially of the Holy Eucharist.3 In the case of the other Sacraments it is preferable to assume a purely moral causality, as weighty arguments can be alleged against the theory of physical causation (Thesis II). Before discussing this difficult problem it is important to establish accurately the state of the question. Assuming, what is self-evident, that the Sacraments as such are merely instruments (causae instrumentales) in the hand of God, and that God, as their causa principalis, physically produces sanctifying grace in the soul, the fundamental problem at issue may be formulated as follows : Does the external sign receive from God a peculiar supernatural power enabling it physically to produce sanctifying grace in the soul, either by a quality inherent in the rite, as Billuart and the Thomists contended, or by an external stimulation of the potentia obedientialis in the soul, as Suarez held? By formulating the question thus we avoid the ambiguity involved in the assertion that the Divine Omnipotence, as embodied and included in the sacramental sign, physically produces grace (Viva), or that the Holy Ghost exerts a physical causality in the applica8 See the treatise on the Holy Eucharist.
tion of the external sign (Berti). These assertions, correct enough in themselves, do not touch the point at issue. The problem to be decided is whether or not the sacramental sign as such, i. e. as an instrument distinct from the Divine Omnipotence and from the Holy Ghost, exerts a physical efficacy after the manner of a physical cause. 2. Dogmatic Theses. — If it can be shown that the sacramental signs are endowed with a true, though purely moral causality, we may, without trenching on the dogmatic teaching of the Church, set aside the theory that they are physical causes of grace. Taking this ground will enable us to shatter the absurd Protestant contention that the Church attributes a sort of magic efficacy to her Sacraments. Thesis I: All the Sacraments, as acts of their invisible author and chief minister, Jesus Christ, by virtue of their immanent dignity, move God to the (physical) production of grace, and hence exert at least a moral causality. This proposition may be technically qualified as communis. Proof. Even those theologians 4 who assert the physical efficacy of the Sacraments, do not deny their moral efficacy. Others5 content themselves with upholding the moral efficacy of the Sacraments, without fear lest they be thereby de4 Suarez, Gonet, and Gutberlet. Sacram., thts. 10 sq.), Chr. Pesch, 5 De Lugo (JDe Sacram. in Genere, Sasse, Tepe, et al. disp. 4, sect 4), Franzelin (De MANNER OF OPERATION 147 prived of the “mysterious” element in their operation.6 Indeed, is it not a profound mystery that God allows Himself to be moved by an external sign to bestow sanctifying grace? The moral efficacy of the Sacraments is sufficiently secured by two conditions : first, that the sign instituted by Christ, according to moral estimation, is considered as filled with the merits of the passion and death of Christ, and secondly, that the sacramental act of the human minister is looked upon as performed by our Divine Saviour Himself. From these two elements the sacramental rite receives an objective dignity which raises it far above its natural meaning, constitutes it the moral cause of the bestowal of grace, and renders it independent of the spiritual condition of the minister. a) The argument from Sacred Scripture may be formulated as follows: Christ’s passion is the moral, because it is the meritorious cause of justification.7 Consequently, and a fortiori, the Sacraments, being a mere application of the merits of the passion, are only the moral cause of justification. The Sacraments derive their efficacy from their immediate relation, not only to the blood of Christ,8 but likewise to His sacred «This fear is entertained by Atz- 8 Cfr. Col. I, 19 sq.; Heb. IX, 13 berger and Gihr. sq.; 1 Pet. I, 2, etc. 7 Cfr. Rom. V, 10; Eph. I, 7; x John I, 7; Apoc. I, 5, etc. Person, in whose name and as whose representative the human minister acts,9 and thus they cannot be merely conditions or occasions of grace. i Pet. Ill, 21, we read: “Salvos facit baptisma, non carnis depositio sordium, sed conscientiae bonae interrogate (errcpwrqiia) in Deum per resurrectionem Christi” Our English Bible renders this text as follows: ”… Baptism … now saveth you also: not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the examination of a good conscience towards God by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.” Here the water of the Deluge, from which some were rescued according to the body, is opposed to the water of Baptism, through which all faithful Christians are saved according to the spirit, and Baptism is declared to be more than a ” putting away of the filth of the flesh,” i. e. more than a Levitic purification. Whence does Baptism derive its power of spiritual regeneration? First of all from “the resurrection of Jesus Christ,” which term is here employed by synecdoche for the entire work of the Redemption.10 St. Peter goes on to describe Baptism as owctS^o-cws dya&Js iwtpwrqfia cfe ®c6v. The Greek word iirtpurqua in this connection can only mean “question” (interrogatio) or “petition” (rogatio, petitio), all other meanings — such as “vow” (sponsio) or ” treaty ” (pactum) — being excluded either for exegetical or lexicographical reasons. But the Latin rendering of the Vulgate, “conscientiae bonae interrogation which is followed by our English Bible, evidently does not give the right sense. For to think of an examination of the baptizandus before Baptism would 9Cfr. i Cor. I, 13, III, 4 sq., 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, IV, x. pp. 101 sqq.
MANNER OF OPERATION 149 be to confuse an accidental rite with the essence of the Sacrament, which the Apostle means to characterize. Consequently, i^wrrj/ia must here mean11 a prayer or petition for a good conscience, i. e. a purified and regenerated soul.12 Now prayer and petition belong to the category of moral causes, and consequently Baptism, — and all the other Sacraments a pari, — exert a moral efficacy.18 b) Tradition asserts the moral causality of the Sacraments wherever it speaks of the sacramental sign as “containing” the merits of Christ, who is the meritorious cause of our salvation, or refers to the human minister as a mere representative of the Redeemer. In the former case a Sacrament produces its effects in the same way as the Precious Blood of Christ, i. e. as a moral cause; in the latter, the rite, conceived as an action, has the same dignity and power before God as if the Redeemer baptized, confirmed, consecrated,14 absolved, etc., in person, employing the human minister merely as His instrument or agent.15 Needless to say, the human minister of a Sacrament must not be identified with its Divine Institutor and principal Administrator. The instrumental cause has its nCfr. Matth. XVI, z: bctp&rrr trap = rogaverunt. i2Cfr. John III, 5. 18 On 1 Pet III, 21, see Hundhausen, Das erste Pontifikalschreiben des Apostelfursten Petrus, Mainz 1873. i4Cfr. the Hoc est corpus meum in the Canon of the Mass. lBCfr. St Augustine, Contr. Lit. Petti., Ill, 49. So: “Hie [*. e. Christus] est qui baptisat in Spiritu Sancto, nec, sicut Petilianus dicit, iam baptisare cessavit, sed adhuc id agit, non ministerio corporis, sed invisibtii opere maiestatis.” Both these momenta are also emphasized by St Thomas (v. supra, p. 100, n. ISO THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL own peculiar operation, which does not coincide with that of the principal cause. Therefore, all defects, such as moral un worthiness, neglect, faulty pronunciation of the form, etc., are imputable to the minister. If he were to mutilate the baptismal formula in some non-essential point, it would not be true to say : ” The Lord has baptized wrongly.” Nor would it be right to say with regard to Penance : ” Christ confesses through the penitent.” But it would be proper to say : ” Christ absolves the sinner through the priest.” Where the recipient himself has to furnish the matter of a sacrament, as in Confession, the form alone is the work of the human minister, and, in the last resort, of Christ. But even where both matter and form are furnished by the minister, it is not permissible to substitute Christ unconditionally for His minister, though in most cases, as in the administration of Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Orders, and Extreme Unction, this would generally be true. Not so, however, in the case of Matrimony, which is both a human contract and a mystic relation, and consequently limited to human beings, and hence it would be false to say : ” Christ enters into the matrimonial state.” 16 c) To this may be added the following metaphysical considerations. The Sacraments derive their dignity from the merits and the ministerial action of Jesus Christ. Not, of course, from any merits acquired after His sacred passion or any new motive arising in His holy will. A Sacrament is merely an application of the exist6) ; cfr. Morgott, Der Spender der 16 For the solution of other difhl. Sakramente nach der Lehre des ficulties see De Augustinis, De Re hi. Thomas, pp. 2 sqq., Freiburg Sacramentario, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 1886. 245 sqq.
MANNER OF OPERATION 151 ing merits of the Redeemer ; but it is more than a mere condition or occasion of grace. It is a true moral cause. Let us illustrate our meaning by an example. A king grants a general amnesty to all political offenders. Though this act of itself objectively includes all, nevertheless, petitions submitted by the convicts severally may be a moral cause of pardon, inasmuch as by these petitions the king is moved to apply his general will of showing mercy to each separate individual. Other examples sometimes adduced by theologians are less appropriate. Take, e. g., that of “a man who, on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king’s command, a hundred pounds; not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money, this being the effect of the mere will of the king.” St. Thomas, who cites this example, justly observes: “If we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the Sacraments are mere signs; for the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king’s command that this man should receive money.” (S. Th., 3a, qu. 62, art. 1.) If the simile is really to illustrate the causality of the Sacraments, it must be changed as follows : Man, in the Sacrament which he receives, presents a gold coin, which, on account of its intrinsic value, morally compels his sovereign to be liberal. Melchior Cano compares the recipient of a Sacrament to a man who, by submitting a list of the merits of Jesus Christ, compels God to give the promised grace as a quid pro quo. This example is somewhat more pertinent but still inadequate. Velasquez’s contention that the moral causality of the Sacraments is owing to a merely impetratory influence is altogether unacceptable. The most satisfactory theory is the one we have adopted, viz.: that the objective dignity of the Sacraments is due partly to the fact that they embody the effects of the merits of Jesus Christ, and partly to the act of their principal minister, i. e. our Lord Himself. Thesis II: The Sacraments are not physical causes of grace. This proposition is held as “more probable” by the majority of Catholic theologians. Proof. The doctrine enunciated in our thesis is defended by the Scotists without exception, by Cano, Vasquez, De Lugo, Tournely, Franzelin, De Augustinis, Pesch, Tepe, and others, against almost the entire Thomist school and Suarez, Bellarmine, Ysambert, Drouin, Schazler, Katschthaler, Oswald, Gutberlet, and Gihr. Since the latter group all unhesitatingly admit the moral causality of the Sacraments, whereby the doctrine of their efficacy ex opere operato is MANNER OF OPERATION 153 fully safeguarded, it is not easy to see why they should, in addition, adopt the theory of physical causality, which is both unprovable and unintelligible. a) It is unprovable. The Scriptural and Patristic arguments upon which these writers base their contention merely prove the efficacy of the Sacraments but nothing as to the manner in which it is exercised. We may add, however, that the exaggerations (suggesting physical causality) upon which they lay so much stress may be welcome material in the defence of the real efficacy of the Sacraments, — in the same way as the hyperboles of St. John Chrysostom in regard to the real presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist are often used in support of that dogma. That such Biblical phrases as “born again of water,“17 “cleansing it by the laver of water,“18 “He saved us by the laver of regeneration,” 19 etc., do not necessarily imply a physical, but may be understood of a moral efficacy, is evidenced by such parallel passages/ as : ” Being born again not of corruptible seed-, but incorruptible, by the word of God,” 20 ” We have redemption through his blood,“21 “Alms is that which purgeth away sins,“22 and so forth. No doubt many Patristic i7loa. Ill, 5: * Renatus … ex aqua.* 18 Eph. V, 26: ” Mundans lavacro aquae.” 19 Tit. Ill, 5 : * Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis.* 20 1 Pet I, 23: Renati non mx setnine corruptibili, sed incorruptibili per verbum Dei vivi. 21 Eph. I, 7: * Habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius.* 22Tob. XII, 9: * Elemosyna … ipsa est, quae purgat peccata* 154 THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL expressions regarding the efficacy of the Sacraments are derived from physical phenomena, as e. g. the comparison of Baptism to water that engenders fish, or to the maternal womb developing a foetus. But they are employed merely to prove the efficacy of the Sacraments, not to define the nature of that efficacy. Whenever the Fathers speak of physical causality as such, they refer it either to the totum, as the synthesis of ” omnipotence and sign,” or to the divine omnipotence alone, and thereby indirectly admit that the sign, as sign, produces its effects in a purely moral way.28 It is claimed that the surprise which the Fathers often betray at the mysterious power of the baptismal water would be inexplicable, had they held the efficacy of Baptism to be merely moral.24 But the theory of moral causality leaves sufficient room for surprise and mystery. Is not justification through the instrumentality of a visible sign mysterious enough? Does not the fact that God makes His grace dependent on material-elements challenge surprise and admiration? b) The theory of physical causality is unintelligible. In itself, this would not be a sufficient reason for rejecting it; but it justifies us in demanding stringent proofs before admitting a new theological mystery. Scotus 25 and some of his followers declare that it is impossible for a material element physically to produce 23 For the Patristic texts in proof of this statement see De Augustinis, De Re Sacrament., Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 258 sqq.; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. VI, 3rd ed., pp. 65 sq. 24 Cfr. Billuart, De Sacram., diss. 3, art. 2. 25 Comment, in Sent., IV, dist. i, qu. 5. MANNER OF OPERATION 155 supernatural effects. We would not go as far as that; but we do hold with De Lugo that matters of religious belief should not be unnecessarily rendered obscure or difficult.26 The two principal arguments against the theory of physical causality are based on the nature of the sacramental rite and the revival of the Sacraments. a) The whole sacramental sign never exists simultaneously. Either the sacramental form in its physical entity has passed away, as in the reception of the Holy Eucharist, or the matter is no longer present, as in the absolution of a penitent who has confessed his sins the day before he receives absolution. But even where matter and form coexist, as they do e. g. in Baptism, the administration of the Sacrament requires time; that which physically existed at the beginning no longer exists in the end, and vice versa. Now it is a philosophical axiom that action supposes being, and consequently, nothing can produce physical effects unless it has a physical existence. Which part, then, of the sign produces the effect ? Or does each part produce part of the effect ? Is justification divisible? Does it arrive by parts? Clearly, here is a new mystery. To escape the force of this argument, Suarez 27 and others declare that the bestowal of grace is physically bound up with the last word or final syllable of the sacramental form. Why not with the last letter? — or, to be entirely consistent, with the last breath escaping from the mouth of the minister who pronounces the formula? If only a part of the sign is efficacious, what value has the remainder? Or, if it be admitted that what has physically passed away endures morally 26 De Sacram., disp. 4, sect. 4, 27 De Sacrament., disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 35: * Non debemus res nostrae n. 15. fidei absque necessitate dUKciliores et obscuriores reddere.*
and produces moral effects, what reason is there to assume that it is precisely the last word or syllable of the form that becomes the physical instrument of grace? Then, again, there are cases in which the necessary conditions of physical efficacy are entirely absent, as in a marriage contracted by proxy. Who would assert that God causes the consent of a bride residing in New York to produce a physical effect in the soul of her husband in London, or vice versa? These and similar consequences entailed by the theory of physical causation provoke the scorn of infidels and help nothing towards clearing up the mysterious action of the Sacraments.28 p) The possibility of a revival of the Sacraments (reviviscentia sacramentorum) furnishes another convincing argument against the theory of physical causality. This argument may be briefly stated thus : The Sacraments frequently confer grace in an exclusively moral manner, as when Baptism is validly conferred on an unworthy subject and attains its efficacy only after the existing obstacle has been removed (remoto obice). If grace can be conferred by a purely moral influence in exceptional cases, why assume that it produces its ordinary effects by physical causation ? Baptism, though physically past, effects in its unworthy subject, as soon as he acquires the proper disposition, spiritual regeneration and forgiveness of sins. This cannot be a physical effect, because the cause is no longer present when the effect sets in, as even Suarez admits.29 The contention of certain Thomists that the sacramental character is the physical medium of grace, is inadmissible. To produce grace is not the purpose of the as Cfr. Vasquez, Comment, in 20 : ” In eo casu sacramentum praeSent., Ill, disp. 123, c. 6. teritum non concurrit per physic am 29 De Sacram., disp. 9, sect. 2, n. eMcientiam ad gratiam praestandam”
MANNER OF OPERATION 157 character, but of the Sacrament itself. Besides, there are Sacraments which, though they confer the sacramental character, are incapable of being revived. Where, for instance, is grace to find its physical medium in Matrimony? There is nothing left but to admit that it is truer and more probable to assume that those Sacraments which do not imprint a character on the soul produce their effects morally, not physically, when the obstacle is removed.30 But if this be admitted in some cases, why not in all? c) The attitude of St. Thomas is in dispute. Perhaps the Angel of the Schools, like St. Bonaventure,31 favored neither opinion. It is safe to assume, however, that he regarded the Sacraments as moral, without denying that they are also physical, causes of grace. There is no contradiction in ascribing to the Sacraments such a twofold causality. If St. Thomas believed in the latter theory, he did not exclude the former, as is evidenced by his declaration that “The Sacraments of the Church derive their power especially from Christ’s passion, the virtue of which is in a manner united to us by our receiving the Sacraments.* 82 If the passion of our Lord is 30 Cfr. Gonet, De Sacram., disp. 3, art. 3, §2, n. 81 : * Verior et probabilior est solutio ac doctrina aliorum Thomistarum asserentium, sacrament a quae non imprimunt characterem recedente fictione [t. e. remoto obice] non causare physice, sed moraliter.** Si Comment, in Sent., IV, disk i, p. 1, qu. 4: * Nescio tamen, quae sit verior.** MSumma Theol., 3a, qu. 62, art 5: Sacramento Ecclesiae specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cuius virtus nobis quodammodo copulatur per susceptionem sacramentorum,* 158 THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL morally efficacious, the same must be true of its concrete embodiment and application through the sacramental sign.33 In his earlier days St. Thomas held that the sacramental sign, on account of its inability to produce the substance of sanctifying grace, — this being reserved to the Divine Omnipotence, — effects in the soul only a kind of spiritual disposition (dispositio spiritualis) or ornament (ornatus animae) which, as res and sacramentum, is on a level with the sacramental character, and imperatively demands the infusion of sanctifying grace.34 Whether he conceived this dispositio or ornatus as produced by physical or moral means, is open to debate. However, the fact that the Angelic Doctor does not mention this theory in the Summa Theologica 35 seems to prove that he attributed no particular importance to it. At any rate, since its rejection by Cardinal Cajetan, the theory has disappeared from the writings of the Thomists, who vigorously defend the physical causality of the Sacraments. The only reason why we mention it at all is that it has been recently revived by Cardinal Billot,36 who holds that the Sacraments produce sanctify88 This argument is ably developed by Tepe, Instit. TheoL, Vol. IV, pp. 47 sq. 84 Comment, in Sent., IV, dist. i, qu. i, art. 4. He was followed in this opinion by nearly all pre-Tridentine theologians, — Capreolus, Paludanus, Sylvester of Ferrara, etc. 85 It recurs, however, in his Quaestiones Disp., De Potentia. 36 De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 68 sqq., Rome 1907. MANNER OF OPERATION 159 ing grace neither morally nor physically, but efhcienter dispositive, i. e.} by creating in the soul a certain spiritual disposition, of the same kind as that which the ancients called ornatus. If this were true, the efficacy of the sacramental rite would be indirect, — an assumption which unduly depreciates the Sacraments. To this should be added the following consideration: The spiritual disposition produced in the soul by the Sacraments, according to Billot, is either a physical quality, or it is not. If it is, there is no essential distinction between those Sacraments that imprint a character and those that do not. If the dispositio spiritualis is not a physical quality of the soul, it can hardly be anything more than a moral claim to grace (titulus gratiae), and then the efficacy of the Sacraments is purely moral. Scheeben’s curious theory that the Sacraments produce their effects by a sort of “hyper-physical” efficacy, is too obscure to obtain general acceptance.37 Readings : — *C. von Schazler, Die Lehre von der Wirksamkeit der Sakramente ex opere operato, Munich i860. — Bucceroni, Commentarius de Sacramentorum Causalitate, Paris 1889. — G. Reinhold, Die Streitfrage tiber die physische oder tnoralische Wirksamkeit der Sakramente, Vienna 1899. — *Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogtnatische Theologie, Vol. IV, §485-491, Mainz 1901.— Gihr, Die 87 On the ornatus animae cfr. M. 1901. For a defence of Billot’s Buchberger, Die Wirkungen des teaching see G. Van Noort, De S& Bussakramentes nach der Lehre des cramentis, Vol. I, 2nd ecL, pp. 49 hi. Thomas, pp. 150 sqq., Freiburg sqq., Amsterdam 19 10. hi Sakramente der kath. Kirche, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 63 sqq., Freiburg 1902. — Pourrat, La Theologie Sacramentaire , pp. 85-184, Paris 1910 (English tr., Theology of the Sacraments, pp. 93-196, St. Louis 1914). — Mohler, Symbolik, § 28 sqq., nth ed., Mainz 1890 (English tr. by J. B. Robertson, 5th ed., pp. 202 sqq., London 1906). — J. B. Rohm, Konfessionelle Lehrgegensatze, Vol. Ill, pp. 539 sqq., Hildesheim 1888.