Miracles — Part I: Nature and Possibility

Chapter XVII.—Miracles

Art. I.—Nature of a miracle.

I.—The meaning of the word “miracle.”

Apparent from etymology, it is “a fact or event causing wonder.” St. Thomas (C. Gentes, Bk. III., c. 101) gives a definition which may be regarded as nominal: “Those facts or events are called miracles which are accomplished by God outside the order of nature commonly observed.”

II.—Miracle as a motive of credibility.

The Vatican Council (D. 1790) describes a miracle as a “Divine fact clearly showing the omnipotence of God.” A miracle therefore is above the powers of created, including angelic, nature, and is distinguished from extraordinary natural facts, and from diabolic deceptions. A miracle is marked off from ordinary Divine events (such as the constant creation of souls) which are in accordance with the usual order, and which cannot be a sign of Revelation.

Some Catholic writers (Le Grand, Brugère, La Hogue) have unwisely defined a miracle as some fact or event above human power, but not above angelic or diabolic power.

III.—Heterodox notions of a miracle.

(A) According to Determinist teaching a miracle is an extraordinary natural fact not as yet scientifically explained. The physical laws of nature are as unchangeable as mathematical or metaphysical laws. On this ground Spinoza denied the possibility of a miracle. Deists claim that God does not attend to particular or individual acts, as the doctrine of miracle implies. Malebranche was of opinion that some miracles might be due to angelic power; other miracles, like the Incarnation, were undoubtedly Divine. Leibnitz’s view was practically identical with that of Père Malebranche. The change of water into wine at Cana might be due to angelic power. If God worked a miracle surpassing the powers of nature, He would change the course of the universe, because of the connexion of matter with matter. But Leibnitz admitted miracles such as the Incarnation. Houtteville maintained that a miracle was a natural effect, inasmuch as it comes from the order of nature or the laws of motion, but supernatural inasmuch as by the sole powers of nature it cannot be foreseen by man. Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Sabatier hold that an event may be natural, i.e., in accordance with unknown laws of nature, and miraculous as an effect of Divine benevolence.

(B) The Agnostic view is that a miracle is not an infringement of the laws of nature, but an infringement of our subjective view of these same laws. M. Poincaré in his work La Science et l’Hypothèse (p. 113-119) regards the idea of the stability of the laws of nature as due to our subjective mode of regarding them. Hence an exception to the laws of nature is not a miracle. As we do not know all the laws of nature, we cannot be sure of the intervention of a Cause who transcends the phenomenal order.

Messieurs Blondel and Laberthonnière characterise miracles respectively as “dérogations aux apparences anthropomorphiques,” and “dérogations à un ordre illusoire.” M. Le Roy regards a miracle as an extraordinary effect of vehement Faith.

IV.—Catholic idea of miracle.

The definition, not merely nominal but real, of a miracle is as follows: “A sensible fact produced by God in the world, which fact is beyond the order of action of entire created nature.” This definition is based on St. Thomas’s exposition (Iᵃ q 110 a. 4):

1° “A sensible fact.”

2° “Produced by God” as principal cause, who sometimes uses creatures as His instruments.

3° “In the world” inasmuch as miracles are intended to affect mankind.

4° “Beyond the order of nature,” but not beyond the order of Divine Providence.

5° “Beyond the order of action of entire created nature,” and not merely beyond the inclination of a particular created nature, otherwise to throw a stone upwards would be a miracle. Again a miracle is beyond the order of action, but not beyond the order of being of entire created nature. A miracle exceeds effectively all the powers of nature. It is supernatural modally, whereas grace is supernatural intrinsically, and is therefore beyond the order of being of entire created nature.

From the explanation just given, it is clear that a miracle is different from (a) natural extraordinary facts which are fortuitous from the standpoint of secondary causes, but not from the standpoint of Divine Providence; (b) diabolic deceptions which are intended to be like miracles; (c) ordinary Divine works, e.g., conservation, “præmotio,” creation of souls, justification of the sinner, etc.; (d) ordinary facts called providential—often an answer to prayer.

Properties of a miracle.

A miracle must be:

1° Difficult because it exceeds the power of nature.

2° Beyond the hope of nature, but not beyond the hope of grace.

3° Unusual, not because it may not frequently happen, but because it is beyond natural experience.

4° Not against nature: it is not a violation of the laws of nature.

5° A sign manifesting supernatural teaching, or witnessing the sanctity of some servant of God.

6° A portent soliciting attention.

V.—Division of Miracles.

Miracles exceed the power of nature in a threefold way:

(1) As regards the nature or substance of the fact, e.g., two bodies occupying the same space,¹ as when Our Lord came into the Cenacle, the doors being closed, or the miracle popularly described as the standing still of the sun. These are absolutely beyond the power of nature.

(2) As regards the subject in whom the miracle is worked, e.g. giving sight to the blind, giving life to the dead. Nature can give life and sight but not to one who is dead, or congenitally blind.

(3) As regards manner of action, e.g., instantaneous cure from fever, instantaneous change of water into wine, etc.

The student must not confound the “miraculous as to substance” (the first category of miracles just given) with the “supernatural as to substance.” A miracle as to substance is only effectively or modally supernatural. Supernatural as to substance means that which is intrinsically or essentially supernatural, e.g., sanctifying grace.

Art. II.—Possibility of a miracle.

I.—Possibility of miracles denied.²

1° Determinists like Spinoza deny the freedom of God to work miracles. Deists deny the exercise of God’s particular Providence. Leibnitz, like Spinoza, maintained that God’s choice of action was morally necessary.

2° Agnostics hold that nature’s powers are not fully known, and that it is impossible on that account to characterise a fact or event as miraculous. Others say that the laws of nature are contingent, and that therefore an exception in the working of the laws is not miraculous.

3° Huxley’s argument against miracles is thus expressed: “When repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of our practical life is built upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never been broken and will never be broken becomes one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the actual occurrence of interruptions of that order to produce evidence in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that which leads us to adopt ours.” (Cf. Hume, English Men of Letters Series, chap. vii., p. 129). An answer to this objection will presently be given.

II.—Proof of the possibility of a miracle.

St. Thomas states the proof in syllogistic form:

Major: A free cause on whom depends the application of laws only hypothetically necessary, and who is not bound to them, can act independently of and above them.

Minor: But God is an omnipotent free Cause on whom depends the application of laws only hypothetically necessary, nor is He bound to the present natural order.

Conclusion: Therefore God can act independently of, and above, the whole course of created nature, i.e., can work a miracle.

In this syllogism there are three propositions to be proved—the Major and the two statements in the Minor.

Proof of the Major.

1° (A) (à posteriori). A man throws a stone upwards. He suspends, for the time being, the effect of the law of gravitation. He does not violate the law. A composer of genius produces a sublime symphony beyond and above the ordinary laws of his art. Such instances are suspensions of the ordinary laws owing to the action of a special cause, and the exception confirms the law because it is not against it but above it.

(B) (à priori). God can exercise not only the “liberty of exercise” (libertas exercitii), i.e., He can act or not act, but also the “liberty of specification” (libertas specificationis), i.e., He can decree this or that effect, since He is in no way bound to the present order.

2° Absolute necessity is independent of any condition, and is founded on the essence of a thing, e.g., the angles of a plane triangle equal two right angles. Mathematical laws and great principles of Metaphysics (e.g., principles of contradiction, causality, etc.) are necessary.

Hypothetical necessity is that which must be because of some extrinsic cause, efficient or final. Granted that such an agent acts under natural conditions, then the effect is necessary. Fire burns, because God freely determined so, but the action can be suspended by the same Cause who freely instituted physical laws. The laws of nature express the manner of action which created beings follow. Therefore the laws are such because of their efficient cause, and are only hypothetically necessary. A stone naturally tends to fall to the ground. If supported by the hand the tendency still remains. If miraculously supported, there is no violation of the law of nature, inasmuch as the tendency to fall remains. St. Thomas noted this distinction with his usual perspicacity: “In igne fornacis, remanebat ordo ad comburendum, licet non combureret tres pueros in camino” (de Pot. q VI., a 1 ad 20). Hence absolute necessity excludes the possibility of a miracle, but not hypothetical necessity.

Proof of the Minor. God is an omnipotent free Cause on whom depends the application of laws hypothetically necessary, and He is not limited to them.

(A) God is omnipotent free Cause.

(a) God is the supreme immaterial and intelligent First Cause. The Divine will follows the intellect, and is free regarding individual goods, which are not needed for Infinite Perfection. Hence God is free regarding works ad extra, e.g., in creating or in not creating. The nature of created things is determined, and hence their actions (free or necessary) are confined within certain limits through necessity of nature. But the Divine nature is not determined, and effects come from Him in accordance with the free choice of will and intellect.

(b) God is infinite in power as in other respects, and can accomplish anything which is not intrinsically impossible.

(B) Application of laws, only hypothetically necessary, depends on the Divine will, which is not bound to them.

(a) Just as God is free to create or not, He is free to withhold His concursus necessary for the operation of a created agent. Hence it is not repugnant that fire should not burn, if God withholds His concursus.

(b) When an end is proportioned to things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to a determined order. But Divine Goodness is an end, which exceeds created things out of all proportion. Hence Divine Wisdom is not determined to any certain order of things, so that another order cannot come from Him. Thus comes the freedom not only of exercise (exercitii), but of specification (specificationis).

Conclusion: God can act negatively and positively as regards natural laws. Negatively by impeding the natural action of things, e.g., fire, and positively in the threefold way mentioned in the classification of miracles.

Object of miracles: The proof of salutary truth is an end of sufficient importance that God should act beyond and above the order of nature.

Corollary: No creature can work a miracle by his own power. When a creature works a miracle, he receives from God a transient supernatural power, and uses at the same time his own power.

Can an evil man work a miracle as an instrument? To one who preaches the true Faith and invokes the name of Christ, even though he may not be a good man, the power of working a miracle may be given in confirmation of the doctrine preached.

Hume’s objection against miracles may be stated as follows: There is physical certitude of the uniformity of Nature’s laws. There is only moral certitude based on human testimony in favour of the occurrence of miracles. Now physical is stronger than moral certitude. Consequently the justification of belief in miracles disappears.

Hume’s objection overlooks the distinction between suspension of a law of nature and violation of the same law. Experience justifies us in regarding the non-violation of the laws of nature as (to use Professor Huxley’s words) “one of the strongest and most justifiable of human convictions.” But suspension of nature’s laws is of frequent occurrence. Hundreds of instances occur daily of the suspension of the law of gravitation and of other physical laws. A miracle therefore does not involve a conflict of two kinds of certitude. Physical certitude safeguards the non-violation of a law of nature, but the certitude has no relevance in the case of a miracle which does not involve such violation. For the credibility of a miracle, therefore, is required adequate testimony. Professor Huxley in his work on Hume (English Men of Letters Series) rightly deprecates the description of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature. Huxley’s own objection against the occurrence of miraculous interposition is based on the presumption that the Supernatural does not exist.

A miracle, not being a natural event, cannot be tested by the ordinary methods of physical science, viz., by repetition. If it could be so tested, then the alleged miracle, repeated at will, would at once lose its miraculous character, becoming a purely natural event. The only remaining method of establishing events is by testimony, and even physical science is not without examples of incidents which by their very nature are incapable of universal demonstration, but nevertheless are accepted upon the testimony of the observers. This testimony does not need to possess the extraordinary characteristics demanded by Hume, and in practice rarely does so. A miracle by its very nature precludes the possibility of Hume’s demands being satisfied, without invoking conditions no less miraculous than the event itself. To meet legitimate demands of credibility, alleged miracles, e.g., at Lourdes, are most carefully examined by a Commission of medical experts, before a pronouncement is made endorsing their miraculous character.

Objection on the ground that a miracle would involve a contradiction of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not valid, for this law applies only to purely physical events, and in addition definitely excludes external agency from activity in the event selected, whereas a miracle essentially involves an external agent.

Objection on the ground that a miracle would contradict the law of Conservation of Energy is not valid, for this law also applies only to purely physical events, and in any case the immense amount of energy normally dissipated exceeds demands occasioned by the performance of miracles.

Professor Ernest W. Hobson (The Domain of Natural Science, 1923), writes: “The fact that we have no assurance that all possible forms of energy, which may occur in physical phenomena, are known to us makes it impossible to conceive that the principle (of the Conservation of Energy) should admit of anything like complete empirical verification.”

Notes

Footnotes

1. “We mean by matter something such that two portions of it cannot be in the same place at the same time—that is probably the best definition of matter which we can give.” Dr. W. Brown in Science, Religion and Reality, p. 325. ↩

2. The agnostic view claims that, as instalments of knowledge a+b+c+ … . become known, the conception of the universe is represented by: a+b+c+ … . +x, where x represents the, as yet, unknown elements. The scientific ideal is to get rid of x. Professor Simpson points out that a more correct representation of these phenomena would be (a+b+c+ … .) ⁄ x, where x represents the continual sustaining and control of all things by God. (Cf. J. Y. Simpson “The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature” p. 297.) ↩