Prophecy as a Motive of Credibility

Chapter XVIII.—Prophecy as a Motive of Credibility

Art. I.—Nature of Prophecy.

I.—Meaning of the word.

De Quincey writes: “Primarily the word prophet means, and Scripturally it means—interpreter of the Divine purposes and thoughts. If those purposes and thoughts should happen to lurk in mysterious doctrines of Religion, then the prophet is simply an exegetes, or expounder. But, it is true, if they lurk in the dark mazes of time and futurity unrolling itself from the central present, then the prophet means a seer or reader of the future, in our ordinary modern sense. But this modern sense is neither the Mahometan sense, nor that which prevails in the New Testament. Mahomet is the prophet of God—not in the sense of predicter from afar, but as the (supposed) organ of communication between God and man, or revealer of the Divine will. In St. Paul, again, ‘gifts of prophecy’ mean uniformly any extraordinary qualifications for unfolding the meaning of Scripture doctrine, or introducing light and coherency amongst their elements, and perhaps never the qualifications for inspired foresight” [De Quincey’s Works (Masson) Vol. V., p. 289 note].

Hence the Greek word προφήτης corresponds to the Hebrew word nâbi and indicates one who is of enthusiastic spirit, and speaks on behalf of God to men. According to St. Thomas προφήτης is from προφαίνειν which signifies “to appear,” “quia scilicet eis (prophetis) aliqua, quæ sunt procul, apparent.” Others derive the word from προφάναι which suggest either “to announce beforehand” or “to announce on behalf of another,” i.e., on behalf of God. Hence prophecy means Revelation. But in a special sense, prophecy is taken to mean “the pre-knowledge and prediction of future events divinely given to the soul.”

II.—Motive of Credibility.

The Vatican Council defines prophecies as “Divine facts which, since they shew clearly the infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of Divine Revelation, and are accommodated to the intelligence of all.” Prophecy differs from a miracle inasmuch as it belongs to the intellectual, whereas a miracle belongs to the sensitive order.

III.—Heterodox notions of Prophecy.

Rationalists reject the idea of prophecy. Some identify it with the tendency to divination which exists in all forms of religion, and which is based on credulity. Others say that the predictions were nothing more than the à priori assumption that God will bless the just and punish the wicked. Auguste Sabatier writes: “The Hebrew seers (like the Sibyls and the soothsayer Tiresias) never possessed the miraculous gift of reading the future. The superiority of their inspiration is from another source. It is due to a purer idea of God, to a more elevated ideal of justice, to a religion essentially moral, to their indefectible faith in the triumph of the Law, and of the holy and merciful will of the Eternal. Resting on the one hand on the sovereignty of their God, and on the other on the inflexible law of moral conscience, they announced with certainty the chastisement of the wicked, the consolation of the oppressed, the return of captives, the healing of the sick, the salvation of all who repent and amend. The Kingdom of God would be the effect of this conversion of hearts and wills. Such were the prophecies of John the Baptist, such were those of Christ Himself: they do not in any way proceed from a special gift or miraculous power of divination, but from a firmer moral conviction, a more profound life in God, a more sincere and disinterested piety… . The moral idea of prophecy remains, but the miraculous element has gone” (Esquisse d’une philosophie de la Religion d’après la psychologie et l’histoire, p. 91. So also Spinoza, Renan, etc.).

IV.—Catholic idea of Prophecy.

What is the proper object of prophecy?

Things are distant: (1) locally; (2) because of want of knowledge (e.g., supernatural mysteries hidden in God); (3) because of their indetermination, such as future contingent events, which constitute the proper object of prophecy. Hence the definition of prophecy: “Infallible foretelling of a future contingent event, which can be certainly foreseen by supernatural light alone.”

(a) Infallible—to eliminate mere conjecture.

(b) Foretelling of a future contingent event, such as those which depend on freedom of the will.

(c) Requiring supernatural light, inasmuch as a future contingent event is indifferent either to being or to non-being.

1st Corollary: The prophetic light is a transient impression (Cf. 4 Kings iv. 27).

2nd Corollary: Prophetic knowledge implies two things:

(1) Representation of the future contingent event, and

(2) Infallible judgment concerning it.

3rd Corollary: The principal element in prophetic revelation is the supernatural light—not the representation of a future contingent event. Representations were given to Pharaoh, to Nabuchodonosor, to Baltassar, etc., and they were not prophets.

V.—Different kinds of Prophecy.

• Prophecy
  • From standpoint of object known
    • as regards extension of knowledge to a future event
      • and extension to, or non-extension to
        • 1. a fixed time.
        • 2. the Divine origin of the prophecy.
        • 3. the significance of the future event.
    • as regards the nature of the future contingent event
      • future unconditional: prophecy of prescience.
      • future conditional: prophecy of commination.
  • From standpoint of mode of knowledge
    • formally
      • Intellectual vision.
      • Vision through imagination.
      • Vision through the senses.
    • materially
      • In state of wakefulness.
      • In ecstasy or rapture.
      • In sleep.

(A) From standpoint of the object known.

(a) As regards extent of the knowledge concerning the future event, there are four grades:

1° Most perfect: future event, exact time, Divine origin of prophecy, and meaning of future event—all known, e.g., Our Lord’s announcement of His Passion and Resurrection.

2° Future event, its meaning, Divine origin of prophecy known, e.g., Our Lord’s prophecy of the end of the world. The destruction of Jerusalem is foretold as a figure of the catastrophic destruction of the world (Cf. Matthew xxiv. 1-36).

3° Future event and its meaning known. A prophet may speak from a sort of instinct as well as from definite revelation. When he speaks from instinct the Divine origin of the prophecy is not clear.

4° Future event known. Both Divine origin and meaning are unknown, e.g., Caiphas’ prophecy as narrated in John xi. 49 sq.

Regarding the meaning of the predicted event, it may be supernatural, e.g., Incarnation, Mission of the Holy Ghost, etc., or a future contingent event of the natural order, e.g., destruction of Jerusalem.

(b) The nature of the future contingent event supplies a twofold division.

1° Prophecy of prescience (unconditioned).

2° Prophecy of commination (conditioned), e.g., Prophecy of Jonas (Jonas iii. 4); Prophecy of Isaias to Ezechias (Is. xxxviii. 2).

(B) From standpoint of mode of cognition.

The mode may be taken:

(a) Formally.

1° Intellectual vision.

2° Picture in the imagination, e.g., God, angel or man speaking, words heard, etc.

3° Sensitive image, e.g., seven full ears of corn.

(b) Materially.

1° In a state of wakefulness.

2° In ecstasy or rapture.

3° In sleep.

Art. II.—Possibility of Prophecy.

I.—God can communicate prophetic knowledge to man.

Major: God can communicate to man those things which He knows.

Minor: But He knows infallibly future contingent things.

Conclusion: Therefore He can communicate to man the knowledge of future contingent things.

Major is proved. Knowledge of a future contingent event exceeds the capacity of our intellect, not because the future event possesses an intrinsic supernatural character (as in the case of the mystery of the Trinity), but because of its contingency or indetermination. God can direct human concepts to such an event by the infusion of prophetic light. Light modally supernatural (i.e., light corresponding to a miracle of the first order) is sufficient.

Minor is proved. If God did not know from eternity all future contingent things, He would pass from power to act (i.e., from potentiality to achievement)—a consequence opposed to His infinite perfection. Eternity, which exists simultaneously, comprises the whole of time in a changeless present. The prescience of God in regard to future contingent things does not affect freedom. “Since the Divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that those things are done which God wishes to be done, but it follows that they are done in the manner in which God wishes—some necessarily and some freely” (Iᵃ q 19, a 8).

II.—God alone can by His power give to man prophetic knowledge of future contingent things.

God is the absolutely universal Cause, unchangeable, and hence He alone can infallibly know future things.

III.—God alone can communicate to man certain knowledge of the secrets of hearts.

This knowledge is described by St. Paul as “discernment of spirits” (1 Cor. xii. 10). Secret thoughts in the mind and affections in the will as such, apart from their effects, are known to God alone, because both intellect and will are subject to Him. The interior life is the special domain of God. History can tell nothing of the interior life of St. Joseph and of the Blessed Virgin: “God hath hidden me in His tabernacle” (Ps. xxvi. 5).

Art. III.—Discernibility of Prophecy.

Rationalists claim that even if supernatural prophecy were possible, it could not be discriminated from conjecture.

The Vatican Council (D. 1790) teaches that “prophecies are Divine facts, which, since they clearly shew the infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of Divine Revelation and accommodated to the intelligence of all.”

I.—The prediction of a future contingent event and its subsequent fulfilment are facts quite within the power of the human mind to verify.

II.—Many prophecies may with certainty be differentiated from human conjecture and from the divination of spirits.

1° Common opinion.

In cases where (1) minute circumstances regarding future contingent events are clearly announced, (2) the events being remote, (3) many and complex, (4) dependent on the free-will of several, (5) when, as sometimes happens, a miracle depending on Divine free-will is foretold—prophecies with these characteristics can be discriminated with certainty from human conjecture.

The theory of probability shews that in regard to a number of circumstances, the probability of the fulfilment of each being ten to one, the probability of the fulfilment of two is a hundred to one, of three a thousand to one, and so on. The possibility of fortuitous occurrence is soon practically eliminated.

2° Philosophic Reason.

Major: It is impossible with certitude to predict, naturally or fortuitously, long before the event, to predict too with minute circumstances future contingent events, the greater number of which depend on human freedom, and some on Divine freedom.

Minor: But many predictions are of such a nature, e.g., propagation of Monotheism, Davidic origin of the Messiah, characteristics of the Messiah, passion and death of the Messiah, conversion of Gentile nations, etc.

Conclusion: Therefore these predictions are beyond human power and postulate the infinite prescience of God.

(A) How prophecy differs from chance occurrence.

Chance is the accidental meeting of causes. A man digs a grave and unexpectedly finds treasure. The digging of the grave is intentional. The hiding of the treasure was intentional. The accidental meeting of the causes (hiding and digging) constitutes chance. In the following five cases the possibility of chance is eliminated.

(1) Many things cannot by chance concur to the formation of one perfect result. Otherwise the perfect result (e.g., faculty of vision) would be without a reason of being.

(2) From one principle, many parts, connected inter se, cannot come by chance, e.g., from an acorn, the different parts of an oak.

(3) From one principle there cannot come by chance some definite effect, e.g., an act of intelligence from the intellectual faculty, or an act of vision from the sensitive faculty. Chance, i.e., the accidental conjunction of causes, is eliminated by the simplicity of both terminus a quo and terminus ad quem.

(4) Things which happen invariably or frequently are not caused by chance, otherwise the constancy would be without a reason of being.

(5) Chance cannot be the first cause of the disposition of things, inasmuch as a cause per accidens presupposes a cause per se to which it is an accident. Otherwise the order of things would come from the absence of order.

These principles illustrate the difference between the fulfilment of a true prophecy, and fortuitous occurrence based on natural conjecture.

(a) In the fulfilment of many prophecies, various elements concur to the realisation of one contingent effect clearly predicted.

(b) From the primitive and simple promise of a Redeemer came many results admirably connected inter se.

(c) From one principle there cannot come by chance the unity of the consummation and perfection of innumerable souls. From the promise of a Redeemer comes the consummation of the Judaic-Christian Religion which has brought and brings to unity in Christ countless souls of good-will.

(d) Similar things which happen frequently or invariably cannot proceed from chance. In various prophecies of the Old Testament, similar events are foretold, especially the Messiah and His works.

(e) The Jewish religion is a prophecy of the Christian religion. The orderly development and fulfilment of this great historical prophecy cannot be due to chance, otherwise order would come from disorder—organic development of a unique kind would be due to an accidental cause.

(B) How prophecy is discriminated from conjecture which is fortuitously verified.

Renan wrote that the Messianic hope caused expectation on the part of the Jews, and when Christ appeared His friends gave Him the name and attributed to Him the qualities of the Messiah. Christ at first had no consciousness of being the Messiah, but gradually the conviction came. His disciples tried to shew that in Him the Messianic prophecies were fulfilled.

Critique

(a) Just as the order of the world does not come from blind necessity, so the order of prophecy and its fulfilment do not come from natural necessity without the arrangement of Divine Providence.

(b) Prophetic announcement is concerned not with a future necessary occurrence, but with a future contingent event, depending on the free-will of many.

(c) Moreover in some cases the future contingent event is a miracle to be attributed to Divine Free-will, e.g., Incarnation, Resurrection, Mission of the Holy Ghost, propagation of the Church, perpetuity of the Church, etc.

(d) The Messianic hope did not naturally appear amongst the Jews. The Jews frequently refused to believe the prophets and killed them. The Apostles and Evangelists were not alone in shewing that Christ fulfilled prophecy. The fulfilment was and is a historic fact.

Moreover Divine Providence would not allow false prophecy in all its minute circumstances to be fulfilled. Otherwise God would permit men to be invincibly deceived in matters which concern their salvation.

III.—Some prophecies, taken individually, can be discriminated from human conjecture or divination of spirits only with moral certitude.

This moral certitude is based on the consideration of circumstances.

Do the circumstances point to honesty, seriousness, virtue? If the prophet be a man of holy life, one may believe that a prophecy fulfilled has come from God.

Art. IV.—Probative force of Prophecy.

I.—Teaching of the Church.

“Prophecies are most certain signs of Divine Revelation” (D. 1790). The Apostles and especially St. Matthew appeal to the fulfilment of prophecies of the Old Testament.

II.—The probative force of prophecy is proved by reason.

A Divine sign—the seal of God—most certainly confirms Divine Revelation, and prophecy is undoubtedly a sign which can come from God alone.

Prophecy fulfilled directly shews the infinite knowledge of God, as a miracle shews the Divine omnipotence.

Prophecy fulfilled indirectly shews the Divine origin of Revelation. Otherwise God would be a witness to false teaching.

The connection between the prophecy and the revealed doctrine to be confirmed is declared by the prophet explicitly or implicitly (Cf. Matt. xii. 39).

Some prophecies are intrinsic to Religion, e.g., those announcing the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, Indefectibility of the Church, etc. Similarly some miracles, e.g., Resurrection, Ascension, etc., belong intrinsically to Religion and not merely extrinsically as the giving of sight to the man born blind.