The Rule of Faith: Councils, Censures, and the Development of Dogma

§ 32. General Councils

I. The Pope, speaking ex cathedra, is infallible independently of the consent of the subordinate members of the Teaching Body. On the other hand, the whole of the Bishops apart from the Pope cannot pronounce an infallible judgment. The Pope, however, can assemble the Bishops and constitute them into a tribunal which represents the Teaching Body more efficiently than the Pope alone. Their judgments given conjointly with his are the most complete expression of the Teaching Body. This assembly is termed a Universal or Œcumenical Council. It is not an independent tribunal superior to the Pope. It must be convened by him, or at least with his consent and co-operation; all the Bishops of the Church must be commanded, or at least invited to attend; a considerable number of Bishops must be actually present, either personally or by deputy; and the assembled prelates must conduct their deliberations and act under the direction of the Pope or his legates. Some of the Councils styled œcumenical do not, however, fulfil all of these conditions. The First and Second Councils of Constantinople are well-known instances. But these Councils were not originally considered as œcumenical except in the sense of being numerously attended, or on account of the ambition of the Patriarchs. It was only in the sixth century, some time after the Creed of the First Council of Constantinople had been adopted at Chalcedon, that this Council was put on a level with those of Nicæa, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. Similar remarks apply to the Second Council of Constantinople. See Hefele vol. i., p. 41, and vol. ii., § 100.

It may seem strange that none of the early Western Councils, although presided over by the Roman Pontiff and accepted by the whole Church, received the title of Œcumenical. This, however, may be easily accounted for. The Western Councils only represented the Roman patriarchate, and consequently their authority was identical with that of the Holy See. Moreover, before the Great Schism the notion of a General Council was that of a co-operation of the East with the West: in other words, of the other patriarchates with the patriarchate of Rome. The Eastern Bishops attended personally, whereas the Pope and the Western Council sent deputies. Thus a Council, although meeting in the East, was really composed of representatives of the whole Church. The later Councils held in the West were far more conformable to the theological notions already given, because the entire episcopate was convened in one place, by express command, not by mere invitation, and the body of the Bishops acted on the strength of their Divine mission, no distinction being made in favour of patriarchs or metropolitans, or other dignitaries.

II. Councils, when defining a dogma, perform a double function: they act as witnesses and as judges. The co-operation of the Pope is especially required as supreme judge. Care must be taken not to lay too much stress on the function of witnessing, lest the importance of the papal co-operation be unduly minimized and the true notion of a council be distorted. It is true, indeed, that many expressions of the Fathers of the fourth century concerning the Council of Nicæa seem to insist almost exclusively on the witnessing function. We must, however, remember that this Council was the first of the General Councils, and that under the then existing circumstances an appeal to the solemn testimony of so many Bishops was the best argument against the heretics. The subsequent Councils, especially the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, followed quite a different line of action. Stress was there laid upon the judicial function, and consequently upon the influence of the Roman Pontiff and the various grades of hierarchical jurisdiction.

III. The special object of General Councils is to attain completely and perfectly the ends which particular councils can attain only partially and imperfectly. In relation to the Pope’s judgment, which is in itself a complete judgment, the object of General Councils is (1) to give the greatest possible assistance to the Pope in the preparation of his own judgment by means of the testimony and scientific knowledge of the assessors; (2) to give the Papal definition the greatest possible force and efficacy by the combined action and sentence of all the judges; and (3) to help the Pope in the execution and enforcement of his decisions by the promulgation and subsequent action of the assembled judges. The co-operation of the Council brings the testimony and the judicial power of the whole Church to bear upon the decision of the Pope.

IV. The action of General Councils essentially consists in the co-operation of the members with their Head. To the Pope therefore belongs the authoritative direction of all the proceedings of the Council. He can, if he chooses to exercise his right, determine what questions shall be dealt with and the manner of dealing with them. Hence no decision is legitimate if carried against his will or without his consent. Even a decision accepted by his legates, without an express order from him, is not absolutely binding. On the other hand, no decision is unlawful or void on account of a too extensive use of the papal right of direction, because in such a case the restriction of liberty is caused by the internal and legitimate principle of order, not by external and illegitimate pressure. The decision would not be illegitimate even if, as in many of the earlier Councils, and indeed in all Councils convoked for the purpose of promulgating and enforcing already existing papal decisions, the Pope commanded the acceptance of his sentence without any discussion. At most, the result of this pressure would affect the moral efficiency of the Council. On the other hand, the forcible expulsion of the papal legates from the “Latrocinium” (Council of Bandits) at Ephesus was rightly considered by the Catholics as a gross violation of the liberty of a Council. The sentence of the majority, or even the unanimous sentence, if taken apart from the personal action of the Pope, is not purely and simply the sentence of the entire Teaching Body, and therefore has no claim to infallibility. Such a sentence would not bind the absent Bishops to assent to it, or the Pope to confirm it. Its only effect would be to entitle the Pope to say that he confirms the sentence of a council, or that he speaks “with the approval of the Sacred Council” (sacro approbante concilio).

The Vatican Council, even in the Fourth Session, may be cited as an instance of a Council possessing in an eminent degree, not only the essential elements, but also what we may call the perfecting elements. The number of Bishops present was the greatest on record, both absolutely and in proportion to the number of Bishops in the world; the discussion was most free, searching, and exhaustive; universal tradition, past and present, was appealed to, not indeed as to the doctrine in question itself, but as to its fundamental principle, which is the duty of obedience to the Holy See and of conformity to her Faith; absolute unanimity prevailed in the final sentence, and an overwhelming majority even in the preparatory judgment.

The decrees of the General Councils may be found in the great collections of Labbe, Hardouin, Mansi, Catalani; the more important decrees are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.

§ 33. The Roman Congregations—Local or Particular Councils

I. The Roman Congregations are certain standing committees of Cardinals appointed by the Pope to give decisions on the various questions of doctrine and discipline which arise from time to time. The most important Congregations are the following:

1. The Congregation of the Council of Trent;
2. The Congregation of Bishops and Regulars;
3. The Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda);
4. The Congregation of Sacred Rites;
5. The Congregation of the Index of Prohibited Books;
6. The Congregation of the Holy Office (the Inquisition).

To these must be added the Pœnitentiaria, which is a tribunal for granting absolutions from censures and dispensations in matters of vows and matrimonial impediments. It also passes judgment on moral cases submitted to its decision.

These Congregations have as their principal function the administration, or, if we may so term it, the general police of doctrine and discipline. It is their duty to prosecute offences against Faith or Morals, to prohibit dangerous writings, and to attach authoritative censures to any opinions the profession of which is sinful. They do not give decisions without appeal, because finality is inseparable from infallibility. Although they act in the Pope’s name, their decrees are their own and not his, even after receiving his acknowledgment and approbation. If, however, he himself gives a decision based upon the advice of a Congregation, such decision is his own and not merely the decision of the Congregation. What, then, is the authority of the Roman Congregations?

1. Doctrinal decrees of the Congregations, which are not fully and formally confirmed by the Pope, are not infallible. They have, however, such a strong presumption in their favour that even internal submission is due to them, at least for the time being. The reason of this is plain. The Congregations are composed of experienced men of all schools and tendencies; they proceed with the greatest prudence and conscientiousness; they represent the tradition of the Roman Church which is especially protected by the Holy Ghost. We may add that their decrees have seldom needed reform. Hence Pius IX points out that learned Catholics “must submit to the doctrinal decisions given by the Pontifical Congregations” (Brief to the Archbishop of Munich, Tuas libenter, 1863).

2. If the Pope fully and formally confirms the decrees they become infallible. It is not easy, however, to decide whether this perfect confirmation has been given. Certain formulas, e.g. the simple approbavit, may signify nothing more than an act of supervision or an act of the Pope as head of the Congregation, and not as Head of the Church.

II. Particular or Local Councils are assemblies of the Bishops of a province or a nation as distinguished from assemblies of the Bishops of the world. When the council is composed of the Bishops of a single province, it is called a Provincial Council; when the Bishops of several provinces are present, it is called a Plenary or National Council. Thus in England, where there is only one province, the province of Westminster, the English Councils are called the “Westminster Provincial Councils.” In Ireland there are four provinces, and consequently when all the Irish Bishops meet in council the assembly is called the “National Council.” The usual name given to similar assemblies in the United States is Plenary Council. Every Particular Council must be convened with the approbation of the Holy See. The Bishops act indeed in virtue of their ordinary power, and not as papal delegates; nevertheless it is only fitting that they should act in union with their Head. Moreover, the decrees must be submitted to the approval of Rome. The approval granted is either Simple or Solemn (approbatio in forma simplici, approbatio in forma solemni). The Simple form, which is that usually granted, is a mere act of supervision, and emanates from the Congregation of the Council. The Solemn form is equivalent to an adoption of the decrees by the Holy See as its own, and is seldom granted. The Provincial Councils held against Pelagianism are well-known instances. In modern times, Benedict XIII granted the solemn approbation to the decrees of the Council of Embrun. Without this solemn approval the decrees of Provincial Councils are not infallible. The presumption of truth in their favour depends partly on the number and the personal ability and character of the Bishops present, and partly on the nature of their proceedings and the wording of their decrees. Peremptory and formal affirmation of a doctrine as Catholic, or condemnation of a doctrine as erroneous, would not be tolerated by the Holy See unless such affirmation or condemnation was in accordance with the teaching of Rome; and consequently even the simple approval of decrees of this kind gives a strong presumption of truth. When, however, the decrees have not this peremptory and formal character, but are simply expositions of doctrine or admonitions to the Faithful, the presumption in their favour is not so strong.

See Bellarmine, De Conciliis; Benedict XIV, De Synodo Diœcesana, l. xiii. c. 3. The decrees of the various Provincial and other Particular Councils may be found in the great collections of Councils named above. The more recent decrees are given in the Collectio Lacensis (Herder, Freiburg). The Westminster Councils, of which four have been held, have been published by Burns and Oates. The most important National Council of Ireland is the Synod of Thurles held in 1851. There have been three Plenary Councils of Baltimore (United States), held in the years 1852, 1866, and 1884 respectively.

§ 34. Dogmatic Censures

I. The Vatican Council has spoken of the right of censure belonging to the Church in the following terms: “Moreover, the Church having received, together with the apostolic office of teaching, the command to keep the Deposit of the Faith, hath also the right and the duty of proscribing knowledge falsely so-called, lest any one should be deceived by philosophy or vain deceit. Wherefore all the Faithful are forbidden, not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the Faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are also bound to hold them rather as errors having the deceitful semblance of truth” (sess. iii., chap. 4). See also Pius IX’s brief Gravissimas inter.

II. Dogmatic censures impose most strictly the duty of unreserved assent. In matters of Faith and Morals they afford absolute certainty that the doctrines or propositions censured are to be rejected in the manner required by the particular censure affixed to them. Sometimes the obligation of submitting to the Church’s judgment is expressly mentioned; e.g. in the Bull Unigenitus: “We order all the Faithful not to presume to form opinions about these propositions or to teach or preach them, otherwise than is determined in this our constitution.” In cases of this kind the infallibility of the censures is contained in the infallibility concerning Faith and Morals which belongs to the Teaching Apostolate, because submission to the censure is made a moral duty. No difference is here made between the binding power of lesser censures and that of the highest (heresy). Moreover, these censures bind not only by reason of the obedience due to the Church, but also on account of the certain knowledge which they give us of the falsity or untrustworthiness of the censured doctrines. To adhere to these doctrines is a grievous sin because of the strictness of the ecclesiastical prohibition sanctioned by the heaviest penalties, and also because all or nearly all the censures represent the censured act as grievously sinful.

The duty to reject a censured doctrine involves the right to assert and duty to admit the contradictory doctrine as sound, nay as the only sound and legitimate doctrine. The censures do not expressly state this right and duty, nevertheless the consideration of the meaning and drift of each particular censure clearly establishes both. In the case of censures which express categorically the Church’s certain judgment, such as “Heresy,” “Error,” “False,” “Blasphemous,” “Impious,” and also in cases where moral certainty is expressed, such as “Akin to Heresy,” “Akin to Error,” “Rash,” there can be no question as to this.

Doubt might perhaps arise whether the other censures, such as “Wicked,” “Unsound,” “Unsafe,” and mere condemnations without any particular qualification, impose the duty of admitting the falsity of the condemned doctrines as at least morally certain, or whether it is enough to abstain from maintaining them. As a rule, however, we must not be content with the latter.

III. The Church’s judgment is also infallible when condemning doctrines and propositions in the sense meant by some determinate author. This infallibility is already contained in the infallibility of the censure itself when no distinction can be drawn between the meaning of the words and the meaning intended by the author. But, where this distinction can be drawn, the infallibility of the judgment concerning the author’s meaning is at least virtually contained in the infallibility of the censure itself. The Church sometimes condemns an author’s propositions in the sense conveyed by their context, and sometimes formulates propositions conveying the author’s meaning. In the former case the censure applies to the context as well as to the proposition; in the latter case there is a twofold censure, one on the propositions as formulated by the judge, and another on the text as containing the sense of the propositions. In neither of these cases would the censure be infallible, if it were not infallible in determining the sense of the author. For this reason the Church does not give a separate judgment to establish that a particular text conveys a particular meaning; she simply attaches the censure to the text as it stands.

These various distinctions were of great importance in the Jansenistic controversy. The Jansenists admitted that the five propositions censured by Innocent X were worthy of condemnation, but denied that they were to be found in their master’s works.

§ 35. Development of Dogma

I. The truths which God has been pleased to reveal to mankind were not all communicated in the beginning. As time went on, the later Patriarchs had a larger stock of revealed truth than those who preceded them; the Prophets had a still larger share than the Patriarchs. But when the Church was founded, the stock of Revelation was completed, and no further truths were to be revealed (§ 6). The infallibility of the Church manifestly precludes any change in dogmas previously defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Church has not always possessed the same explicit knowledge of all points of doctrine and enforced them just in the same way as in the time of the Apostles. In what terms should this difference be stated?

II. 1. It is not enough to say that the difference between the earlier and the later documents is merely nominal; viz. that the terminology of the earlier Creeds is obscure and vague, while in the later ones it becomes clear and precise.

2. Nor, again, will it do to make use of the comparison of a scroll gradually unrolled or of a casket whose contents become gradually known. There is, indeed, some truth in these comparisons, but they cannot account for all the facts.

3. A better comparison is that the later defined doctrines are contained in the earlier ones as the conclusion of a syllogism is contained in the premises. This is to admit that there has been a real, though only logical, development in the Church’s doctrine. Such is the argument of St. Augustine in the dispute concerning the re-baptism of heretics. According to him, a dogma may pass through three stages: (1) implicit belief; (2) controversy; (3) explicit definition. Thus in the early ages the validity of heretical Baptism was admitted in practice by the fact of not repeating the Sacrament. But when the question was formally proposed, there seemed to be strong arguments both for and against the validity. At this stage the most orthodox teachers might, and indeed did, disagree. Finally, the matter was decided, and thenceforth no further discussion was lawful within the Church. (De Bapt., II. 12–14; Migne, ix. 133. See also Franzelin, De Trad., thes. xxiii.)

4. But can we not go further and admit an organic development? In the case of logical development all the conclusions are already contained in the premises, and are merely drawn out of them, whereas in organic development the results are only potentially in the germs from which they spring (Mark v. 28–32). In organic development there is no alteration or corruption, no mere addition or accretion; there is vitality, absorption, assimilation, growth, identity. Take, for example, the doctrines mentioned above. Scripture teaches plainly that there is only one God; yet it speaks of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and it speaks of Jesus Christ in such terms that He must be both God and Man. It was not until after some centuries that these truths were elaborated into the definitions which we are bound to believe. Who can doubt that during these centuries the primitive teaching absorbed into itself the appropriate Greek elements, and that the process was analogous to the growth of an organism? This view of the organic development of the Church’s teaching is a conclusive answer to those who ask us to produce from ancient authorities the exact counterpart of what we now believe and practise. They might just as well look for the branches and leaves of an oak in the acorn from which it sprang.

“Shall we then have no advancement of religion in the Church of Christ? Let us have it indeed, and the greatest… . But yet in such sort that it be truly an advancement of faith, not a change (sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio), seeing that it is the nature of an advancement, that in itself each thing (severally) grow greater, but of a change that something be turned from one thing into another… . Let the soul’s religion imitate the law of the body, which, as years go on, develops indeed and opens out its due proportions, and yet remains identically what it was… . Small are a baby’s limbs, a youth’s are larger, yet they are the same… . So also the doctrine of the Christian religion must follow those laws of advancement; namely, that with years it be consolidated, with time it be expanded, with age it be exalted, yet remain uncorrupt and untouched, and be full and perfect in all the proportions of each of its parts, and with all its members, as it were, and proper senses; that it admit no change besides, sustain no loss of its propriety, no variety of its definition. Wherefore, whatsoever in this Church, God’s husbandry, has by the faith of our fathers been sown, that same must be cultivated by the industry of their children, that same flourish and ripen, that same advance and be perfected” (Commonitorium, nn. 28, 29).

III. Revelation does not follow the merely natural laws of development like any other body of thought. While it is indeed necessarily influenced by the natural environment in which it exists, this influence works under Divine Providence and the infallible guidance of the Church. Moreover, it can never come to pass that an early dogmatic definition should afterwards be revoked, or be understood in a sense at variance with the meaning originally attached to it by the Church. “The doctrine which God has revealed has not been proposed as some philosophical discovery to be perfected by the wit of man, but has been entrusted to Christ’s Spouse as a Divine deposit to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence sacred dogmas must ever be understood in the sense once for all (semel) declared by Holy Mother Church; and never must that sense be abandoned under pretext of profounder knowledge (altioris intelligentiæ).” (Vat. Council, Sess. iii. chap. 4.) On the whole subject, see Newman’s great work, Development of Christian Doctrine.

§ 36. The Chief Dogmatic Documents—Creeds and Decrees

The most important dogmatic documents are the Creeds, or Symbols of Faith, and the decrees of the Popes and of General and Particular Councils.

I. Creeds.

1. The simplest and oldest Creed, which is the foundation of all the others, is the Apostles’ Creed. There are, however, twelve different forms of it, which are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion. See Dublin Review, Oct., 1888, July, 1889; and Le Symbole des Apôtres, by Batiffol and Vacant, in the Dict. de Théol. Catholique.

2. The Nicene Creed, published by the Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325), defines the Divinity of Christ. It originally ended with the words, “and in the Holy Ghost.” The subsequent clauses concerning the Divinity of the Holy Ghost were added before the First Council of Constantinople. In its complete form it is now used in the Mass.

3. The Athanasian Creed was probably not composed by St. Athanasius, but is called by his name because it contains the doctrines so ably expounded and strenuously defended by him. It is aimed at the heresies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and dates back at least to the sixth or seventh century.

4. The Creed of Toledo, published by the sixth council of Toledo (A.D. 675), further develops the Athanasian Creed, and is the most complete of the authentic expositions of the dogmas of the Blessed Trinity and Incarnation. As it closely follows St. Augustine’s teaching, it might almost be called “St. Augustine’s Creed” with even more reason than the preceding creed is called the creed of St. Athanasius. See Denzinger, n. xxvi.

5. The Creed of Leo IX is a free elaboration of the Nicene Creed, with some additions against Manichæans and Pelagians. See Denzinger, n. xxxix. It is still used at the consecration of Bishops.

6. The Creed of the Fourth Lateran Council, the famous Creed of caput Firmiter credimus, under Innocent III (1215), which is the first Decretal in the Corpus Juris Canonici, is in substance similar to the foregoing, but further develops the doctrine concerning Sacrifice, Baptism, and particularly Transubstantiation. The subjoined condemnation of Abbot Joachim completes the dogmatic definition of the Holy Trinity. See Denzinger, n. lii.; also St. Thomas, Expositio Primæ et Secundæ Decretalis, Opuscc. xxiii. and xxiv.

7. The formula prescribed by the same Pope Innocent III (1210) to the converts among the Waldenses, states more or less extensively the doctrine concerning the Sacraments, and also various matters of morals and discipline. Denzinger, n. liii.

8. The Confession of Faith made by Michael Palæologus in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, accepted by Pope Gregory X, is based upon the Creed of Leo IX, but adds clauses containing the doctrine concerning the Four Last Things (Death, Judgment, Hell, Heaven), the Sacraments, and the Primacy of the Roman Church.

After the Council of Trent three more professions of Faith for the use of converts were issued by the Popes, all of which begin with the Nicene Creed, and contain in addition appropriate extracts from the decrees of several councils.

9. The so-called Tridentine Profession of Faith, drawn up in 1564 by Pius IV for converts from Protestantism, recapitulates the most important decrees of the Council of Trent. Denzinger, n. lxxxii.

10. The Profession of Faith prescribed by Gregory XIII to the Greeks contains the principal decrees of the Council of Florence concerning the Trinity, the Four Last Things, and the Primacy. Denzinger, n. lxxxiii.

11. Lastly, the Profession of Faith for the Easterns, prescribed by Urban VIII, is copied from the Decretum pro Jacobitis, published by the Council of Florence. It is a summary of the teaching of the first eight œcumenical councils, and contains the same extracts from the Council of Florence as the foregoing Profession. It also includes many definitions of the Council of Trent. It is composed on historical lines, and is the most complete of all the Creeds. Denzinger, n. lxxxiv.

II. The decrees of the Popes and the councils are sometimes negative and aphoristic, and sometimes positive and developed formulas. The drawing up of these formulas was, as a rule, the work of doctors or of particular Churches or of the Holy See; in a few cases these were the results of the combined labours of the bishops assembled in councils. In this respect the Council of Trent excelled all others. The various decrees are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.