Part II, Chapter II, Section 2, Article 4: The Different States of Man, and the State of Pure Nature in Particular

Pohle, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, Part II, Chapter II, §2, Article 4 (pp. 226–231)

1. The Different States of Man

A sharp distinction must be drawn between historic and purely possible states.

a) A historic state is one in which the human race some time or other actually existed, or now exists. Such states are: (1) the state of original justice in Paradise (status iustitiae originalis), of which we have already treated; (2) the state of fallen nature (status naturae lapsae), into which the human race was precipitated by the sin of Adam. This state consisted in the loss of all supernatural and preternatural prerogatives which our first parents enjoyed in the Garden, and soon gave way to (3) the state of repaired nature (status naturae reparatae), in which God, in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ, restored sanctifying grace, though without the preternatural prerogatives of integrity, impassibility, and bodily immortality which had accompanied it in Paradise. The state of repaired nature is the historic state par excellence, because it has been the condition of mankind since the promise of Redemption.

b) Those states in which man might, but in matter of fact never did exist, are called possible. We may, in the first place, conceive of a state of natural integrity (status naturae integrae) in the narrower sense, i.e., one with a purely natural end,¹ yet endowed with such preternatural prerogatives as, e.g., freedom from concupiscence. According as we combine the preternatural prerogatives (freedom from concupiscence, bodily immortality, impassibility, and infused knowledge) into one harmonious whole, or imagine any one of them separately realized to the exclusion of all others, we may subdivide the state of natural integrity into four different states, all of them devoid of strictly supernatural grace. It would serve no useful purpose to enter into a speculative discussion of these states here. Lastly, by eliminating man’s supernatural destiny together with sanctifying grace and all preternatural prerogatives, we arrive at what is termed the state of pure nature (status naturae purae).

2. Possibility of the State of Pure Nature

The concept of the status naturae purae involves only such notes as belong to the essence of human nature and are due to it by virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, and the general providence of God.² Among the things that are due to man, as man, (aside from his physical endowment which is included in the definition of animal rationale), is the ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural end and of discovering and observing the moral law of nature. That is, man must be able, by leading a naturally good life, to attain to his natural destiny, which would consist not in the beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of God apt to render the creature naturally happy.

To these positive notes must be added a negative one, viz.: the exclusion of all such prerogatives as are either strictly supernatural (e.g., grace, actual and habitual), or at least preternatural.³ A recent writer observes that “this state [of pure nature] is conceived as substantially identical with the state in which man actually exists, minus the character of guilt and punishment which mark the absence of the higher prerogatives, and minus the grace which is operative in all men unto salvation.”⁴ In this hypothetic state of pure nature, therefore, man would be subject to the same evils from which he suffers at present, viz.: concupiscence, ignorance, and death with its attendant sufferings.

There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state of pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be essentially like the present state of original sin. Original sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs the purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not likely that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bestiality would have wrought such havoc as they actually did and do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we consider that original sin has immensely increased the ravages of these two arch-enemies of humankind. Abstracting from the guilt of sin and the punishment due to it, the state of pure nature may consequently be conceived as somewhat more perfect than the state of original sin.

It is permissible, too, with Cardinal Franzelin⁵ and other eminent theologians, to postulate certain natural aids as substitutes for the missing supernatural assistance in the battle against concupiscence. We may conceive these adiutoria Dei naturalia as due to man in the pure state of nature, but they would not, of course, partake of the essence of strictly supernatural grace.⁶

Though it would not essentially coincide in every detail with the state of original sin, this hypothetical state of pure nature is per se possible. To say that it is impossible would be tantamount to asserting that God was bound to endow man with supernatural graces and prerogatives. This was precisely the false teaching of Baius.⁷ “Deus non potuisset,” reads the fifty-fifth of his condemned propositions, “ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.” The Catholic doctrine is that, had He so chosen, God could have created man in the state in which he is now born, minus original sin.

The so-called Augustinians and some Thomists⁸ thought that the teaching of the Church would be sufficiently safeguarded against the errors of Baius by holding that God could have established the state of pure nature de potentia absoluta, though not de potentia ordinata. But this is not a safe position to take. What God may not do by virtue of His wisdom, sanctity, and benevolence (potentia ordinata), He cannot do by virtue of His omnipotence (potentia absoluta), which is invariably directed in its operations by the other divine attributes. If God were constrained by some one or other of His attributes⁹ to endow man with supernatural gifts, these gifts would forthwith cease to be graces, because they would correspond to a legitimate demand of nature. The theologians with whom we are here dealing declare, in opposition to Baius, that these prerogatives are supernatural graces; but in this they are guilty of inconsistency, because they confound nature with the Supernatural, and fail to distinguish between the characteristics of both.¹⁰

Notes

Readings

Berti, Augustinianum Systema Vindicatum, diss. 2. Card. Norisius, Vindiciae Augustinianae, c. 3, Batav. 1673. Kuhn, Die christliche Lehre von der göttlichen Gnade, § 16, Tübingen 1868. G. Vandenesch, Doctrina Divi Thomae Aquinatis de Concupiscentia, Bonn 1870. Möhler, Symbolism, pp. 23 sqq., Robertson’s translation, 5th ed., London 1906. Suarez, Proleg. 4 ad Tract. de Gratia. Goudin, Tract. Theol., t. II, qu. 2, art. 1. F. X. Linsenmann, Michael Bajus, Tübingen 1867. J. F. Sollier, art. “Baius” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II. Kroll, “The Causes of the Jansenist Heresy” in the Am. Cath. Quarterly Review, 1885, pp. 577 sqq. W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 338 sqq., London 1897.

Note on this transcription: this article was textually clean, with no significant OCR interleaving issues. German titles had umlauts restored (göttlichen, Tübingen).

This completes Section 2, “The Supernatural in Man” (Articles 1–4), and with it the full account of nature, grace, and Paradise that Chapter II builds on. Section 3, “Man’s Defection from the Supernatural” (original sin), follows next.