Omniscience: God's Knowledge of Possibles, Contingents, and Free Future Acts

§2: The Objects of Divine Knowledge — Omniscience

THE OBJECTS OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE — OMNISCIENCE Being absolutely simple, and therefore indivisible, God’s Knowledge can be distinguished only in respect of its objects. Inasmuch as, and because, God knows whatever is and can be, He is called the Omniscient (omniscius). A common division of the Knowledge of God is that into scientia necessaria and scientia libera, according as its object is something absolutely necessary (e. g., God, or the purely possible), or exists by virtue of the free will of the Creator (e. g., the physical universe). Of particular importance is the distinction between God’s Knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia sim~ plicis intelligentiae) , which has for its object the purely possible (i. e., the metaphysical essences, abstract truths) ; and His knowledge of vision (scientia visionis), which, as a spiritual ” seeing,” terminates on every thing actually existing. Between these two, the Molinists have placed a third, the famous scientia media, which, holding the “middle” between the purely possible and the really actual, is supposed to comprehend the free acts of the future which intelligent beings zvould perform under certain conditions, though as a matter of fact many of them never will be performed, because the con349

ditions will not be realized. The Thomists refuse to admit the scientia media; but by disputing among themselves whether the conditionally future free actions of rational creatures (actus liberi futuribiles) belong to the scientia simplicis intelligentiae or to the scientia visionis,1 they seem virtually to admit that there is room for such a distinction. A further distinction, between scientia approbationis and scientia itnprobationis, is based upon the Will of God rather than upon His Knowledge. God wills and approves all good things and deeds which He sees, while He disapproves — or, in the language of Holy Scripture, ” knows not,” ” ignores ” — the bad. Cf r. Math. XXV, 12: “Amen dico vobis, nescio vos — Amen I say to you, I know you not.” Abstracting from the Divine Substance, which, after what we have already said, we may leave out of consideration here, there are to be distinguished four groups of objects outside of God, viz.: (1) the purely possible; (2) those which actually exist, including the free actions of rational creatures past and present; (3) the free future acts of these creatures; and (4) the free acts conditionally future, which are held to form the object of the scientia media. 1 Billuart, De Deo, -diss. 6, art.5, obj. 3.

Article 1: Omniscience as God’s Knowledge of the Purely Possible

OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURELY POSSIBLE i. The, Teaching of Divine Revelation. — Whatever has real existence was before its realization merely possible; and after its disparition will return to that state. Hence the possible is co-extensive with truth or being. Intrinsic possibility is predicable of the Divine Essence, though, needless to insist, it necessarily coincides with the existence of God. From these considerations it is manifest that the possible constitutes the adequate and total object of the scientia simplicis intelligentiae. The assumption that any truth whatsoever can elude the Divine Omniscience, has been condemned as heretical. Consequently it is an article of faith that God knows whatever is possible. This dogma can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. Job XIII, 9: Deum celare nihil potest — God … from whom nothing can be concealed. Ps. CXXXVIII, 5: Tu cognovisti omnia — Thou hast known all things. Or the prayer of Esther (Esth. XIV, 14): Domine, qui habes omnium scientiam — O Lord, who hast the knowledge of all things. If these passages left any doubt as to whether or not the knowledge of God includes the realm of the purely possible, such doubt would be dispelled by Ecclus. XXIII, 29: Domino Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita — For all things were known to the Lord God, before they were created, and Rom. IV, 17: Vocat ea quae non sunt, tamquam ea quae sunt — God … calleth those things that are not, as those that are. Moreover, it is plain that God’s adequate conception of His own omnipotence must necessarily exhaust the fullness of that attribute, i. e., comprise everything possible. Cf r. Matth. XIX, 26: Apud Deum omnia possibilia sunt — With God all things are possible. 2 2. The Infinite Multitude of Possible Things. — As there is a confusing multiplicity of possible things (species, individuals, series, actions, etc.), God’s knowledge actually extends to a multitude which is infinite. a) Ruiz calls this deduction ” certissima et fidei proximo”* It is obvious that the totality of possible objects,, at the attempted contemplation of which the human intellect reels,4 cannot be expressed by any finite number, and that it must, therefore, be infinite. St. Thomas expressly teaches this: * Deus scit non solum ea quae actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae; haec autem constat esse infinita** 2 For farther information, consult Deo, IV, 3 sqq.) and Ruiz (De our chapter on the attribute of Scientia Dei, disp. 9, sect. 3). Omnipotence; also § 1, proposition 3 De Scientia Dei, disp. 20, sect. 1. 2, supra. Many pertinent quotations 4 Cfr. Lessius, De Perfect. Div., from the writings of the Fathers VI, 2. have been collected by Petavius (De 5 S. TheoL, ia, qu. 14, art. 12, THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 353 Long before him St. Augustine had written : * Infinites itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius intelligentiae non est numerus.* 6 Though it is impossible that there should actually exist an infinite number of substances and accidents, yet their possible qualities and mutations, nay, even their real variations and actions in the course of an infinitely prolonged existence — God destroys no essences — cannot be expressed in finite numbers.7 b) There is another question of a more philosophical character, which cannot be solved by theological arguments; namely, whether the multitude of objects comprised by the Knowledge of God is actually or merely potentially infinite.8 The older school of theologians, headed by Aquinas,9 and comprising the famous Jesuit writers Pallavicini, Suarez, De Lugo, etc., held that it is actually infinite. Of late years, however, it has become the fashion to deny that there can be such a thing as an actually infinite multitude, because ” the very term involves an intrinsic contradiction.” Until lately Msgr. Gutberlet and the author of this volume were probably the only theological writers among moderns who defended the possibility of an actually infinite multitude.10 To my mind the following argument is absolutely irrefutable: The possible things of which God has knowledge are either finite, or potentially infinite, or actually infinite. That they are not finite, is self-evident. They cannot be potentially inQ De Civil ale Dei, XII, 18. 8 Vide supra, p. 190. 7Cfr. St. Thorn., /. c: “Dens 9 Contr. Gent., I, 69; De Verit., scit etiam cogitationes et affectiones q. 11, art. 9. cordium, quae in infinitum multi- 10 Cfr. Der Katholik, Mainz 1880. plicabuntur, creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine.”

finite, because God does not conceive an infinite multitude after the manner of creatures, i. e., by a series of successive concepts, but simultaneously in one act. Consequently, they must be actually infinite.11 Those who ascribe to the Divine Intellect a distributive, but deny it a collective, knowledge of all possibles, and who try to justify this subtle distinction by pointing to the impossibility of the whole collection co-existing, confuse the logical with the physical order. The possibility of co-existing in the intellect does not argue the possibility of co-existing in rerum natura. The fact that God perceives an infinite multitude of things, does not argue that all these things, with their various contradictory determinations, can actually exist as an infinite multitude. Though God might, for example, in His Divine Intellect combine into one infinite multitude the future acts of Judas the traitor, nevertheless these acts in reality constitute a series which is always actually finite and only potentially infinite. As Ruiz pointedly puts it: “Actus illi constituunt unum totum infinitum potentiate successivum quantum ad realem essentiam et existentiam; sed hoc totum in scientia est simul infinitum actuale, quoniam simul totum cognoscitur” 12 All these acts can be gathered into a logical whole, because they coincide in the general note of being, and also in another note, which may be called ” homogeneous psychic coincidence.” 13 11 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., I. c, 12 De Scientia Dei, disp. 20, sect, ad. 1 : ” Deus out em non sic cog- 3. noscit infinitum vel infinita, quasi 13 Cfr. Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, enumerando partem post partem, metaphysisch und mathematisch becum cognoscat omnia simul, non trachtet, Mainz 1878; E. Illigens, successive,** Die unendliche Zahl und die M at hemat ik, Munster 1893.

Article 2: Omniscience as God’s Knowledge of Vision of all Contingent Beings — Cardiognosis

OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S KNOWLEDGE OF VISION OF ALL CONTINGENT BEINGS — CARDIOGNOSIS, OR i. State of the Question. — In the innumerable multitude of possible things there are some which the creative will of God has (either immediately or mediately) endowed with actual being. In so far as these exist, they form the object of the scientia visionis. a) Contingent actuality, that is to say, the created universe, consists of two large groups of beings, viz.: the free intelligences (angels, men), and the unfree creatures (plants, brute animals, inanimate matter). The latter are determined by intrinsic necessity, while the intelligent beings of the first-mentioned group generally speaking have free control over their actions. These actions cannot for this very reason be known a priori, as effects necessarily flowing from a cause. Despite this fact, however, the Omniscient God has just as clear and definite a knowledge of the acts of such free beings, as he has of those of His unfree creatures, no matter whether these acts are past, present, or future. To Him time is not. In virtue of His undivided eternity, which co-exists with all three modes of time, He contemplates the past and the future as though they were actually present. We, because of the imperfect character of our conception of divine things, are compelled to make a distinction between the after knowledge by which God knows the past, the knowledge SEARCHING OF HEARTS

whereby He contemplates the present (especially cardiognosis, so-called, whereby He knows the innermost secrets of the human mind and heart), and His knowledge of the future, in particular of the free acts of His rational creatures. The last-mentioned mode, on account of its importance and difficulty, we shall treat in a series of separate Articles. b) To our creatural knowledge of contingent beings it is by no means immaterial whether an event belongs to past history, or happens before our eyes, or will take place in the future. God is by His very essence determined to the knowledge of all truths, including the future, but the created intellect is causally dependent upon the things themselves. It is for this reason that, while historical research familiarizes us with many facts of the past, and daily experience unrolls to our gaze a great variety of contemporary events, our predictions of the future are perforce vague guesses and uncertain conjectures. There is but one extremely limited sphere in which men are able to forecast future events, vis.: that division of astronomy which deals with eclipses of the sun and moon, to which may be added meteorological forecasts of the weather for a few days ahead. Such predictions are sure only because, and in so far as, they are based upon laws of nature whose uniform and necessary action we are able to some extent to gauge. Laplace’s fictitious magician, who by means of a magic ” world formula” was able to control the course of events forward and backward, and to indicate the precise posture of all atoms at any given moment, was nothing but a fine product of his author’s imagination ; — unless indeed we identify him with the Creator of the universe, though even the Creator Himself would find the

Laplacian “world formula” utterly inadequate to fathom the free decisions of intelligent beings. For where there is no necessary connexion between cause and effect, there can be no infallibly certain foreknowledge. The free will of man, even when strongly inclined to a certain decision, may yet, at the last moment, make a different choice, and thus belie the cleverest prognostication based on a knowledge of causes and motives. In considering the knowledge of God, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that we distinguish between free and necessary causes, since only the latter offer a sure basis of calculation. Nothing but the false theory of absolute determinism can disregard this essential distinction, which is rooted in the * very Essence of God. True, from the well known bent of a person a good judge of human nature can predict his free-will actions with more or less certainty; but no such forecast is ever infallible, since even the most determined and obstinate person will sometimes suddenly and unaccountably ” change his mind.” Furthermore, while we may form a fairly correct opinion of a man’s character and ethical leanings from his known utterances and deeds, yet no mortal can penetrate the recesses of the human heart and gain an a priori knowledge of its most intimate affections. Cardiognosis is a wonderful prerogative reserved to Almighty God alone. 2. The Teaching of Revelation. — a) Holy Scripture contains many and various passages which prove that the all-seeing eye of God pierces the whole universe, with all its attributes and relations, even the most hidden and minute. He “telleth the number of the stars/’ He “cov 

ereth the Heaven with clouds/’ He “maketh grass to grow,” He “giveth to beasts their food” (Ps. CXLVI); He “beholdeth the ends of the world, and looketh on all things that are under heaven” (Job XXVIII, 24); “all things are naked and open to his eye” (Hebr. IV, 13), etc., etc. Such providence, extending to the minutest details of workaday life, necessarily supposes a most comprehensive knowledge of all things. What is said Gen. I, 31: “And God saw all the things that he had made,” is true of all time, — past, present, and future. Cfr. Wisdom VIII, 8 : “And if a man desire much knowledge : she [i. e., Uncreated Wisdom] knoweth things past, and judgeth of things to come : she knoweth the subtilties of speeches, and the solutions of arguments: She knoweth signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of times and ages.” 3. The Argument From Tradition. — It is not difficult to prove this truth from Tradition. The reader will find the arguments well marshalled by Petavius, De Deo, IV, 3, and Ruiz, De Scientia, de Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, disp. 9. A hermeneutic difficulty arises from a passage in St. Jerome, who would spare “God’s majesty” the task of regulating the number of gnats, fishes, etc., and of watching over their individual antics. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 359 * Absurdum est,* he says, “ad hoc deducere Dei maiestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices quotve moriantur; quae cimicum et pulicum et muscarum sit in terra multitudo, quanti pisces in aqua natent.” (In Hab., I, 14). This phrase had perhaps better have remained unwritten, though it cannot justly be cited to impugn the universally accepted Catholic teaching, which St. Jerome himself defends in his commentaries In Ier., XXXII, 26, and In Math., X, 28. No doubt he did not wish to deny that God is omniscient, but merely meant to say that He consults with the same paternal care for His irrational creatures as for those whom He has endowed with reason and redeemed by the Blood of His Son.14 3. Cardiognosis, or Searching of Hearts. — It is a separate and distinct part of the teaching of Divine Revelation that the knowledge of God extends to the most secret thoughts and affections, the most hidden impulses, inclinations, and decisions of the human heart. “The searcher of hearts and reins is God.” 15 He is therefore called ”* KapSwyvcoo-nys.” 16 This knowledge of hearts is His exclusive privilege. Cfr. 3 Kings VIII, 39: “Tu nosti solus cor omnium Miorum hominum — Thou only knowest the heart of all the children of men.” Divine Revelation does not describe “cardiognosis” as a posteriori knowledge derived from external manifestations, such 14 Cfr. the question asked by St. God take care for oxen?* See Paul in his First Epistle to the also Suarez, De Deo, III, 3, 3. Corinthians (IX, 9): * Numquid 15 Ps. VII, 10. de bobus cura est DeoT — Doth 1 6 Acts XV, 8. 360 KNOWLEDGE OF VISION as speech, facial expression, conduct; but as an a priori intuition, which enables God to pierce the innermost recesses of the human heart and to know man even more intimately than he knows himself. Consequently it is preposterous to refer to modern thought-reading as an analogous phenomenon. Cfr. Ecclus. XXIII, 27 sq. : “And he [the sinner] under standeth not that his [God’s] eye seeth all things … that the eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun, beholding round about all the ways of men, and the bottom of the deep,* and looking into the hearts of men, into the most hidden parts.* Cfr. also Jer. XVII, 10: *I am the Lord who search the heart and prove the reins.” To illustrate the unanimous teaching of the Fathers it will suffice to quote the two oldest extant texts bearing on our subject. St. Ignatius Of Antioch Says: “Ov&v XavOdvci rbv Kvptov, aWa Kal ra Kpwra fj/JUDv cyxvs civtw iariv Nothing is hidden from the Lord, but even that which is hidden in us [t. e., our secret thoughts] are near to Him.” 17 St. Polycarp expresses himself even more Clearly \ “IlavTa rjfiwv GKOirdrai Kal XiXqOev avrov ov&iv ov8c koyiafJAOv ovSk iwouov ovSi rt raw Kpynrriav rrj

The divine searching of the heart and reins is defined by some theologians as supercomprehensio cordis, that is, a full and “adequate knowledge of the nature and faculties of the free created being, and of all the attracting and rev pelling impulses to which it will be subjected previously to its choice.” 19

Article 3: Omniscience as God’s Foreknowledge of the Free Actions of the Future

OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE FREE ACTIONS OF THE FUTURE i. The Dogma. — The dogma that God foreknows the free future actions of His intelligent creatures comprises two momenta, both of which are de fide, viz.: (1) that His Knowledge is actual, and (2) that it is infallible. Cfr. Cone. Vatic, Sess. Ill, cap. 1, De Deo: “Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius; etiam ea, quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt — All things are naked and open to His eyes, even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.” We should deny this dogma were we to hold that God’s foreknowledge is merely a morally certain knowledge, or that it is purely presumptive. Sixtus IV condemned a proposition put forth by Peter of Rivo, i» Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 282. For the philosophical arguments the reader may consult St. 24 Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 68 (summarized by Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 51). 362 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS to the effect that *Deus non habet notitiatn certain de significato, quod import at propositio fidei de futuro (e. g., Petrus negabit Christum).*20 The Socinians and the followers of Gunther trenched on this dogma by questioning the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge. ‘a) Holy Scripture not only ascribes to God a general foreknowledge of future things,21 but it expressly declares that His prescience extends to the free acts of the future. The classical passage in Psalms CXXXVIII, (CXXXIX), 3 sqq. : “Intellexisti cogitationes meas de longe ( Pfrnp ) … omnes vias meas praevidisti… . Ecce Domine, tu cognovisti omnia, novissima [i. e., futura] et antiqua — Thou hast understood my thoughts from afar off, … and thou hast forseen all my ways… . Behold, O Lord, thou hast known all things, the last (i e., future) and those of old.” Firmly convinced of this truth, the chaste Susanna, asserting her innocence against the two wicked elders, cried out: “O eternal God, who knowest hidden things, who knowest all things before they come to pass (*plv ytvrptm avrw)f thou knowest that they have borne false witness against me.*22 Cfr. John VI, 65: For Jesus knew 20 On Peter a Rivo, cfr. H. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius Theoloffiae Catholicae, t. II, ed. altera, col. 1034, Oeniponte 1906. si Cfr. Is. XL VI, 9 sq.: “Ego sum Deus … annuntians ab exordio novissimum et ab initio quae necdum facta sunt — I am God, … who shew from ancient times the things that as yet are not done.” 22 Dan. XIII, 42 sq. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 363 from the beginning (jfi y«p #

sima insania est… . Qui non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus — To confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. … He Who has no foreknowledge of all future things, can not be God.* 27 The future, according to Augustine, is present to the Divine Intellect in the same manner as is the now: Novit omnia it a, ut nec ea quae dicuntur praeterita, ibi praetereant, nec ea quae dicuntur futura, quasi desint, exspectentur ut veniant, sed et praeterita et futura cum praesentibus sint cuncta praesentia — God knows all things in such wise that neither what we call things past are past therein, nor what we call things future are therein waited for as coming, as though they were absent, but both past and future with things present are all present.” 28 2. God’s Foreknowledge in Its Relation to Free Will. — That intelligent creatures are endowed with free will is as much a revealed dogma as that God foreknows their future conduct. Hence there devolves upon speculative theology the duty of reconciling these two dogmas. Does not an infallibly certain prescience on 28 De Trinit., XV, 7, 13. Oswald ical arguments in proof of this (Dog mat. Theologie, Vol. I, pp. 168 dogma, sqq., Paderborn 1887) presents an 27 De Civ. Dei, V, 9, n. x, 4. effective summary of the philosophTHE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 365 the part of the Almighty destroy, or at least diminish, the freedom of the created will with regard to its future actions? Future events must occur just as God foreknows them, else His knowledge would be fallible. This objection was first raised by Celsus, who declared that Jesus was the author of His own betrayal at the hands of Judas.29 But if the free actions of the future are subject to the law of necessity, they are no longer free. Let us first remark that even were human reason unable to solve this apparent antinomy, this would not be sufficient cause to relinquish either of these seemingly contradictory truths. * Ignorantia modi non tallit certitudinem facti. In matter of fact, however, the objection can be solved. a) In attempting a solution we must remember that God’s foreknowledge no more exercises a compulsory influence on the free acts of the future, than does the contemporaneous knowledge of any observer on an event happening at the present time. The future act is not the effect, but the terminus of the divine foreknowledge, which cannot therefore be regarded as the determining cause of such act, but is merely directed to it as a faculty to its object. The foreknowledge of a future act of the free will no more destroys its freedom than would the recollection of a past act or the witnessing of a present one.30 Hence many of the Fathers, in attempting to solve the difficulty, proceed from this principle : * The future free acts of the 29 Cfr. Origen., Contr, Celsum, II, n. 20’. * Prae dixit et otnnino fieri debuit (ir&vrwf ixPW 7«vicOaC 30 Cfr. St. Augustin., De Lib. Arb., Ill, 4: * Sicut tu tnemoria tua non cogis facta esse, quae proeterierunt, sic Deus praescientia sua non cogit faciendd, quae future sunt.* 366 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS will do not come to pass because God foreknows them; but, contrariwise, God foresees them because they will happen.” As Origen puts it: ” Non enim quia cognitum est, idcirco fit; sed quia futurum est, est cognitum;“zi or St. Jerome: “Non enim ex eo, quod Deus scit futurum aliquid, idcirco futurum est; sed quia futurum est, Deus novit quasi praescius futurorum; ” 32 or St. John of Damascus: “[God’s] prescience is not the cause of future events; He merely foresees this or that act because we shall do it.” 88 b) The Schoolmen solved the problem by distinguishing between antecedent and consequent necessity. The necessitas antecedens annuls the freedom of the will, the necessitas consequent does not ; it is merely that historical necessity which constitutes a free act once performed as performed and incapable of being undone. Future events and acts are also subject in advance to this same consequent and historical necessity, because, and in as much as it is infallibly certain that they will occur, either freely or of necessity. The Portuguese revolution of the year 1910 was as historically certain twenty years ago as now that it belongs to past history. Yet if some divinely inspired seer had predicted it, would any sane man have claimed that the psychological freedom of the anti-clerical Republicans had thereby been annulled? The same distinction, though somewhat differently worded, occurs in the writings of the older Schoolmen, when they speak of a necessitas consequent tis, which necessitates, and a necessitas consequentiae, 81 Quoted by Eusebius, Praep. n. i), Epiphanius (Haer. I, 38, it. Evang., 1. VI, p. 287. 6), Cyril of Alexandria (In Ioa., 82 In let., XXVI, 3- XI, o), and many others. Cfr. 88 Contr. Manich., n. 79. Simi- also St. Anselm, De Concordia Lib. lar passages might be quoted from Arb., qu. 1, c. 2; Humphrey, ” His Chrysostom (In Matth., Horn. 60, Divine Majesty/* pp. 155 sqq.

which does not. The latter belongs to the divine foreknowledge of free acts.84 St. Thomas explains this point very luminously in his treatise De Veritate:™ ” Quamvis res in seipsa sit futura, tamen secundum modum [Dei] cognoscentis est praesens, et ideo magis est dicendum: si Deus scit aliquid, Mud est — quant: hoc erit. Unde idem est iudicium de ista: si Deus scit aliquid, hoc erit — et de hac: si ego video Socratem currere, Socrates currit; quorum utrumque est necessarium, dum est” Or, as Father Wm. Humphrey, S. J., puts it : ” God’s foreknowledge stands to our acts, as our knowledge stands to objects which are present to us. His knowledge, therefore, is not antecedent but consequent. We see things because they are. They do not exist because we see them. God knows our acts of the future, because they will be. It is not because He knows them that they will be. They are future as 34 S. Thorn., Contr. Gent., I, 67 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 49 sq.). — ” Since everything is known by God as seen by Him in the present, the necessity of that being true which God knows, is like the necessity of Socrates’s sitting from the fact of his being seated. This is not necessary absolutely, * by necessity of the consequent,’ as the phrase is, but conditionally, or • by necessity of the consequence.’ For this conditional proposition is necessary : ’ He is sitting, if he is seen seated.’ Change the conditional proposition into a categorical of this form : ’ What is seen sitting, is necessarily seated ’ : it is clear that the proposition is true as a phrase, when its elements are taken together (compositam) , but false as a fact, when its elements are separated (divisam). All these objections against the divine knowledge of contingent facts are fallaciae compositions et divisionis.” (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 50.) Fr. Rickaby adds this curious foot-note: ” This distinction appears in modern logic books as in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. It has its value in the disputes on efficacious grace. There is a tradition of Father Gregory de Valentia, S. J., fainting away when it was administered to him by’ a Dominican disputant. Bolsover Castle in Derbyshire was built by * the building# countess,’ of whom it was said that she would never die, while she kept on building. True in sensu composito only. In point of fact the lady died in a great frost, which stopped her building and her breath together.* 35 Verity qu. 2, art. 12, ad 7. 368 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS regards passing time, but they are present to the divine eternity.* M From what we have so far said, the reader may infer how untenable is the opinion of Johannes Jahn, an otherwise praiseworthy writer, who says in his Introductio in Libros Vet. Test,31 that God was compelled to veil the Old Testament prophecies, lest they should be crossed by the free action of men. The pagan oracles (e. g., the answers of the Pythian priestess at Delphi) were couched in such indefinite, obscure, and ambiguous phraseology that they were sure to come true in one sense or another. This cannot be said of the divine prophecies recorded in the Old Testament, which contain so many well defined details.88 3. The Causality of God’s Knowledge. — But do not the two Patristic axioms we have quoted (“God foresees future things because they will come to pass/’ and: “Things are because God knows them”), involve a contradiction? The apparent discrepancy is all the greater because both phrases occur in the writings of the same Father.8* We have too much respect for the Fathers of the Church to follow certain Thomists, who reject the firstmentioned axiom as ” false,” because it does not happen to fit into their system.40 The axiom : ” God foresees future things because they will happen,” does 33 ” His Divine Majesty/’ pp. 174 •q. 37 L. II, sect. 2, { 80. 38Cfr. Matth. XXVII, 35, and other well-known passages. On this whole subject the reader may profitably consult Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 42 and thes. 44. Likewise Schwane, Das gottliche Vorherwissen, Munster 1885. The best authority is Ruiz De Scientia Dei, disp. 22 so, 3» St. Augustine, De TriniU, X, 6; De Civit. Dei, V, 10, n. 2; De Lib. Arb., Ill, 4, et passim. 40 Cfr. Alvarez, De Aux., disp. XVI, n. 6: ” Causalis ista: quia res futurae sunt, ideo cognoscuntur a Deo, est falsa; haec autem est vera: quia Deus scientia libera THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 369 not square with the Thomist teaching on grace, which holds that the free actions of the future are subject to the divine foreknowledge only in so far as God, by an antecedent and absolute decree, has physically predetermined the will to perform this or that free act (praedeterminatio physica). We prefer to solve the apparent contradiction by distinguishing a speculative and a practical knowledge of God, applying the first-quoted Patristic axiom to the scientia speculative/,, the second to the scientia practice. In regard of His speculative knowledge, God may be compared to a savant and is called ” omniscient ” ; in regard to His practical knowledge, on the other hand, He rather resembles an artist who has knowledge of that which he is to produce before he makes it; and in respect of this knowledge God is called ” all-wise.” Being omniscient, He knows whatever is knowable (scibile) ; being all-wise, He knows whatever is feasible (operabile). Having established this fundamental distinction, we proceed to lay down the following principles.41 a) In the first place we must firmly hold as an article of faith, that the practical knowledge of God, when it has the Divine Will with it, operates creatively and thus, as sapientia creans, is the cause of all things. Cfr. Wisdom VII, 21 : Omnium, enim artifex docuit me sapientia — Wisdom, which is the worker of all things, taught me. Ps. Oil, 24: Omnia in sapientia fecisti — Thou hast made all things in Wisdom. John I, 3 : Howl & avrov [i. e., Ao’yav] scivit aliquid esse futurum, ideo 41 Cfr. St. Thomas, Sumtna Thejuturum est* ologica, ia, qu. 14, art. 16.

37o FUTURE FREE ACTIONS b/ivtro — AH things were made by him [i. e., the Logos]” The Sapiential books of the Old Testament furnish a running commentary on this important truth.42 But it is also in its role of sapientia disponens that the practical knowledge of the Most High exercises a causal influence upon the various contingent beings, imparting to them ” intrinsic order, harmony, and a suitable organization,” and uniting them all in one harmonious whole. It is to this specific feature of God’s practical knowledge that Holy Scripture alludes when it speaks of Him as ordering all things in measure, number, and weight. 48 That legislative wisdom, on the other hand, which imposes upon irrational creatures the immanent laws of their being and operation, while it inscribes into the hearts of rational beings the natural law of right and wrong,44 is merely a separate function of the sapientia disponens. The same is true of that educative wisdom which, as “doctrix disciplinae Dei et electrix operum illius” guides intelligent creatures (angels and men) to their supernatural end. Viewed from still another point of vantage, the practical knowledge of God exercises a truly causal influence, inasmuch as it acts as governing Wisdom {sapientia gubernans) and, objectively, as Divine Providence, rules the universe. Cf r. Wisd. VIII, i : * Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit (Stouca) omnia suaviter — She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.* 46 Sup42 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., ia, qu. 14, art. 8. 43 Wisdom XI, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti. Cfr. Job XXVIII, 20 sqq. 44 Rom. II, 15. 45 Wisd. VIII, 4. 46 Cfr. Cone. Vatic., Sess. Ill, cap. J, De Deo (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1785). THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 371 ported as it were by holiness and benevolence, God’s wise Providence reaches the apex of its glory in the supernatural order of grace. But we cannot hope to penetrate its depths. ” O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways ! ” 47 In all three of the respects we have indicated above, God’s practical knowledge, considered more especially as creative wisdom, is in the fullest and truest sense the cause of all things. From this particular point of view, therefore, we may unconditionally assent to the proposition that God knows things not because they are, but, conversely, things are because God knows them. It was thus understood by St. Augustine 48 and St. Gregory the Great,49 as is quite plain from the fact that whenever they quote this axiom these Fathers expressly treat of creation in general, not of the free actions of rational beings.60 b) The case is quite different when we consider the speculative knowledge of God, whether as scientia simplicis intelligentiae or as scientia visionis. In neither of these two relations can it be strictly designated as the cause of things. Being the intellectual expression of a perceived object it is reproductive rather than productive; it does not create, but presupposes its object. 4* Rom. XI, 33* On the attribute of wisdom, cf. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 93 and 94; Heinrich, Dogm. Theologie, Vol. Ill, { 205; Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, Monast. 1869. %De Trinit., XV, 13. 40 Moral, XX, 32. 50 Cfr. Greg. M., Moral., XXXII, 6 : * Non existentia videndo creat, existentia videndo continet. Cfr. also St Anselm, Monol., c. 33 sqq. 372 FUTURE FREE ACTIONS Were this not so, God in creating would eo ipso sin, because He has a speculative knowledge of all creatable things including sin. ” Scientia/’ says Aquinas, ” significatur per hoc, quod est aliquid in sciente, et ideo a scientia nunquam procedit effectus nisi mediante voltmtate.”51 This principle — after being duly purged, of course, of all creatural imperfections — also applies to the Divine Intelligence. Although things outside the Divine Essence would be neither possible nor real without God’s scientia simplicis intelligence, they constitute a part of the divine knowledge only for the reason that God has previously beheld their prototypes in His own Essence as the exemplary cause of all things. His knowledge does not create the possibles, but rather supposes them. Similarly, too, the scientia visionis, like the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, can see contingent beings only on the supposition that they exist in return natura. It does not follow that in this hypothesis God would derive His knowledge from existing objects rather than from His own Essence. The distinction, already noted, between causa and terminus,62 will preserve us from falling into this error. By way of illustration let us consider the creation of light as described in the first chapter of Genesis. In this act God’s speculative co-operated with His practical knowledge. In virtue of His (speculative) scientia simplicis intelligentiae, He perceived in His own Essence the intrinsic possibility (creatability) of light; thereupon His creative Will united with His Wisdom in uttering the command: “Let there be light.” As soon as light had sprung into being, it became the terminus58 (not the 51 De Verit., qu. 2, art. 14. is that which is known… . The 52 Supra, pp. 336 sqq. Divine Knowledge is changeless, as 53 ” The terminus of knowledge regards all things outside God