Scientia Media and the Medium of Divine Knowledge

§2 Article 4: Scientia Media — §3: The Medium of Divine Knowledge

cause) of the scientia visionis. “And God saw the light, that it was good.” 54 Not a few of the Fathers, on the other hand, championed the principle that ” Things do not exist because God knows them, but God knows them because they exist.” In doing this they had in view solely His speculative knowledge. It cannot be too often nor too strongly insisted that, like the Molinists, these Fathers never meant to assert that the free acts of the future are the cause or the determinant of divine foreknowledge, but rather its terminus or indispensible condition.55

Article 4: Omniscience as God’s Foreknowledge of the Conditionally Free Acts — the Scientia Media

OMNISCIENCE AS GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITIONALLY FREE ACTS OF THE FUTURE; OR THE ” SCIENTIA MEDIA ” 56 i. State of the Question. — The knowledge of God not only comprises those future free acts which rational creatures will some day actually perform, but likewise those which they would which are knowable. All change is in the termination of the Divine Knowledge in the objects known.” (Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty/’ 164 sq.) 54 Gen. I, 3. 55 Cfr. loan. Damasc, /. c: Ac vis quidetn Dei praescia a nobis’ causam haudquaquam habet; at vero, ut ea quae facturi sumus praesciat, id a nobis proficiscitur. On the Thomist view, according to which the knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) in union with the Divine Will is the cause of all things, see Billuart, De Deo, diss. 5, art. 3. Cfr. also Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 290 sqq., Ratisbonae 1 881; Chr. Pesch, De Deo Uno, 2nd ed., pp. 153 sqq., Friburgi 1899. 66 ” Middle knowledge ” would be the English equivalent for ” scientia media,” — * but it is not in use.* — Cfr. Sylvester J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II (2nd ed.), p. 90. — Humphrey ” His Divine Majesty ” employs the term ” mediate knowledge.” 374 GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE perform if certain circumstances would concur or certain conditions were fulfilled. Acts of the first-mentioned order are called free acts absolutely future ( actus liberi absolute futuri) . Such an act was Judas’s betrayal of our Lord. Acts of the latter group we term free acts conditionally future {actus liberi hypothetice futuri seu futuribiles). Such an act was, e. g., the conversion of Tyre and Sidon, which Jesus said would certainly have ensued if the inhabitants of those cities had witnessed His miracles. a) The question here at issue may be concretely formulated thus: Does God foreknow every single free (or semi- free) act which some particular student would perform if he were to spend the present semester at the Catholic University of America rather than at Harvard ? There can be no foreseeing a conditionated future event 67 except on the basis of an actually existing relation between the condition and the conditioned (ratio conditionis et conditionati) , so that from the positing of the one the positing of the other may somehow be inferred. Where there is no such relation, we have two incoherent events, ontologically independent and therefore also logically unconnected. On the other hand, however, the connexion existing 57 ” Conditionated events of the future are those which will occur, given certain adjuncts. Those adjuncts are the circumstances of the thing or action — who ? — what ? — where ? — with what aids ? — why ? — how ? — and when ? Under the circumstance with what aids, is to be included the divine co-operation or concurrence in order to the doing of the action as a physical act. This is a condition which is always required, and which is, therefore, always supposed, in every act of every creature.” (Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty/’ p. 175, London 1897.) THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 375 between the condition and the conditioned is not necessary (either metaphysically or physically) ; if it were necessary we should not be dealing with a free but with a predetermined process ; e. g., ” If a triangle would appear on this sheet, the sum of its three angles would be equal to two right angles;” or, “If it were to rain now, the ground would get wet.” Hence there can be question only of a condition which in some manner (hypothetically) moves, without compelling the free will ; as, for instance : ” Had Jesus given to Judas the look He gave Peter, Judas too would have experienced a change of heart.” b) Special emphasis must be laid on the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge. It would be manifestly unbecoming to ascribe to the Omniscient God a merely probable or presumptive knowledge of the conditionally future. True, some of the older Thomists taught: “Potest quidem Deus iudicare, quid foret verisimilius vel probabilius in tali eventu, non tamen potest definitum iudicium ferre: hoc esset aut erit, si illud fiat seu fieret.” 58 This teaching is excusable only on the supposition made by the Thomist system, that God can know the contingent events of the future solely through His will {deer eta praedeterminantia) . The Thomists felt the ridiculousness of indefinitely multiplying the number of hypothetical determinations, and therefore were logically led to deny the truth, and hence also the knowableness, of conditional future events. For that which is not, God cannot know. And yet, rather than deny Him an infallible knowledge of all these things, one would prefer with the Salmanticenses 69 to have recourse to the ” ridiculous ” assumption of an infinite number of 58 Lcdesma, De Div. Grat. Aux., 59 De Deo, Tr. Ill, disp. 9, dub. pp. 574 8

hypothetical decrees. If the Almighty Himself were questioned about these things, would He perhaps answer : ” I do not know, for I have not made any decrees with respect thereto”? The later Thomists, be it remarked, are unanimous in holding with the Molinists that God knows all conditioned future actions (futuribilia) without exception, and with metaphysical certainty.60 While the Church has not yet dogmatized this teaching, it must be regarded as doctrina certa, since it is clearly contained both in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. 2. The Teaching of Divine Revelation.—. a) A thoroughly conclusive passage from Holy Writ seems to be i Kings XXIII, 1-13.61 In escaping from Saul, David had fled to Ceila, whither his royal persecutor followed him, seeking his life. Thereupon David got Abiathar, the priest, to bring him the ephod; and he interrogated Jehovah : “Will the men of Ceila deliver me into his hands? And will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard ?” And the Lord answered: “He will come down” (descendet = “HI), and: “They will deliver thee up” (tradent = itw ). Then David arose and departed from Ceila with his six hundred men. In consequence, of course, Saul did not come down to Ceila, nor did the Ceilaites deliver up David. 60 Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. certain difficulties as to the trans61 We say, ” seems to be,” be- Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II (2nd cause the passage is not free from ed.), p. 91. 6, art. 5. lation. See Hunter, Outlines of THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 377 The Lord’s reply referred to a conditionate futurum, something which would have happened had David tarried in Ceila, instead of leaving that city. God must have had infallible knowledge of what the men of Ceila would have done had Saul remained; else He could not have declared so positively: “descendet” “tradent.” Another Scriptural proof for our thesis may be drawn from Matth. XI, 21 : ” Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida: for if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” As a matter of fact, no such miracles were wrought in Tyre and Sidon,62 nor did these cities do penance in sackcloth and ashes. Hence we have here again a mere futuribile, — a contingent future event which Jesus foresaw as clearly and definitely as if it had really come to pass.63 Other pertinent Scriptural texts are Wisd. IV, 11: “He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul.” Jer. XXXVIII, 19: “And King Sedecias said to Jeremias: I am afraid because of the Jews that are fled over to the Chaldeans, lest I should be delivered into their hands, and they should abuse me. But Jeremias answered : They shall not deliver thee.” 64 Vainly do the Socinians and Ledesma65 pretend that the particles “forte” and ” fortasse,” which the Vulgate occasionally prefixes to the divine prediction of 62Cfr. Luke X, 13. 64 Cfr. also Gen. XI, 6; Acts 63 The commentaries of the Fath- XXII, 17 sq. ers on these various passages are 65 De Div. Grat. Aux.f pp. 590 reproduced by Ruiz, op. ext., disp. sqq. 62, sect. 1. 25

futuribilia, furnish a Scriptural basis for the theory that God’s foreknowledge of conditioned free acts of the future is uncertain. The only passage that seems to support their claim is Jer. XXVI, 3 : ” si forte [ = if not = perhaps] audiant et convertantur” But this whole passage is manifestly anthropomorphic,66 as the expression “I may repent me” {ibid.) shows. St. Jerome commentates this verse as follows : ” Verbum ambiguum ’ for sit an’ maiestati Domini non potest convenire; sed nostro loquitur affectu, ut liberum homini servetur arbitrium, ne ex praescientia eius quasi necessitate vel facere quid vel non facere cogatur* In all the other texts which Ledesma and the Socinians allege, the * ne forte” of the Vulgate is a somewhat too free rendition of the Hebrew JB = ne, ” in order that not,” while where the Vulgate has “si forte” the Hebrew text reads DK = si, ” if.* In neither case does the Hebrew particle connote doubt.67 Where the Vulgate version of the New Testament in such instances has * forte” the Greek nearly always has av, indicating an impossible condition, as, e. g., Matth. XI, 23; “forte mansissent (ifuivfv av) usque in hanc diem” Elsewhere the Vulgate employs the word “utique” instead of “forte” •• or, where the conditional clause is negative, ” nunquam” equivalent to the Greek ” owe av.* 69 Cfr. also Luke VII, 39: Hie si esset prophet a, sciret utique (iyiwaiccv 07).” From all of which it is quite obvious that Holy 66 This and similar expressions in the Bible are called anthropomorphic, because they represent God under the form of a man (AvOpwiros, fiopJj), Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II (and ed.), pp. 63 sqq. Petarius, De Deo, II, x. 67 Cfr. Gesenius’s Hebrew Lexicon, s. h. v. 68 Compare John XIV, 7 : ” Utique cognovissetis = e^ypc&jceirc &vt” with John VIII, 19: “Forsitan sciretis &p jjfoiTe” 69 1 Cor. II, 8. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 379 Scripture does not countenance any doubt as to the infallibility of God’s foreknowledge of the futuribilia. b) The Fathers, in their controversies with heretics, expressly recognize the scientia futuribilium and treat it as an undoubted ingredient of the revealed faith. a) To establish their heretical theory of the creation of the universe through the instrumentality of a Demiurge, the Manicheans, the Gnostics, and the Marcionites argued thus : ” Either God foresaw that angels and men would sin, or He did not foresee it; if He foresaw it, He is not good; if He did not foresee it, He is not omniscient.,, In solving this difficulty not one of the Fathers, from Irenaeus down to St. John Damascene, dreamed of denying that God foresaw the sin of angels and men in the event of their creation. Their argument is that, although God clearly foresaw that millions of angels would become devils, and that Adam by transgressing the divine command would involve his entire posterity in original sin, He nevertheless created those particular angels and this particular human race. For, as St. Isidore says: * Sicut praescivit Dens lapsum, ita praescivit, quomodo posset Mi subvenire. 70 That the sin of angels and men was a mere futuribile, which did not become a futurum until God had decreed the creation of the universe, is made evident by a consideration of the eternal plan of creation. If God would create these angels and those men, then many of the former would fall away, and all of the latter would sin. 71 70 Quoted by Suarez, Opusc, De Scientia Div., II, 2. 71 Ruiz gives numerous Patristic quotations bearing on this topic in

ft) Thomassin claimed that the scientia futuribilium was an invention of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, and that it was on this account that St. Augustine fought it so bitterly. But this is an altogether gratuitous assertion. Replying to the question, ” Why does God not take from this life the just before they fall into sin (which He foresees) ?” the “Doctor of Grace” expressly declares that this omission is not due to nescience. ” Respondeant, si possunt, cur illos Dens, cum fideliter et pie viverent, non tunc de vitae huius periculis rapuit, ne malitia mutaret intellectum eorum… . Utrum hoc in potestate non habuit, an eorum mala futura nescivitf … Nempe nihil horum nisi perversissime et insanissime dicitur — Let them answer, if they can, why God did not, when these were living faithfully and piously, snatch them from the perils of this life, lest wickedness should change their minds… . Had He not this in His power or was He ignorant of their future sins? … To assert either the one or the other would be most wicked and foolish.* 72 And still more clearly in another work: * Certe poterat illos Deus, praesciens esse lapsuros, antequam id Heret, auferre de hoc vita — Assuredly God, foreknowing that they would fall, was able to take them away from this life before that fall occurred.” 73 Thomassin mistook the point at issue in St. Augustine’s controversy with the Semi-Pelagians. Semi-Pelagianism taught that infants who die unbaptized are held responsible by God for the sins they would have committed had they reached maturity; so much so that their dying without the grace of bis famous work De Scientia, de 72 De Corrept. et Grat., cap. 9, Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, n. 19. disp. 65-67. See also Petavius, De 78 De Dono Per sever antiae, c Deo, IV, 8. 9, n. 22.

Baptism is really a punishment for these hypothetical sins which in reality they had never committed; while on the other hand the salvation of those who were baptized is attributable to the good deeds which God foresaw they would have performed in after life had they continued in this world. Augustine rightly protested against this absurdity. * Unde hoc talibus viris in mentem venerit, nescio, ut futura, quae non sunt futura, puniantur aut honorentur tnerita parvulorum* 74 He did not deny God’s scientia futuribilium as such, but protested against its being put on the same level with His scientia futurorum. Cfr. De Anima et eius Oriff., I, 12, n. 15: Ipsa exinanitur omnino prae scientia, si, quod praescitur, non erit. Quomodo enim recte dicitur praesciri futurum, quod non est futurum? From Augustine’s point of view, therefore, there is, besides the scientia futurorum { = visionis) and the scientia mere possibilium (=simplicis intelligentiae) , another intermediate species of Divine Knowledge, namely, the scientia futuribilium, which was later called scientia media by the Molinists. c) The theological argument for our thesis is partly based on the intrinsic perfection of the Divine Knowledge, partly on the indispensableness of the scientia futuribilium for the purposes of providence. To know precisely what circumstances, conditions, and situations the created will can encounter, and how it would conduct itself in each and every possible juncture, is doubtless a wonderful prerogative of the Divine Intellect, which it could not relinquish without ceasing to UDe Praedest, SS,, c. 12, n. 24.

be divine. As St. Jerome says: ” Cut praescientiam tollis, aufers et divinitatem.” In matter of fact nescience of conditionally future acts would entail a woful ignorance of many important truths that are essential to that infinite knowledge which evolves harmony out of confusion. Even a mere doubt as to how free creatures as yet uncreated would deport themselves under all possible combinations of circumstances, would be utterly incompatible with God’s Knowledge and destructive of His Providence. If such a doubt were possible, the Creator could not consistently carry out any fixed plan of governing the universe. He would simply have to trust to ” good luck,” because His creatures, by reason of their free will, would be in a position to disturb all His calculations. Like ” the best laid plans of mice and men,” His most wise counsels would ” gang aft aglee.” Unable to provide against unforeseen surprises, Divine Providence would be fated to grope in the dark and to steer an ever-changing zigzag course. The Lord of the universe would be dependent on the moods of mortal men, and oftentimes could not set the machinery of His omnipotence in motion until it was too late to accomplish His designs. What an utterly unworthy conception of God all this implies! Cicero75 denied God’s foreknowledge, because he saw no other way of preserving the liberty of man. A convinced theist would, on the contrary, sacrifice the doctrine of free-will rather than attenuate the divine omniscience. The Christian Church has always clung to the conviction, so beautifully voiced in her liturgical prayers, that Divine Providence ( provider e = praevidere) not only knows what will actually happen in the future, but also what would happen if individuals were placed in different circum75 De Divinat., II, 7.

stances. Imbued with this persuasion we pray God to ward off injury from our souls and to afford us opportunities for doing good. We console the Christian mother who has buried a beloved child, by telling her that Providence disposes all things wisely, that her child is spared much suffering and would perhaps, had God permitted him to live, have wrought his own destruction and broken the hearts of his parents.76 The Jesuit theologian Ferdinand Bastida very eloquently set forth these and similar considerations in the presence of Pope Clement VIII, at one of the meetings of the famous * Congregatio de Auxiliis.* 77 Molina has unfolded the divine plan of governing the universe in the light of the scientia media, in language which may truly be called sublime.78 3) The Molinist Theory of the Scientia Media. — The historic controversy between Thomism and Molinism, which is latterly showing signs of a revival, has its proper place in the treatise on Grace rather than in that part of dogmatic theology which deals with God and His attributes. Nevertheless, the contending parties rightly feel that the roots of their respective systems reach deep down into the dogma of the divine omnis76 Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa says (De Morte Praemat. Infant., circa finem [Migne, P. G. 46, 184]): ” It belongs to the perfection of Divine Providence, not merely to heal diseases, but also to prevent them. It is fitting that He, to whom the future is no less known than the past, should stay the child’s advance to his full age, lest the evil which the prescient Intellect foresees should come about in him, should his life be prolonged.” Cfr. also St. Aug., De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 8, n^ 19. 77 Cfr. Livinus Meyer, Historia Corigr. de Aux., V, 43 sqq. 78 Concordia, etc., qu. 23, art. 45, disp. 1. 384 THE MOLlNIST THEORY cience. As a matter of fact the doctrine of the scientia media marks the very heart of Molinism, just as the Thomistic system centres in the theory of the praemotio physica. a) Scientia media, as the very term indicates, has reference solely to the Knowledge of God, while praemotio physica primarily regards the Divine Will; though, of course, ultimately there can be no physical premotion without the action of the Divine Intellect. This explains the transparent endeavor of both parties in the very vestibule of dogmatic theology so to adjust the teaching of the causal influence of God’s knowledge,* as to make it fit into, and furnish a basis for, their respective systems of grace, and so to interpret the Patristic sayings about God’s knowledge, as to support those systems. Both parties, it is true, are on common ground in accepting it as a revealed dogma that the omniscient God from all eternity definitely foresaw whether His free creatures would co-operate or refuse to co-operate with His grace, and that He disposed His eternal scheme of grace, salvation, and reprobation in accordance with this foreknowledge. They have also come to an agreement on the proposition that God foresees the conditionally future acts of His free creatures as infallibly as He foreknows their absolutely future acts (actus absolute futuri), and both schools consequently employ the term scientia conditionate futurorum seu futuribilium in precisely the same sense. This being so, how is it that the Thomists so hotly reject the term scientia media, which the Molinists have coined for the purpose of designating that scientia futuribilium which both schools admit?79 Is the whole ?»Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, art. 6.

controversy a mere war of words? The character and ability of the theologians engaged on both sides compels us to reject this assumption. Or is the Thomist opposition to the scientia media perhaps due to the novelty of the term? It is true, scientia media, as a technical term for God’s scientia futuribilium, was unknown before Molina, whose teacher, Peter Fonseca, S. J., still employed in its stead the expression scientia mixta.90 But is not the Thomistic term praemotio physica, or praedeterminatio physica, likewise a coin of comparatively recent mintage? Who ever heard of it before Banez? And does not the gradual development of dogma, which results from the action of the ecclesiastical magisterium and the discussions of the theological schools, necessitate the adoption every now and then of some new dogmatic term to give accurate and precise expression to a more clearly defined concept?81 Nor are there wanting instances in the history of dogma where a middle term was invented to bridge a chasm between two extremes. While the ancient creeds, for example, divide all created beings into visibilia and invisibilia, the Fourth Lateran Council saw fit to insert between these two a third category, which it designates as humana creatura quasi communis ex spiritu et corpore. Now, the division into things visible and invisible is fully as adequate as the division of the divine Knowledge into scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis. If, therefore, it was possible to find middle ground between the two first-mentioned extremes, there is no reason why middle ground should not be found between God’s knowledge of simple intelligence and 80 Metaph., 1. VI, c. 2, qu. 4, 81 E. g., bfu>ov

386 THE MOLINIST THEORY His knowledge of vision.82 The sharp rejection of the scientia media by the Thomists, therefore, must be due to some strong objective motive. This motive is that the Molinists have loaded the term scientia media with a number of connotations which extend its meaning far beyond that of simple knowledge. b) If we review the history of the long and acrimonious dispute, we find that both parties, in attacking the problem under consideration, forthwith went to the root of the matter by searching for the medium in which God perceives the infallible connexion of the efficacy of His grace with the free consent of the created will. According to the Thomists, this medium is found in the eternal decrees of His Divine Will, or in His natural or supernatural predeterminations, which in time, as praemotiones physicae, physically predetermine the created will freely to perform the action willed (or, in case of sin: permitted) by God. Therefore God knows the rational creature’s free decisions, which He has predetermined, as infallibly as He knows His own will and its decrees. Molinism, on the other hand, regarding physical premotion, or predetermination, as a grave peril to freewill, nay as its absolute negation, rejects the Thomist hypothesis and seeks to explain God’s infallible foreknowledge of creatural concurrence with His grace by the scientia media, in virtue of which God, before He utters His decrees, and altogether independently of them, foresees how each (actual or possible) rational creature would freely conduct itself in any conceivable juncture of circumstances, were He to offer this or that grace to the supernaturally equipped will. Hence concurrence or refusal, virtuous or sinful conduct, are known to His omniscience, not only before the creature’s 82 Cfr. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 284 sqq.

free will has begun to exist, but even before He Himself has formed any decree (be it positive or merely permissive) with regard to it. According to this theory, therefore, the proper object of the scientia media are the conditionally future free actions of all rational creatures in so far as they are still absolutely free and uninfluenced by any antecedent decrees of the Divine Will. These explanations will enable the reader to grasp the full significance of Tournely’s definition: “Scientia media est scientia conditionatorum independens ab omni decreto absolute et efficaci eoque anterior/’ 83 This peculiar concept of the scientia conditionatorum contains the very quintessence of Molinism, and also its antithesis to Thomism. This fundamental divergence at the outset widens into an abysmal chasm when theological speculation arrives at the doctrine of divine concurrence and the efficacy of grace. While Thomism admits merely a concursus praevius and a gratia ab intrinseco eflicax, Molinism insists on a concursus simultaneus and a gratia ab extrinseco eflicax. c) It will be helpful to illustrate the difference between the two systems by a concrete example. We choose for this purpose the conversion of St. Paul. According to the Thomist view, God (supposing for a moment that He reasoned humanwise), would put the case thus: I will absolutely, from all eternity, that at a certain time Saul shall be physically predetermined by the efficaciousness of my grace to become converted of his own free will; and in this predetermination I foresee his actual conversion as infallibly certain. According to the Molinist theory, God would argue in this wise: Independently of any decree of my will, I know with infallible certitude from all eternity that, if I give WDe Deo, qu. 16, art. 5.

388 THE MOLINIST THEORY Saul this particular grace of conversion, he will freely co-operate with it, and thus become transformed into Paul ; on the basis of this previous knowledge ( = scientia media) I now decree to give him this particular grace, and no other, and by means of creation, preservation, concurrence, and providence, in course of time to posit all those conditions which are requisite to bring about that end. Thus the scientia media becomes scientia visionis, i. e., infallible knowledge of an actual event, only after God’s consequent decree has supervened. Whereas Thomism, therefore, under the leadership of Banez, posits the knowability (= truth) of both the absolutely future and the conditionally future free acts of rational creatures in the Essence, or, more proximately, in the Will of God; Molinism holds that it does not lie proximately and primarily in the Divine Will, but in the historical truth of the absolute or conditioned future, for the certain cognition of which truth God’s Intellect is eternally determined by His own Essence, as the faithful mirror of all truths. Others give still other explanations.84 From what we have so far said it is plain that both systems aim at a scientific conciliation of the seemingly contradictory dogmas of grace and free will. It is a sublime aim, though perhaps beyond the reach of human ingenuity! It is as important that the dogma of grace be kept intact as that the dogma of free-will be safeguarded and defended to its fullest extent. While Thomism, with due regard to the absolute sovereignty, causality, and omnipotence of God, erects a mighty bulwark for the defense of grace, Molinism is busily at work throwing a stiff rampart around the equally important dogma of the free will of man. It was for this reason that 84 Cfr. supra, § 3*

Molina entitled his epochal work Concordantia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione.*5 d) Molina (+ 1600) had cherished the hope that his scheme of harmonizing the two dogmas in question (grace and free-will, providence and predestination), would deal a death blow to all heresies and put an end to controversy. History shows this expectation to have been unfounded. Molinism did not succeed in overthrowing Bajanism, nor did it avail against Jansenism, which arose soon after, and joined forces with the heretical determinism of the Protestant Reformers in a terrible onslaught on the dogma of free-will; nor was it able to bridge the deep chasm which separated the adherents of Banez from those of Molina, the Dominicans from the Jesuits. The battle is still on, though fortunately the combatants engaged in it at present evince far more humility and moderation than their protagonists. This gratifying development we are inclined to attribute largely to the conviction, which is steadily growing on both sides, that if pushed to its extreme logical conclusions, either system is certain to arrive at a point where human reason is confronted by an unfathomable mystery. Several eminent champions of the newer Molinism,86 while strenuously upholding the scientia media, admit that it is a hopeless undertaking to try to explain its ” How ” and ” Why.” In this they follow Billuart, who replied to the question: How are we to conceive the harmony between praemotio and free-will ? by saying: * Respondeo, mysterium esse.*87 Under these 85 Olyssipone 1588; Parisiis 1876. non (Baties et Molina, pp. 113 86 Notably Kleutgen (De Ipso sqq., Paris 1883.) Deo, p. 319), Cornoldi (Delia 87 De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4, 8 a, ad Liberia Umana, Roma 1884), &£g- &

circumstances the paternal admonition which was uttered by Paul V in 1607, when he closed the sessions of the Congregatio de Auxiliis (1598-1607), before that famous body had arrived at a final conclusion, may be said to be doubly important to-day. He counselled the defenders of both systems ” Ut verbis asperioribus, amaritiem animi significantibiis, invicem abstineant” 88 88 The following bibliographical references may prove useful to those who wish to go into the subject more deeply: Platel, Auctoritas contra P roe deter minationem Physic am pro Scientia Media, Duaci 1669. — Henao, Scientia Media Historice Propugnata, Lugd. 1655. — Id., Scientia Media Theologice Defensa, I and II, Lugd. 1674-76. — De Aranda, De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante, sen Schola Scientiae Mediae, Caesaraug. 1693. — Of modern authors we mention: Schneemann, S. J., Controv. de Divinae Gratiae Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progress**, Frib. 1 88 1 > Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae, Parisiis 1886; Gayraud, Thomisme et Molinisme, Paris 1890. — Cfr. also Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae secundum Principia Thomismi et Molinismi Collota, Graecii 1905. — On the * Congregatio de Auxiliis,* see A. Astrain, S. J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 538 sq. SECTION 3 THE MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE I. According to St. Thomas Aquinas,1 there are three different media of higher cognition. “Unum, sub quo intellectus videt, quod disponit eum ad videndum, et hoc est nobis lumen intellectus agentis… . Aliud medium est, quo videt, et hoc est species intelligibilis… . Tertium medium est, in quo aliquid videtur, et hoc est res aliqua, per quam in cognitionem alterius devenimus, sicut in effectu videmus causam” Applying this theory to bodily vision, we have as medium sub quo light, which renders a body proximately visible; as medium quo the species sensibilis through which the eye sees; and, lastly, as medium in quo the mirror which reflects material objects to the eye. The medium quo is also called medium incognitum, because the impression or concept received into the eye or the intellect is not perceived qua species, but merely conveys a knowledge of that which it represents. The medium in quo, on the other hand, is invariably also medium cognitum, because in this 1 Quodlib., VII, art. i. 391 case the medium (e. g., a mirror, a cause), must first be perceived before the mind can apprehend that which it reflects (e. g., a tree, an effect)* Such a cognition is by its very nature not immediate but mediate. In turning our attention to the Divine Understanding we must first recall2 that none of its three media can lie outside the Divine Essence. God, in the first place, is His own medium sub quo, that is to say, He is in Himself the clearest and purest light of truth and understanding, the infinite lumen intellectuale for Himself as for Others. ” cO ©cos

and actual. The created intellect, in acquiring its mediate knowledge of things, proceeds from truth to truth, either by a mere transition, as in the case of antitheses, or by the aid of a middle term, as in the case of syllogistic reasoning. But Almighty God, in the words of St. John of Damascus, ” knows all things with a simple and inscrutable knowledge — ” simplici et inscrutabili cognitione cognoscit omnia/’ 6 His cognition, therefore, is immediate or intuitive, not mediate or discursive,7 except perhaps in this sense that it has for its sole and necessary medium the Divine Essence, i. e., God’s knowledge of Himself. Considered in itself, God’s knowledge is a calm, simple, immediate intuition of things. 2. There is no noteworthy difference of opinion among theologians as to the medium sub quo and the medium quo of divine cognition. With regard, however, to the medium in quo of God’s understanding of the truths external to Himself, there are decided divergencies. Here we have to deal with a most complicated, difficult, and obscure problem. Leaving aside all useless subtleties, and adhering to the familiar classification of extra-divine things which we have adopted in §2, we will confine ourselves to the subjoined theses : Thesis I: Although God perceives the purely possibles exactly as they are in themselves, He does not know them immediately in themselves, but mediately in His own Essence as medium in quo. 9De Fide Orth., I, 19. 7 Cf r. Hebr. IV, 13. 26

This teaching is common to all theological schools. Proofs. Our thesis is a development of proposition 3, § i, supra, where it was shown that God perceives the extra-divine things — including those that have actual existence — not only in His own Essence, that is to say, merely according to their ideal-eminent being, but likewise as they are in themselves, i. e., according to their real and formal being. We have now to consider the question whether God perceives this real and formal being, — a being in which the possibles, too, participate as soon as they become actual — immediately in the things themselves, or mediately in and through His own Essence. Either view has its defenders. In the 17th century still another solution was suggested which aims at combining both modes of cognition. a) Becanus, Vasquez, and others hold that, as there is no ontological, so there can be no logical nexus between the Divine Essence and purely possible beings, for the reason that God must be conceived as res plane absoluta, sine ulla connexione cum creaturis possibilibus; and that, consequently, He knows all things outside of Himself immediately and without the agency of any medium in quo (prius cognitum). It will appear from our subsequent explanation that this view is untenable.8 b) A second view, which is defended by all Thomists and leading Molinists, regards the Divine Essence as the sole medium of God’s cognition, and holds that so far as this cognition comprises the purely possible (and also the actually existing) beings, it is not immediate, but mediate. St. Thomas formulates the main argu8C£r. also Billuart, De Deo Uno, diss, 5, art. 4.

ment for this thesis succinctly as follows : ” Deus seipsum videt in seipso, sed seipsum videt per essentiam suam; alia autem a se videt non in ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso” 9 The Divine Essence being the exemplary cause of all possibles, and likewise the efficient and final cause of whatever actually exists, it is impossible to assume that God, in directing His vision to the things outside His Essence, should so to speak overlook His Essence and apprehend those extraneous objects directly and immediately. Only in His own Essence, which most clearly reflects all beings possible and actual, does He understand all that is riot Himself. The position of most of the later Molinists 10 was outlined by Molina, when he wrote: “Deus cognoscit alia a se non in rebus ipsis, sed in seipso, h. e. intuitus divini intellectus non fertur aeque primo in suam essentiam ut in rem cognitam et in naturas, quas aliae res seipsis habent; sed primo fertur in suam essentiam ut in obiectum primarium, in quo virtute continentur naturae aliarum rerum, et mediante essentia ita cognita illo eodem intuitu cognoscit ac intuetur ulterius ut obiectum secundarium naturam cuiusque aliarum rerum propriam. Itaque cum dicimus Deum non cognoscere alia a se in ipsismet rebus, non negamus Deum cognoscere illud esse quod res habent in seipsis, sed negamus cognoscere illud immediate atque ut obiectum primarium.” 11 This argument gains strength from the consideration that the divine Intellect must needs possess the most perfect knowledge which it is possible to have. Now, the most perfect knowledge is that which is drawn from the 9 S. Theol. ia, qu. 14* art. 5. 11 Com. in S. Theol., ia, qu. 14, 10 JB. g.t Suarez, Lessius, Ruiz, art. 5-6, concl. 2, Lugd. 1593, p. Petavius, Franzelin. 165. deepest depths and ascends to the highest cause, which is God Himself. Consequently the Divine Intellect cannot possibly draw its knowledge from any other source than the Divine Essence, which is de facto the supreme and ultimate cause of all things. Wherefore, as St. Augustine beautifully remarks, “In comparatione lucis illius, quae in Verbo Dei conspicitur, omnis cognitio qua creaturarum quamlibet in seipsa [sc. cognitione vespertina] novimusy non immerito nox did potest — In comparison with that light which is seen in the Word of God, all knowledge by which we know any whatever creature in itself, may rightly be called ’ night/ * 12 The Holy Doctor; is careful not to posit in the Divine Cognition, besides the cognitio matutina (sc. in Verbo”), that cognitio vespertina (“in rebus”), which he ascribes to the angels.18 c) What we have said above is sufficient to disprove the opinion of certain Scotists 14 and Molinists 15 who hold that God’s understanding of the possible and the actual is both mediate and immediate. Is this not equivalent to saying that He simultaneously possesses both the most perfect and a less perfect knowledge of things? No wonder St. Thomas rejects such teaching.16 In view of the fact that Molinist theologians are among the most ardent defenders of the mediateness of divine cognition, Billuart must have been ill-advised when he wrote: “Si Deus non cognoscat alia a se nisi in se ut causa, corruit scientia media: e contra si Deus cognoscat alia a se immediate in seipsis, locus erit scientiae mediae” No Molinist would dream of denying the 12-1? Gen. ad Lit., IV, 23. 13 For other arguments in support of this view the reader is referred to * Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 300 sqq. 14 E. g., Henno, Poncius. 15 E. g., Urriga, Viva, Carleton, Platel, Mayf. 16 Contr. Gent., I, 48. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 397 principle that there is, and that there can be, no truth independently of God. Thesis II: God perceives the actually existing things, including free actions, present and past, in His own Essence as medium in quo. This thesis also embodies a teaching common to all theological schools. Proof. The argument by which we have established the preceding thesis applies with equal force to this one, so far as it embraces actually existing beings that are not free (such as inanimate matter and brute animals) and likewise free intellectual creatures (men and angels) so far forth as their actions are determined by intrinsic necessity, as, e. g., in their tendency towards happiness. The threefold division of time makes no essential difference, because the free will of the Creator univocally determines all operations of the past, present, and future in the necessary causes that depend on God alone, and is consequently knowable in God. The only real difficulty in connection with our thesis arises from free actions, — not so much from those which are past, as from those which occur hie et nunc in the present. (The free actions of the future we shall consider separately farther on). Free and necessary actions manifestly stand in an altogether different relation respectively to the Divine Essence regarded as a medium of cognition. For while necessary causes have a sufficient medium in quo in the decree of the Creator by which they are determined ad unum, and all their effects are minutely, predefined; free-will actions are neither necessarily contained in, nor a priori cognoscible by, their causes. u Quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum

ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa,” says St. Thomas, “sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remattet matus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur” 17 Whence it follows that ” quicunque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem cognitionem; Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso” 18 Now, if free acts cannot be known from their cause (i. e., the will of the free agent), whence does God derive His infallible knowledge of them ? Must He wait till the free will has made a decision, and is He compelled like mortal men to learn by observation ? a) The Thomist solution appears simple enough. God in His physically predetermining decrees, that is to say, in His absolute Will, knows the actions of free agents with the same mathematical certitude with which He knows those of necessary agents. Bound and directed by the decrees of His Will, His Essence becomes the sure medium in quo of His cognition. However, this solution is not altogether satisfactory. For does not such absolute predetermination derogate from, not to say destroy, the self-determining power of free will? Again, several passages from the writings of St. Thomas are distinctly unfavorable to this theory.19 17 S, Theol., ia 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4. 18 5. TheoU, ia, qu. 14, art. 13. i» To quote but one: “Ipsa potentia voluntatis, quantum- in se est, in differ ens est ad plura; sed quod determinate exeat in hunc actum vel ilium, non est ab alio determinate, sed ab ipsa voluntate. Sed in naturalibus [sc. non liberis] actus progreditur ab agente, sed tame determinate ad hunc actum non est ab agente, sed ab eo [sc. Deo}, qui agenti talem naturam dedit, per quam ad hunc actum determinatunt est: et idea propriissime actus voluntatis a voluntate esse dicitur. Unde si pliquis defectus sit in actu eius, ipsi voluntati in culpam et peccatum imputatur.* (In J Dist. 39, qu. 1, art. 1.) Cfr. Frins’i obTHE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 399 Cardinal Bellarmine tried to solve the difficulty by cardiognosis : *Deus, quia cognoscit omnes pro penstones et totum ingenium animi nostri … infallibiliter colligit, quant in partem sit animus inclinaturus” 20 But the real crux is not whether God, by means of His supercomprehensio cordis, can calculate with moral certitude at what free decisions the creature will arrive ; but whether He can foreknow these decisions with that metaphysical certainty which they possess after, they have once been made. Now, to know an effect with metaphysical certainty from its cause, is to know a necessary effect. In this case, therefore, the will would no longer be free, — a flaw which has led theologians to relinquish this hypothesis, though it had the support of such authorities as Molina and Becanus.21 b) To the Molinist, on account of the peculiar character of the free-will actions of rational creatures, God’s understanding of these actions appears not as causally antecedent, but as consequent. It is here that the famous axiom of the Fathers is brought into play: Actus liberi non sunt vel erunt quia Deus videt, scd e contra videt, quia sunt vel erunt However, God perceives the free actions of creatures in His own Essence, not only because, as obiectum materiale et secundarium, they are merely the terminus and not the cause of the divine cognition; but especially because, (presupposing the scientia media), they are contained in, and hence knowable through, the divine decrees of creation, preservation, and concurrence. If this explanation is not as clear as it might be, this is due to the concept of the scientia media, or, which comes to the servations on this important pas- 20 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., IV, 15. sage in De Actibus Humanis, nn. 21 For further details, consult 93 sqq., Friburgi 1807. Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 322 sqq.

same thing, to the knotty problem of the knowability of the futuribilia, which we defer to a future chapter. Thesis III: The free actions of the future God foresees not in His physical predeterminations, but in His concurring will, which is directed by the scientia media. Proof. This thesis, which is defended by numerous Molinist theologians, consists of two parts ; one polemical, directed against the Thomist view ; the other positive, in support of Molinism. Both schools agree that the will of God is the medium of His foreknowledge of the free acts of the future. They differ in this that Molinism assumes a ” decreeless ” scientia media as a sort of torch preceding the decree of the divine Will ; while Thomism vigorously rejects the theory of a scientia media or middle knowledge, and bases the reality and cognoscibility of the free actions of the future solely and entirely on the absolute Will of God. a) We prescind from a detailed refutation of the Thomistic position in this volume, because the matter belongs properly to the treatise on Grace. Let us merely observe that the logic of the Thomistic system — we do not impugn the intentions of its thoroughly honorable and orthodox defenders — is sure to lead to the destruction of free-will and to a conception of the origin of sin which it would be difficult to harmonize with the sanctity of the Most High. Compare these two utterances. Alvarez, one of the ablest among the Thomist theologians, says: ” Deus certo et infallibiliter cognoscit omnia peccata futura in decreto [absolute antecedente], quo statuit praedeterminare voluntatem creatam ad entitatem actus peccati, in quantum actio et ens est, et permittere malitiam moralem peccati

ut peccatum est, non dando auxilium efhcax ad Mud vitandum.” 22 Banez : ” Voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet circa quamcunque materiam virtutis, nisi efhcaciter determinetur a divina voluntate ad bene operandum” 28 Between these two determinations the will finds itself in a quandary from which there is no escape. Assuming that it is absolutely predetermined to the entity of the sinful act, — how can the will escape formal sin, if to resist temptation it needs a new predetermination, over whose existence or non-existence it has no more control than over its premotion to the positive entity of sin? It is because they dread this logical consequence of their theory, that several of the followers of Banez 24 restrict the praedeterminatio voluntatis creatae ad entitatem actus to such actions as are morally good. Before Banez’s time, by the way, Thomists generally did not explain God’s foreknowledge of the free actions of the future on the theory of decreta praedeterminantia.2* Among modern Thomists Cardinal Zigliara deviates from the beaten track of what is called pure Thomism.26 If these and other grave objections (to be treated in the volume on Grace), could be satisfactorily solved, the praemotio physica would afford a sure and infallible medium of divine knowledge, and we could confidently say with Billuart : ” Deus cognoscit futura absoluta contingentia et libera in suo decreto eorum futuritionem determinate, sive in essentia sua huiusmodi decreto determinata.” 27 b) One might be tempted to seek a way out of the 22 De Aux. Grat, disp. XI, n. 3. 28 Com. in S. Theol., ia, qu. 14, art 13, concl. 2, ad 2. 24 E. g., Mendoza and Zumel. 26 Cfr. Schneemann, Controv., pp. 98 sqq.; V. Frins, De C 0 operaHone Dei cum Omni Natura, praesertim Libera, pp. 344 sqq., Parisiis 1892. 26 Theol. Nat., 1. Ill, c. 4, art. 3. 27 Op. ext., diss. 6, art. 4. For a refutation of the theory, see G. B. difficulty by regarding eternity, i. e., that attribute in virtue of which God coexists with the past, present, and future, as the medium of His cognition of the free actions of the future, and to say that to the Eternal God the future as well as the past is present. As God truly intues the present, with all events occurring therein, so by virtue of His eternity or, more correctly, sempiternity, He sees the past and the future as clearly and distinctly as if they were present. St. Thomas employs a beautiful simile to illustrate this truth.28 Take an army corps marching past a given point. Those who are in line see each only a few individuals ahead. But an observer stationed on a high coign of vantage outside, would be able to take in the whole corps at a glance. Similarly, God is not carried away by the current of time. He exists outside of, and above time, because He is eternal. Whatever has occurred or will occur in the course of time, past and future, He views from His sempiternal coign of vantage as if it were happening hie et nunc. In the more accurate language of theology, therefore, we ought not to speak of God’s /w^-knowledge or a/ter-knowledge, but rather of His unchanging co-knowledge, based on an immutable and immediate intuition of actuality. The explanation just suggested, however, fails to solve the question as to the medium of God’s foreknowledge of the future free actions of His rational creatures. All it enables us to say is that, because He is eternal, it cannot be more difficult for Him to have an infallible knowledge of the past and future, than of the present. But beyond this many questions remain Tcpc, S. J., Instit. Theol., t. II, Chr. Pesch, S. J., Proelect. Dogpp. 177 sqq., Parisiis 1895; and mat., II (ed. 2a), pp. 125 sqq. 28 De Verit., qu. 2, art. 12.

open and unsolved. Eternity (sempiternity) can no more be the proper medium of God’s knowledge of the free acts of the future, than can His omnipresence, which is often emblemed by an all-seeing eye. Both sempiternity and omnipresence presuppose the physical world with its temporal succession and local juxtaposition, just as the scientia visionis has for its necessary condition actual existence in time and space. That which actually exists God can see as actually existing only on condition that it exists. Speculative knowledge is necessarily a scientia consequens, i. e., a knowledge which follows things actually existing in the various divisions of time ; not a scientia antecedent, which precedes them, either by nature or causally. Sin in particular, as St. Augustine insists, must be conceived as an object of consequent knowledge: ” Neque enim ideo peccat homo, quia Deus ilium peccaturum praescivit, … qui si nolit, utique non peccat, sed si peccare noluerit, etiam hoc ille praescivit — For a man does not therefore sin, because God foreknew that he would sin, … man, if he wills not, sins not; but if he shall not will to sin, even this did God foreknow.” 29 It is furthermore easy to see that if God’s (speculative) scientia visionis has from all eternity a real object in space and time, this can only be for the reason that God had determined from all eternity to create such an object. Consequently the speculative knowledge of God, which assumes things as existing, has for its necessary antecedent His practical knowledge, which is the cause of all being, i. e., the free Will of God, determining that at such and such a time there shall come into being such and such an intelligent creature, privileged to shape its own conduct freely with 29 De Civ. Dei, V, 10, n. 2.

the concurrence of the Prime Cause. Hence it is manifest that God foreknows the future free actions of His intelligent creatures not in His quiescent eternity, but in His operative knowledge, i. e., in an act of His divine Will decreeing to create beings endowed with free will, to preserve their free will, and at all times to co-operate with it, either positively or permissively.30 c) It is on the conclusion just set forth that Molinism bases its contention that the medium of God’s knowledge of the free actions of the future must be sought for, remotely in His creative and preservative Will, proximately in His will of co-operating or concurring with His rational creatures. The whole question at issue is thereby transferred to the domain of the concursus divinus, into which we cannot at present enter.81 According to the Molinist theory, the concursus divinus does not cause the free determination of the will promovendo, but rather includes it per modum conditionis — else the will would not be free — and hence, in order to safeguard the infallibility of the knowledge which God draws from His concursus, Molinism finds itself constrained to supply the latter with the scientia media as with a torch, in the light of which the Almighty, even before He offers and confers His cooperation is enabled to know how under existing circumstances the free will of the creature will receive it, and also how it would receive it under all conceivable circumstances. * Deus ex vi suae essentiae,* says Lessius, so The terms creation, preserva- cursus sitnultaneus, and likewise on tion, and co-operation, or concur- the distinction between concursus rence, are more fully explained in oblatus and concursus collatus, the the dogmatic treatise on God the student will find it profitable to Creator. consult Jos. Hontheim, S. J., In31 On the important distinction stit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 731 between the (Thomistic) concursus sqq., Friburgi 1893. praevius and the (Molinistic) con 

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 405 “ante omne decretum liberum … omnia ex hypothesi futura cognoscit [= scientia media], qua cognitione posita accedente decreto libero quo vult creare causas liberas et permittere eas suis motibus in talibus circumstantiis, statim in suo illo decreto effectivo et permissivo videt, quid absolute sit futurum.” 32 This hypothesis, which manifestly owes its existence to a desire to safeguard the freedom of the will, is tenable only on the assumption that the free actions of rational creatures are from everlasting uni vocally true, or knowable in themselves objectively and independently of any decree of the Divine Will. Hence the eager efforts of the Molinists to establish the determinata Veritas of the free acts of the future (absolutely and conditionally), and hence also the equally transparent endeavor of the Thomists to deny the existence of such a determinata Veritas, except on the assumption of absolute and hypothetical predeterminations. Later Molinists argue something like this: d) When Christ said to Peter in the night of His sacred Passion: In hac nocte ter me negabis and Peter obstinately insisted : * Non te negabo* 33 it is quite plain that one of these contradictory propositions was certainly and eternally true, while the other was equally false. The outcome might have been logically formulated thus: (1) Peter will either deny Jesus, or he will not deny him; (2) Peter will not deny Jesus; (3) Peter will deny Jesus. Of these three propositions the first, being merely a concrete application of the principle of contradiction, while evidently true, is so indefinite as to be valueless. As the Molinist Martinez told Gonet : * Si hoc esset, spiritus propheticus esset omnibus innatus.* 34 The second proposition, on »2De Perf. Div., VI, i, n. 7. 34 De Scientia Dei Controv., 3, 88 Math. XXVI, 34 sq« disp. 3, sect. 5.

4o6 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE the other hand, is as certainly false as the third is true. For if Christ had prophesied: * Non me negabis,* He would have uttered a definite untruth, just as He uttered a definite truth when He said : ” Ter me negabis.” To assert, therefore, that before its actual occurrence, Peter’s denial of the Saviour was neither definitely true, nor definitely untrue, but at best indefinitely true, after the manner of a disjunctive proposition, would be tantamount to giving the lie to divine Revelation, which foretells definite truths, and to denying the eternal coexistence of God with His free creatures in the past, present, and future. Nor could this condition of affairs be altered by a decree of the Divine Will, because even omnipotence cannot reconcile contradictories. When Peter was called upon to declare himself either for or against His Divine Master, the circumstances of the case (which God had foreseen from all eternity) were such that he had either to take His part or deny Him. To do both indefinitely, or to do neither definitely, would have been as contradictory as it would be for a material body to exist without definite quantity or color. This contradiction not only reaches back into the past, but it also reaches forward into the future, for time — especially in relation to the Eternal God — cannot alter an objective truth. The indefiniteness which attaches to the free actions of the future, therefore, is not inherent in these actions themselves, but only in our knowledge of them, which must await the fact in order to have a determinant. Consequently, all absolute future events are just as definitely determined from all eternity as if they were present or past, and therefore belong to the category of definite truths, which must be knowable as such. And even though God in some other Economy could have preserved Peter

from his fall by giving him an efficacious grace, nevertheless, in this last-mentioned hypothesis his loyalty would not have been less definitely true than his disloyalty and sin are now; and God would have foreknown the former as definitely from all eternity as He foreknew the latter. While God’s decision to create the present Economy, in preference to any other which He might have chosen, simply resulted in Peter’s denial of Christ becoming an historical fact, in some other Economy this crime would have been just as much a definite objective truth, though, of course, only as a futuribile or futurum sub hypothesi. e) In matter of fact conditionally future actions (liberum futuribile) are in the same category with absolutely future actions (liberum vere futurum), inasmuch as God has revealed truths of either class in the most definite manner, e. g., the conversion of Tyre and Sidon, the surrender of David to Saul by the inhabitants of Ceila,85 etc. For God foresees the future free actions of His rational creatures precisely in the same signum rationis by which they assume the shape of definite truths, namely, through the self-determination of the free will. Before the existence of St. Peter, nay even before the making of the divine decree to which He owed his existence, it was definitely true that he would betray Christ if, furnished with no more than sufficient grace, he would be exposed to this definite temptation under the particular circumstances with which we are acquainted from the Gospel; for even in the merely imaginary order of the futuribilitas it would be impossible to conceive Peter as acting under the indefinite disjunction either — or. Consequently, God’s free decree to create and preserve Peter, and to allow him Z& Supra, p. 376.

4o8 MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE to fall into sin, presupposes on the Creator’s part an infallible foreknowledge of the conditional future (i. e., scientia media). What is true of this typical example, applies likewise to all others. There remains the question: What is the medium of that cognition by which God infallibly foreknows the conditionally future free actions of His creatures? Are these actions themselves, as the Thomists assert, true and cognoscible only in consequence and by virtue of the hypothetical decrees of the Divine Will which precede and determine them? Or does God know them without the agency of such decreta praedeterminantia, and quite independently of His determining Will, as the Molinists allege? These are questions which lead us into the innermost sanctuary of His Divine Majesty, and no matter how we may answer them, we shall find ourselves in the long run enveloped by a mystic darkness such as that which obtains in the mighty vestibule of some great cathedral, into which only a little window shaped like a ” mystic rose ” admits a few subdued rays of light. Human theology seems doomed to disappointment in its efforts to glimpse the mystery of the divine knowledge of Him Who dwells in inaccessible light.86 Thesis IV: God does not foresee the conditionally free actions of the future in any hypothetical decrees of His divine Will, but in their own objective truth, univocally determined from all eternity. Proof. For a better understanding of the Thomistic doctrine expressed in the first part of this thesis we will premise the following explanations. There are two kinds of decrees of the will, absolute and hypothetical. 86 i Tim. VI, 16.

a) An absolute decree is one which is unconditional, both on the part of its subject and on the part of its object, as e. g., ” I will create.” A hypothetical decree, on the other hand, is dependent upon some previous condition, either on the part of the determining subject, or on the part of the determined object. We have to do with a conditional decree of the first kind if the law-giver has no real will (voluntas) to act, but would have it (velleitas) in case some condition were fulfilled; for example, “I would fly, if I had wings.” We should have a conditional decree of the second kind, if the lawgiver had a real will to act, but was determined to await the fulfilment of some objective condition; for instance, “I will spare Sodom, if ten just men can be found therein.” The fulfilment of such a condition may lie in the power either of the one making the decree, or of some other independent will. God’s will that all men should be saved is of the last-mentioned species : ” I will that all men be saved, if they will co-operate with my grace.” According to the Thomists a conditional decree of the first-mentioned order is that regarding the conversion of Tyre : ” I decree to predetermine the inhabitants of Tyre to do penance, if I send them the Messias.” Thomism holds that the decrees of the Divine Will in which God infallibly foresees the conditionally free actions of the future, are subjectively absolute, in so far as God makes a real decision; but objectively conditioned, in so far as they depend on a condition the fulfilment of which lies solely in God’s power. Moreover of themselves they have a predetermining power, which, however, cannot produce its effect because the requisite condition is wanting. Inasmuch as the determinatio ad unutn is not dependent on the free self-determination of 27 4io MEDIUM OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE the conditionally future will of the creature, but solely on the predetermining will of the Creator, the latter must be the sure and infallible medium of divine cognition for which we are seeking. This solution of a much mooted difficulty was unknown to the older Thomists, such as Ledesma, Curiel, etc.; it was excogitated and developed by such later Thomists as Alvarez, Gonet, Joannes a S. Thoma, Gotti, Billuart, etc The theory just developed has one weak point, however. It seems to involve the inevitable, though altogether unintentional and expressly disavowed inference that the freedom of both the conditional and the absolutely future actions of rational creatures is destroyed by the Thomistic assumption of subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned predeterminations on the part of God. Another, even more serious consequence is that according to this theory all conditionally future sins seem to fall back upon God as their author. Both these conclusions appear to flow with irresistible logic from the very notion of praemotio physica, which Molinism therefore sharply combats, in order to preserve the freedom of the will. If we admit them as logically flowing from the Thomistic premises, we must reject these premises. Then such predetermining decrees do not, nay cannot, exist in God, and consequently cannot serve Him as the medium for knowing the conditionally future free actions of His creatures. Even aside from the two capital objections just indicated, there are other serious difficulties that can be urged against these hypothetical decrees. What could be their purpose? Their only conceivable purpose could be to insure to the omniscient Creator an infallible knowledge of the conditionally free acts of the future, for the ends and purposes of His wise Providence. For, as

we have already pointed out, without a knowledge of the futuribilia God could not rule and govern the actual world which He has created. But besides the present universe and Economy, there are conceivable innumerable others, which eternally remain in a state of pure possibility and in the contemplation of which there can be question solely of hypothetical acts performed by hypothetical creatures. The dilemma arises: Either God has uttered subjectively absolute and objectively conditional decrees with respect to all possible rational creatures in all possible Economies; or He has not. If He has not, then His omniscience is limited proportionately to the absence of such decrees; for without decrees He can have no foreknowledge. If we choose the other horn of the dilemma, then we must assume that there exists in God an actually infinite number of decrees of His Divine Will, which have no other purpose than to enlarge and to safeguard His knowledge. This assumption seemed indecens et superftuum even to some Thomist theologians,37 who preferred to hold with John a S. Thoma : €t Deum statuisse nihil de Mis [combinationibus possibilibus] decernere, sed sub sola possibilitate concludes, utramque contingentiae partem aestimans probabiletn.”*8 Thus Thomism pendulates to and fro between an altogether incongruous conception of God and a very serious limitation of His omniscience. There is furthermore something unbecoming and unintelligible in the Thomistic system, because, according to its tenets, most, if not all, decrees of the Divine Will seem to lack a rational and wise motive. Once God had determined absolutely not to send the Messias 87Cfr. Gonet, De Aux. Grat., 2. Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 6, disp. 5, art. 2, $ 8. art. 5, sub finem. ZSDe Scientia Dei, disp. 20, art.

to Tyre and Sidon, the matter must have been at an end, so far as the Divine Will was concerned. Why, then, shall we assume the existence of a second decree to this effect : ” Had I not decreed not to send the Messias to Tyre and Sidon, then I would decree to send Him thither (but I will not send Him thither), and to predetermine the inhabitants of these cities to do penance ” ? Perhaps a Thomist theologian will answer: Without some such decree God would lack that knowledge which is absolutely requisite to govern the universe under the present Economy. But this only proves that the Thomistic theory, which derives God’s scientia futuribilium entirely from the decrees of His Will, moves in a vicious circle, something like this: * I decree in order that I may know what I decree.* Nor can Thomism be spared the reproach of innovation ; for nowhere in the writings of the Fathers or of St. Thomas do we find mention made of such hypothetical decrees. Had they believed in their existence, these authors would surely have adverted to them in their writings on the sanctity of God and on sin. b) We do not mean to convey the idea that the Molinist position is quite satisfactory. On the contrary, when its defenders proceed from criticism to positive construction, the difficulties of their system grow apace. Strictly speaking the Molinists are fully agreed only on two cardinal points: (i) In opposing the theory of praemotio physica, and (2) in unalterably upholding the doctrine of scientia media. Both aim solely at preserving free-will. As soon as the question arises: Whence does the scientia media derive its infallibility? or, in other words, What is the objective medium in which God infallibly foreknows the condi 

tionally free acts of the future? — the theologians of this school forthwith part company. The inherent difficulties of their position are such that some later Molinists, notably P. Kleutgen, prefer to plead ignorance as to the medium of God’s knowledge of the futuribilia. They draw a sharp line of demarcation between the actuality of the scientia media on the one side, and its origin and mode of operation on the other, insisting solely on the first and leaving the second an open question. This is tantamount to admitting that Molinism, too, in its last deductions arrives at the door of that great temple of mystery to which God alone holds the key. In view of these facts we need hardly say that the explanation contained in the following paragraphs cannot claim to be more than a diffident attempt at groping a way. To reconcile the manifold and apparently contradictory explanations given by different Molinist theologians, it will be useful to follow the example of Hontheim,89 who shows their objective agreement by treating them as different stages in the development of the same fundamental idea. From this point of view we may distinguish four stages of Molinism, each of which attempts a deeper explanation than the preceding. First Stage. It is certain beyond a doubt, first, that the divine Intellect is infinite, and, secondly, that all the absolute or conditional future actions of free creatures are univocally determined from all eternity, and are consequently cognoscible. An infinite intellect must needs know all truth. Hence God knows all absolutely or conditionally future actions of His free creatures. But how ? Surely not through the mediation of absolute or hypothetical decrees of predetermining 80 Institution es Theodicaeae, pp. 640 sqq.

effect. Such decrees would destroy the freedom of the will; for the determinatio ad unum must rest on the self-determination of the free will. It follows that God must know the absolutely and conditionally future actions of His free creatures in these actions themselves; or, in other words, in their objective truth. If those Molinists who halt here be asked: How, then, can God know all free actions in His own Essence as medium in quo? they will return the unsatisfactory answer: That is a mystery. Second Stage. To clear up this mystery other Molinist theologians go a little farther. They begin by laying down two principles: First, God perceives all the truths which He knows immediately in His own Essence as the medium of cognition; second, His Essence is the absolutely faithful mirror of all truth (* Deus est speculum absolutum omnis veritatis*). Now, inasmuch as the absolutely and conditionally future actions of free creatures are objectively true, and therefore knowable, they must be vitally represented in the divine Essence, and consequently form part of the knowledge of God. Accordingly, while God perceives the free acts of the future terminatively in themselves, determinatively He perceives them in His own Essence as medium in quo. ” Divinus intellectus ab aeterno cognoscit res, non solum secundum esse quod habent in causis suis, sed etiam secundum esse quod habent in seipsis. Nihil igitur prohibet ipsum habere aeternam cognitionem de contingentibus infallibilem.” 40 But the manner in which those free actions of the future are represented in the divine Essence is wrapt in mysterious darkness; except that we may not assume a praemotio physica. 40 S. Thorn., Contr. Gent., I, 67.

Third Stage. We can best realize the difficulty of explaining this ” mode of reflection,” if we turn our attention to the relation of the futura and futuribilia to the divine Essence as the “mirror of all truth.” The future actions of free creatures can become an object of cognition only if, like all truth, they have a foundation in reality. Where are we to find this foundation if we reject the Thomistic hypothesis of decreta praedeterminantia? Are we to find it in the actuality of the free act itself? But this free act does not yet exist; indeed, in the case of most futuribilia, it never will exist. Or are we to find it in the creatural cause of the future act ? But not even the will as cause exists as yet ; it will not exist till later; and even if it did already exist, it would not necessarily contain the free effect. (” Deficiente fundament 0 deficit Veritas/’) From all of which it would appear that the divine Essence is an inadequate mirror of the free actions of the future. St. Thomas helps us to solve this difficulty. He teaches that God’s eternity reflects the future as clearly and distinctly as it reflects the present. The free self-determination of the will, even if it still lies (absolutely or conditionally) in the future, is continually present to the eternal Essence of God. He does not foresee, He sees always. The fact of His co-existence with His creatures — not their coexistence with Him — raises Him above and beyond all divisions of time. * Futurum dupliciter potest cognosci,* says St. Thomas. ” Uno tnodo in causa sua, et sic futura quae ex necessitate ex causis suis proveniunt, per certam scientiam cognoscuntur, ut solem oriri eras… . Alio modo cognoscuntur futura in seipsis. Et .sic solius Dei est futura cognoscere, non solum quae ex necessitate proveniunt, … sed etiam casualia et fortuita, quia Deus videt omnia in sua aeternitate, quae cum sit simr

plex, toti tempori adest et ipsum concludit. Et ideo unius Dei intuitus fertur in omnia quae aguntur per totum tempus, sicut in praesentia, et videt omnia, ut in seipsis sunt/’ 41 This agrees perfectly with the teaching of St. Augustine: Deo, qui omnia super greditur tempora, nihil est futurum — To God, Who transcends all time, nothing is future.42 Or, as St. Bernard beautifully expresses the same thought: ” Futura non expectat, praeterita non recogitat, praesentia non experitur — [God] does not expect the future, He does not remember the past, He does not experience the present.” 48 From this important truth it follows that the absolutely and conditionally future actions of free creatures are a determinata Veritas from all eternity, not indeed by any divine predetermination, but in virtue of the free-will decisions of the creatures themselves. Let us again quote St. Thomas: ” Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, quasi in arce aeternitatis constitutus, quae est tota simul, cui subiacet totius temporis decursus secundum unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et ideo uno intuitu videt omnia quae aguntur, secundum quad {unumquodque) est in seipso existens, non quasi sibi futurum, … sed omnino aeternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt in quocunque tempore, sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua, … quia unumquodque, prout est in seipso, iam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur, quod Deus certissime et infallibiliter cognoscat omnia, quae -Hunt in tempore; et tamen … non sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed contingent er” 44 It is the eternal powet of reflexion inherent in the Divine Es41 Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol., ia, 48 Sernu in Cant., 80. qu. 57, art. 3. 44 Comment, in AristoU 4 Inter 42 Ad Simplic., 1. 2, qu. 2. preU, lib. I, lect. 14.

sence, which in conjunction with the self-determination of the creatures’ free will — a self-determination in itself temporal but always present to the eternal God — constitutes the truth-reality of the absolutely and conditionally future acts of free creatures. Thus the Molinist theologians, at this third stage, by calling to their aid the mystery of eternity, succeed in securing a real basis for the truth of the free acts of the future. But there remains an unexplained residuum, viz.: the concept of vis repraesentativa aeterna. Fourth Stage. To resolve this residuum other theologians of the same school have shaped a still subtler argument. They proceed from the principle that without the active co-operation of God as the prime mover of all things, no free act of any sort is possible; nor consequently true and knowable. According to this theory God foreknows the absolutely future actions of His free creatures in His Essence (Will) as the medium in quo, in so far as, by virtue of His co-operation, He is the cause of every free act. As to the conditionally future acts of His free creatures, which chiefly concern us here, their knowability, or truth, must consequently depend on God’s hypothetical will of concurrence, and it is the latter which constitutes the medium of His cognition of the futuribilia.4* This brings us to the final terminus of the Molinist system, where we again find ourselves on the brink of an impassable abyss. For as the hypothetical concursus divinus, like the real concursus, according to Molinist teaching does not causally produce but merely presupposes the hypothetical selfdetermination of the will; so at bottom it also presupposes that God has an infallible knowledge of this hypothetically free act by virtue of the scientia media, 45 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, /. c, pp. 118 sqq.

without basing the explanation of the latter on the cqncursus hypotheticus. Hence the scientia media in the Molinistic sense is a valuable and, if you will, indispensable postulate, though it defies every attempt to prove it by strictly scientific argumentation. Thus the famous controversy, which was at one time carried on with so much acrimony, lands us in an impenetrable mystery. * Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me; confortata est, et non potero ad earn.*** Having reviewed both systems at some length, we are now prepared to give a brief characterization of Thomism and Molinism. Thomism is undeniably a grand and strictly logical system, which conveys an imposing conception of the omnipotence, the omni-causality, and the sovereignty of God. But in ruthlessly driving its fundamental principles to their ultimate conclusions, it is led to enunciate some harsh propositions which unpleasantly disturb the harmony of the Thomist system. Its psychological effects are great moral earnestness and a fearsome conception of God, which, while it deeply impresses persons of strong faith, easily drives weak natures into a slough of despair. Hence Thomism as a theological system is adapted to the professor’s chair rather than to purposes of popular exhortation. Molinism, on the other hand, is characterized by its mild and gentle features, — an exalted conception of the loving Providence of God, His merciful will to save all men, His encompassing grace, His condescension to the weaknesses of human nature. Psychologically it produces trust in God, strengthens man’s confidence in his own power of co-operation, spurs him on to work out his salvation, engenders peace of mind and joy of heart. These qualities make it the natural language of the 46 p8. CXXXVIII, 6.

preacher and the unconscious idiom of the catechetical instructor in addressing little children. There are ample indications in his writings that the holy Bishop Francis de Sales, one of the most amiable Saints in the Church’s calendar, was a Molinist. Irreconcilable in their leading principles, far-reaching in their practical consequences, yet based equally on the orthodox teaching of the Church, the two systems are likely to retain their recruiting power. They will continue to have their adherents and defenders among theologians, and to exercise a benign influence each within its own circle so long as blind passion and a spirit of disastrous partisanship do not disturb the good relations existing between their respective champions.47 Readings: — S. Thorn., Summa TheoL, ia, qu. 14 sq. (Bonjoannes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 39 sqq.)— In elucidation thereof especially Didacus Ruiz, De Scientia, de Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, Parisiis 1629. — Summa Contr. Gent., I, 66, 70 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 36 n., 48 sqq.). — Suarez, Opusc. II De Scientia Dei, Matr. 1599. — Ramirez, De Scientia Dei, Matr. 1708. — Of later authors: *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 251 sqq., Ratisbon 1881. — Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol II, pp. 91 sqq., 2nd ed., Friburgi 1899. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, pp. 375 sqq., 3rd ed., Romae 1883. — L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t II, Friburgi 1900. — Ceslaus Schneider, Das IVissen Gottes nach der Lehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, 4 vols., Ratisbon 1884-1886. — Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, I, pp. 214 sqq. — Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 262 sqq. — Hunter, Outlines, II, pp. 81 sqq. — Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty,” pp. 130 sqq. — 47 On the position of St. Thomas, consult A. M. Dumraermuth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae, Responsio ad /?. P. Schneemann Aliosque Doctrinae Thomisticae Impugnatores, Paris 1886; Vict. Frins, S. J., 5. Thomoe Doctrina de Cooperatione Dei cum Omni Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera; seu S. Thomas Praedeterminationis Physicae Adversarius, Paris 1892; against him: Dummermuth, Defensio Doctrinae S. Thomoe de Praemotione Physica, Paris 1896. Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers, pp. 166 sqq., London 1906. Also Billuart, De Deo, dissert. 5 sq. — For the literature on Thomism and Molinism, we must refer the student to the treatise on Grace. Other references in the text