Divine Faith

Section IV.—Credibility of the Mysteries of Faith

Chapter XIV.—Divine Faith

Art. I.—Catholic and Heterodox ideas of Faith.

I.—Catholic notion of Faith and of an Act of Faith.

(A) The virtue of Faith is a supernatural virtue whereby we believe truths revealed by God, and believe them on the authority of God revealing. It is to this “evidence” that the Apostle alludes, when he describes Faith as “the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things which do not appear” (Heb. xi. 1). We believe, not because of the intrinsic truth of things seen by the natural light of reason, but because of the Divine authority which guarantees their truth.

(B) An Act of Faith is a supernatural assent of the intellect, most certain and free, whereby we believe a truth revealed by God on His Divine authority. Hence it is:

(a) An intellectual assent under dominion of the will and therefore free.

(b) Supernatural, because of the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

(c) Absolutely certain and irrevocable, based on the authority of God. The assent is more certain than the antecedent judgment of credibility.

(d) An act of Faith requires an antecedent judgment of credibility that God has spoken.

(e) An act of Faith is free, even after the certain knowledge of motives of credibility. The freedom is not only that of believing or of not-believing (libertas exercitii), but also that of believing or disbelieving (libertas specificationis).

II.—Heterodox opinions regarding Divine Faith.

Note the following chart:

• Heterodox notions of Faith
  • Pseudo-Supernaturalism
    • Early Protestants and Baius.
    • Fideists.
  • Naturalism
    • absolute Naturalism
      • Kantian theory.
      • Liberal Protestant theory.
    • semi-Naturalism
      • Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.
      • Semi-Rationalists.
      • Semi-Immanentists.

1° Pseudo-Supernaturalism.

(A) Early Protestants.

(a) Luther and Calvin rejected the authority of the Church, and placed their basis of Faith in the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

(b) They believed also that by faith sins are remitted, and justification obtained without works.

(c) Luther was a nominalist. He did not believe in miracles, but only in the intrinsic motives of credibility.

(d) Supernatural gifts (so-called), being due to the original integrity of human nature, are really natural.

(B) Fideists. Bautain, Bonnetty and Traditionalists:

Reason cannot prove even the existence of God. Tradition is required.

2° Naturalism and Semi-Naturalism.

(A) Naturalism.

(a) Kantian theory of faith resulted from (1) speculative Agnosticism, and (2) autonomy of reason and will. Hence the “moral faith,” whereby we believe the postulates of practical reason deduced from the Categorical Imperative. This faith is subjectively sufficient and objectively insufficient.

(b) Liberal Protestant theory (Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Sabatier, Harnack) reduce faith to the religious sense. Mysteries are credible if conformable to this sense.

(c) Modernists appeal also to the religious sense. The credibility of mysteries is recommended by the fact that there is some unknown element in the history of the Church, which responds to the exigency of human nature.

(B) Semi-Naturalism.

(a) Pelagians held that when external revelation is given, internal grace is not necessary for belief. Semi-Pelagians held that internal grace is not necessary, at least for the beginning of Faith.

(b) Semi-Rationalists teach that after revelation all the mysteries of Faith can be proved by reason. Hermes’ theory is Kantian. The motive of Faith is the exigency of practical reason.

(c) Semi-Immanentists (Blondel and Laberthonnière). Truth is the equation of mind and life, and is on that account changeable. Miracles have a symbolic, not an ontological value. Faith is identified with religious experience.

Art. II.—Analysis of an Act of Faith from the standpoints of object and subject.

I.—Faith and an Act of Faith from standpoint of object.

(1) The object which is believed is either material or formal. The material object is the totality of Revelation. It is divided into the object of Faith per se, which cannot be known without revelation, and the preambles of Faith. The object of Faith per se is either formal and primary, i.e., intimate life of God, or secondary, i.e., other truths of Revelation. Hence the following chart:

• Material Object of Faith
  • Object per se
    • primary and formal—God in His intimate life.
    • secondary—other supernatural mysteries.
  • Preambles of Faith: Truths of Natural Religion.

(2) The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing.

The authority of God implies (1) His truthfulness; (2) His infallible knowledge.

The assent of Faith is not discursive.

Revelation itself, as the uncreated and free act of God, probably belongs to formal motive of Faith. The testimony of the Church does not belong to the formal motive, but is only a condition.

II.—Faith and an Act of Faith from the standpoint of subject.

1° Analysis of belief.

(A) Belief in general.

“Belief in an act of the intellect moved by the will to assent.” An assent is a judgment which may be doubtful, probable or certain.

• Judgment
  • doubt: intellect not more inclined to accept a statement than to accept its contradictory.
  • opinion: intellect inclined to accept a statement, but with fear of error.
  • certitude
    • from evidence of object
      • immediate, e.g., first principles.
      • mediate, e.g., knowledge discursively reached.
    • from will: object not evident, but accepted on the statement of credible witness.

Since the intellect believes at the command of the will the act of belief is free, because the object believed is not evident, and the motive is only one which influences the will to move the intellect to assent reasonably and firmly.

(B) Belief on the authority of God.

Belief on the authority of God is an assent of the intellect to truths revealed by God—an assent commanded by the will.

2° Divine Faith, including its act and beginning, must be intrinsically supernatural.

(A) The Virtue of Faith must be supernatural and infused. Since the primary object to be believed (God in His intimate life) is essentially supernatural, the intellect of the believer must be proportioned to this object by a power essentially supernatural; belief must be infused by God and not acquired by man; and this is true not only for the faith of one in a state of grace, but for the faith of one in sin. Faith of demons is natural, acquired and reaches supernatural truths only materially, i.e., as far as the natural sense of words goes. In the same way, a listener without a musical ear hears only materially a symphony of Beethoven.

(B) For an act of Faith actual grace is required. Again there must be proportion between the act and the supernatural object believed. An act receives specification from its object.

(C) As the beginning of Faith is essentially supernatural, grace is required.

(D) How Thomists differ from Scotists and Molinists regarding the supernatural character of Faith.

Thomists and Suarez hold: “Man cannot accept supernatural truths based on the formally supernatural motive of Divine Revelation without a special internal grace affecting intellect and will.” They allow that a man can without special grace know and accept supernatural truths with an imperfect assent based on some human motive (as heretics believe).

Scotists, Nominalists and Molina hold that the assent of Faith from motive of Divine Revelation is essentially natural, and supernatural only in regard to its manner. Grace would be necessary for acceptance of Supernatural Mysteries on the authority of God, i.e., for their acceptance with the pious adherence which salvation requires. Necessity of grace would thus depend on the extrinsic end of an act of Faith. Faith would not be intrinsically supernatural.

3° Compatibility of freedom with the certitude of an Act of Faith.

(A) Difficulty of the question.

On the one hand an act of belief is said to be free not only as regards assent or non-assent (quoad exercitium), but also as regards assent or dissent (quoad specificationem) (cf. Acts xvii. 32).

By the Vatican Council, liberty of assent or dissent is declared to remain even after the certain knowledge of motives of credibility. Hermes admitted the possibility only of assent or non-assent.

On the other hand the assent of Faith is defined to be most certain, i.e., infallible on the ground of motive (Authority of God), and most firm from standpoint of adhesion due to motion of will illuminated and inspired by the Holy Ghost.

Hence a twofold difficulty:

(1) Presuming rational certitude of Divine Revelation, how does liberty of dissent remain?

(2) If an act of Faith is free and not necessary, how can it be most certain?

(B) Solution of St. Thomas.

(a) Liberty of assent or dissent remains because of the inevidence of the object to be believed.

(b) Assent of Faith is in itself more certain than any natural (even necessary) assent, but from standpoint of human intellect is less certain.

Assent of Faith is in itself more certain than any natural assent, because it has a more certain cause. But the necessarily obscure knowledge associated with Divine Faith is less proportioned to the human intellect. Hence doubt is possible not from standpoint of the cause of Faith (Divine Authority), but from standpoint of the intellect. Exclusion of deliberate fear of error belongs to all certitude, and Divine Faith is firmer than natural certitude owing to its formal motive. But indeliberate fear of error is more excluded by an assent naturally certain through evidence (e.g., assent to an evident principle) than by assent of Faith. Similarly, metaphysical certitude is in itself firmer than physical, and yet the latter based on objects of sense makes a stronger appeal to many minds.

Is it not true therefore that Faith is only theoretically more certain, but really less certain than natural knowledge? No. Faith is, when accepted, more certain in itself and in us owing to its formal motive and to the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost. At the same time, truth, based on evidence, is more natural and more proportioned to our intellect, and more naturally therefore excludes any movement of hesitation and doubt.

(C) Cardinal de Lugo’s solution.

According to the Cardinal, the proposition “Revelation exists” is certain, inasmuch as it excludes prudent doubt, but it is not evident as it does not exclude imprudent doubt. Since Revelation is not evident although the Authority is evident, there is not evidence of the truth of the object revealed, and as long as this inevidence remains, there is nothing which necessitates assent of Faith.

Critique. From this opinion it follows that liberty of Faith would be destroyed, if human reason, without even imprudent doubt, should know the fact of Revelation. But reason can be certain of the fact of Revelation without any fear of error, and yet Supernatural Mysteries remain obscure. Hence the necessity of intervention of human liberty under God’s grace.

(D) Solution of Suarez.

Suarez is of opinion that “the same truth, looked at in the same way, can be seen and believed by the same individual.”

Critique. The Authority of God revealing cannot be seen and believed (i.e., not seen) by the same individual, unless God be regarded in the one case as Author of nature, and in the other case as Author of grace and glory. Suarez, however, does not make this distinction.

Art. III.—Revelation as formal motive of infused Faith.

I.—Difficulty of the question.

Is a natural knowledge of the authority of God revealing sufficient, or is a supernatural knowledge of this formal motive of Faith required?

Cousin wrote: “Final analysis of the Certitude of Faith consists in the rational evidence of credibility; consequently philosophic reasoning is superior to Faith.” (Introduction à l’histoire de la philosophie, 1° leçon).

Does the soul, without internal light of grace, remain blind concerning the formal motive of Faith, or does the soul see in a confused way this motive, so that grace is necessary only to know it more firmly and to believe with such pious affection of soul as is necessary for salvation?

Thomists answer: Natural knowledge can be obtained of truths concerning God, Author of nature, and of the fact of Revelation as something modally supernatural, exteriorly manifested and confirmed by miracles; but Revelation substantially supernatural proceeds from God, Author of grace, is attained by Faith alone, and is the formal motive of Faith, inasmuch as it is that which is believed, and that by which belief is attained.

(A) What the Church has defined.

The Church has not defined that the formal motive of infused Faith owing to its supernatural character is inaccessible to our reason without infused light.

The Church has defined that the faithful must accept the fact of Revelation most firmly as it is infallibly proposed by the Church herself under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, that this Revelation is strictly supernatural, and has been confirmed by miracles properly so called of which the Church finally judges with certitude higher than natural certitude.

According to St. Thomas, it is not impossible to accept the fact of Revelation from signs (miracles) historically certain, and to believe it because of the infallible testimony of the Church.

(B) Views of Theologians.

Thomists and Suarez write: Revelation as formal motive of infused Faith exceeds the powers of reason, and must be known in a supernatural way; Revelation is both that which is believed, and that by which belief is attained; otherwise Divine Faith would not be essentially supernatural, nor infallible, nor more certain than any natural knowledge, but would be resolved into natural certitude.

Scotists, Nominalists, Molina and some modern theologians write: The formal motive of infused Faith does not exceed the natural powers of reason, and it is sufficient to know naturally the infallibility and truth of God and the fact of Revelation. This knowledge is essentially natural, and is confirmed by declarations of the Church and by the infused light of Faith.

In the latter view, the rational character of Faith is safeguarded, but are its supernatural character and certitude secured?

II.—Teaching of Scripture and of early Tradition.

(A) Sacred Scripture.

Faith is “substance of things to be hoped for” (Heb. xi. 1), i.e., the beginning of eternal life, and therefore essentially supernatural.

The formal motive of Faith is referred to many times in the New Testament as the voice of the Father, or of the Son, or as the testimony of the Holy Ghost.

“You have not heard His voice at any time” (John v. 37).

“My sheep hear my voice” (John x. 27).

“Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little ones” (Matt. xi. 25).

“Everyone who hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me” (John vi. 45).

“No man can say Lord Jesus but by the Holy Ghost” (1 Cor. xii. 3).

From the above texts, it is clear that they who resist the grace of Faith cannot recognise the voice of the Father, although they see miracles wrought, and hear the literal word of the Gospel.

(B) Early Tradition (a few examples):

St. Basil: “No one can think of the Son, unless he has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit” (M.G. t 32 col 329-330).

St. John Chrysostom: “How can unbelievers sin if they have not been enlightened? Because they have not shown themselves worthy to receive that illumination” (M.G. t 55 col 322).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Since it does not belong to common wisdom to acknowledge God in human form, Christ says that no one can come to Him, who has not received light from God the Father” (M.G. t 73 col 605-606).

St. Augustine institutes a comparison between a blind man and a Pharisee: “The sun will shine upon the face of the Pharisee and the blind man; both are shone upon in the flesh, but the eyesight of both does not receive the light, because the blind man is deprived of the faculty of sight. Thus also heavenly light shines upon the intelligence of believer and non-believer; reason in both cases is shone upon (by the evidence of miracles), but in the one case the eye of the soul is not illuminated, because the unbelieving man has not the ‘eyes of the heart enlightened’ (Eph. i., 17, 18) (by the inspiration of Divine grace). Internal grace is necessary to recognise the light” (Gospel of St. John c. viii. 14).

The Council of Orange defined against Semi-Pelagians that it is not possible to accept the Gospel message without illumination and inspiration from the Holy Ghost.

III.—Teaching of Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.

Abelard (+ 1142): Formal motive of Faith is not the authority of God, but rational proof. Hence Faith is only a reasonable opinion (ML t 178 col 1050, 1051).

Hugh of St. Victor (+ 1141) stresses the need of internal illumination as well as the extrinsic motive of miracles. (ML t 176 col 217).

St. Bernard (+ 1158): Faith is supported by certain and firm truth and is recommended by the manifestation of miraculous power (ML t 182 col 1061-1062).

William of Auxerre (+ 1231): Supernatural Faith comes by illumination. When Faith is present a man cannot believe for the reasons which he previously entertained; those reasons do not beget Faith in him, but confirm and augment this gratuitous gift (In iv. Sent. b iii).

William of Auvergne (+ 1249): Certitude of Faith is founded upon the testimony of God (De Fide, Part I).

Alexander of Hales (+ 1245): Rational grounds dispose the soul for reception of light, whereby man assents to the first truth for its own sake (Summa IIIᵃ p, q 68 m II).

Albertus Magnus (+ 1280): Faith from the fact that it is a simple light similar to the first truth gives simple knowledge of credible truths (In Sent. Bk. III).

St. Bonaventure (+ 1274): No man assents to Divine Authority, for its own sake and above all things, except by Divine illumination. (In iv. Sent. Bk. III).

Hence theologians before the time of St. Thomas and those co-temporary with him teach that formal motive of Faith is “first truth known by supernatural light.”

IV.—Teaching of St. Thomas.

Commentary on the Sentences (c. 1253):

“Formal motive of Faith is uncreated first truth not seen but believed” (Comm. Sent. III. d 23 q 3 a 3).

“Faith does not assent to any truth unless on the testimony of uncreated first truth not seen but believed” (Comm. Sent. III d 24 q 1 a 1).

De Veritate. q 14 (c. 1261).

“Formal motive of Faith is uncreated first truth existing in the Divine Knowledge.”

“Divine Revelation is at the same time that by which belief is reached, and that which is believed, just as light is that which is seen and that by which sight is accomplished.”

St. Thomas does not say that a believer has a perception or intuition of uncreated first truth, but that he assents to uncreated first truth by his intellect and will.

Commentary on Boethius’ Trinity: “Just as intuition of first principles follows upon sensitive knowledge notwithstanding that the light whereby first principles are known is innate, so Faith comes from hearing and yet the habit of Faith is infused” (q 3, a 1, ad 4).

V.—History of problem after the time of St. Thomas.

(A) Before the Council of Trent.

Scotus (+ 1307) maintained views summed up in the three following propositions:

1° Natural and supernatural acts may have the same formal object.

2° Infused Faith is not necessary because of the supernaturality of the object; the formal object of theological Faith does not exceed acquired Faith.

3° Infused Faith is resolved into acquired Faith by which we believe (owing to miraculous signs) that the church is divine.

Durandus (+ 1334) and Nominalists (Ockam, etc.), held the same views. Early Thomist theologians, Capreolus (+ 1444), Cajetan (+ 1534), Ferrariensis (+ 1528) defend the doctrine of St. Thomas.

(B) After the Council of Trent.

The Council of Trent teaches that the supernaturality of infused Faith is of the same order as the supernaturality of sanctifying grace.

Melchior Cano (+ 1560): “If assent of Catholic Faith depended on acquired Faith, the assent would not be absolutely firm.” Necessary truths of mathematics are ultimately seen by their own light, though certain conditions are previously required, e.g., sensitive knowledge, explanation of a teacher, etc. (de Locis Theologicis Bk. II c 8).

Bannez (+ 1604): “The ultimate resolution of Faith and of the Act of Faith is to the Holy Ghost revealing” (Iᵃ IIᵃᵉ q 1 a 1 dub. IV).

Suarez (+ 1617) is in agreement with Thomistic teaching, but it is difficult to reconcile his position with his view on “simultaneous concursus” and “active obediential faculty” (De Fide, Part I, disp. III).

Joannes a S. Thoma (+ 1664): “Divine testimony is the formal reason of believing the things testified and the testimony itself” (De Gratia, Vol. V, disp. 20, a 1, n 7).

VI.—Teaching of St. Thomas is proved.

Divine Revelation coming from God, Author of grace, and constituting the formal motive of Faith is that by which belief is reached, and that which is believed; the fact of Revelation, however, only modally supernatural, confirmed by miracles can be naturally known, just as the existence of God, Author of nature, is naturally known.

1° Proof drawn from objective infallibility of Faith.

The Church has defined that Divine Revelation is, in the strict sense, supernatural. Therefore the faithful must believe supernaturally the fact of Divine Revelation, otherwise they would not have a certitude objectively infallible, superior to all natural certitude.

St. Thomas points out that it is possible to know the fact of Revelation naturally from historical testimony, and to believe it on the infallible proposition of the church. The fact of Revelation is reached by Faith inasmuch as Revelation is essentially supernatural, whereas the fact of Revelation is reached by reason in so far as Revelation is modally supernatural.

Again, proof through miracles does not give intrinsic evidence, and hence Faith regarding the same object is possible. The Apostles knew of Christ’s resurrection from evidence of the senses, and at the same time believed it because of the infallible testimony of Christ and of the Scriptures.

2° Proof drawn from the subjective firmness necessary to the knowledge of the motive of Faith.

The faithful adhere to the declaration of the Church regarding fact of Revelation with a certitude subjectively infallible. This firmness of belief transcends natural reason.

3° Proof drawn from the essential supernaturality required in this knowledge.

Revelation as formal motive of essentially supernatural Faith should be itself essentially supernatural. But what is essentially supernatural can be known only supernaturally by supernatural Faith. Therefore Revelation as the formal motive of Faith is that by which belief is reached and that which is believed.

The following table shows the genesis, motive and object of an act essentially supernatural, an act modally supernatural, an act of rational cognition and an act of sensitive perception.

Source	Act	Medium or Objective Motive	Object
1. Habit of Faith,	Act of Faith,	Revelation, essentially supernatural	mystery essentially supernatural
2. Mind of prophet,	prophecy,	Revelation modally supernatural	future contingent event
3. Reason,	rational act,	principles of reason,	conclusion
4. Sense,	sensation	sensible light,	colour.

Hence certitude of Faith is not resolved into the light of first principles of reason (on which Divine truth and miracles confirming preaching of the Gospel ultimately depend), but objectively into the uncreated light of active Revelation, and subjectively into infused light of Faith by which the human intellect is elevated.

Objections:

(1) The objection may be raised that the Gospel message indicates that Divine Revelation comes from God, Author of grace. But this message may be known by the exercise of natural faculties. Therefore the authority of God revealing may be known naturally.

Answer: A reader of the Gospel will know supernatural mysteries but only materially, not formally as supernatural, just as a student may know a metaphysical principle only materially, but may fail to see the necessity and universality of the same. Again, he who lacks a musical ear hears a Beethoven symphony only materially, but he misses the soul of the symphony.

(2) The same truth under the same aspect cannot be known and believed by the same person. But the authority of God revealing is known to many. Therefore it cannot be believed by them.

Answer: Authority of God revealing as it applies formally to God, Author of grace, cannot be proved, and under this higher aspect is the formal motive of Faith. Under a lower and extrinsic aspect, it is proved by miracles which are the seal of God, Author of nature.

(3) The fact that no one can tell with certainty whether his act is supernatural or not is not an argument against the supernatural character of the formal motive of Faith. A supernatural act is necessarily accompanied by a natural act, and it is difficult to distinguish between the supernatural and natural elements. But according to the teaching of the Church: No one can believe, with belief effective for salvation, unless aided by the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.