Credibility
Chapter XV.—Credibility
Art. I.—Rational Credibility.
I.—Catholic notion of Credibility (D. 1812, 1790).
1° (From objective standpoint). The mysteries of Faith are rationally credible, inasmuch as the Divine origin of the Christian Faith can from most certain signs be rightly proved.
2° (From subjective standpoint). Human reason can certainly know before acceptance of Faith the Divine origin of the Christian Religion (D. 1622-1637).
3° Scientific proof of Credibility is not required for each one of the faithful (D. 1815).
4° Probable knowledge of Credibility (D. 2025), purely subjective knowledge (D. 1273), internal experience (D. 1812), private inspiration—all these are insufficient.
II.—Heterodox notions of Credibility.
- False Notion of Credibility
- Pseudo-Supernaturalism
- Early Protestants.
- Fideists.
- Naturalism
- absolute
- Kant
- Liberal Protestants
- Modernists.
- non-absolute
- Hermes
- Semi-Immanentists.
- absolute
- Pseudo-Supernaturalism
(1) Pseudo-Supernaturalism.
(A) Early Protestants, e.g., Luther, Calvin, etc., maintained that the faithful should themselves discern the Word of God by the immediate testimony of the Holy Ghost (D. 767).
(B) Fideists and Traditionalists (Bautain, Bonnetty, etc.), appealed to the faith of humanity founded on tradition and positive revelation. Human reason had been so injured by original sin, that it is incapable of proving even the existence of God (1622, 1627, 1650). Fideism regards the Supernatural as due to nature.
(2) Naturalism and Semi-Naturalism lay down varying bases for Faith:
(A) Kant: “Moral faith is founded on the exigencies of practical reason.” Existence of miracles cannot be clearly proved.
(B) Liberal Protestants (Schleiermacher, etc.): Basis of Faith is “sense of religion.” Divinity of the church cannot be proved by miracles (D. 1813).
(C) Modernists rely on “aspirations and exigencies of the religious sense” (D. 2072, 2101, 2103).
(D) Hermes regarded “exigencies of practical reason” as the credentials of Faith. But Semi-Rationalists do not deny, as Kant did, the fact of revelation and the influx of grace.
(E) Semi-Immanentists (Laberthonnière and Blondel) claim that there is in human nature an exigency for the supernatural order (D. 2103).
III.—Theological explanation of the Catholic notion of Credibility.
Credibility of mysteries of Faith is defined: “Aptitude for belief of those truths which, from most certain signs, appear to our reason to have been revealed by God.”
(A) Comparison with human belief.
Human faith rests on the testimony of witnesses worthy of credit, i.e., of witnesses who (a) know what they affirm, (b) are truthful, (c) really affirm.
Divine Faith rests on God who can neither deceive nor be deceived.
(B) Catholic Credibility depends on previous truths, viz., that an act of Faith is not a species of religious experience, but assent of intellect to truths revealed by God on His Divine authority.
(C) Other definitions of Credibility (such as credibility based on conformity with human aspirations) are insufficient.
(D) Evidence of Credibility is not the same as evidence which an apostle had, when he saw miracles worked in confirmation of our Lord’s mission.
Evidence of Credibility is moral certitude based on human testimony.
(E) Properties of Rational Credibility.
1° Credibility is common to all revealed truths.
2° Truth of Credibility is extrinsic to revealed truths.
3° Truth of Credibility is that which is known as speculative-practical.
4° Evident Credibility is a condition sine qua non of an Act of Faith.
Art. II.—Necessity of Rational Credibility.
Thesis: In order that mysteries of Faith should be rationally credible, reason ought to know with at least moral certitude the fact of Revelation so far as it is modally supernatural. Revelation as the uncreated and essentially supernatural action of God is believed supernaturally and infallibly as formal motive of Faith, i.e., as the motive by which belief is secured and at the same time that which is believed.
I.—Difficulty of the question.
How reconcile the supernatural character with the rational obedience of Faith? If reason can prove that mysteries have been revealed by God, reason can know the formal motive of Faith, which would not in that case be essentially supernatural.
The answer is suggested in the thesis. Reason can know the fact of Revelation so far as it is modally supernatural. Revelation, so far as it is essentially supernatural, belongs exclusively to Faith.
II.—Testimony of Scripture and of the doctors of the Church.
(A) John xx. 30, 31: “Many other signs also did Jesus in the sight of His disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing you may have life in His name.”
I Cor. xv. 17: “If Christ be not risen your faith is vain.”
II Pet. i. 16: “For we have not by following artificial fables made known to you the power and presence of our Lord Jesus Christ; but we were eye-witnesses of his greatness.”
(B) St. Justin, St. Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, St. Hilarius, St. Ambrose, say that the supernatural certitude of Faith is higher and firmer than the rational certitude of Credibility. They hold that the formal motive of Faith is known under internal illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.
(C) Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Thomists and Suarez maintain that the formal motive of infused Faith can only be known through illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.
III.—Rational undoubting knowledge of the fact of Revelation is necessary.
Major: Nothing is rationally credible by Divine and unchangeable Faith unless it is evidently, and not merely probably, credible by this Faith Divine and unchangeable.
Minor: But nothing is evidently such unless reason recognises from miracles that it has been supernaturally revealed by God.
Conclusion: Therefore that the mysteries of Faith may be rationally credible, reason should from signs recognise the fact of Revelation, at least so far as it is modally supernatural.
Reason can recognise through miracles the fact of Revelation so far as it is a miraculous intervention of God, i.e., modally supernatural. But reason cannot grasp Divine Revelation so far as it is essentially supernatural. Under that aspect, Revelation is held by Faith. Hence in Scripture such expressions as “voice of our Heavenly Father,” “voice of the Son,” “testimony of the Holy Spirit,” etc.
Can an object of Faith be something seen? No. Thomas the Apostle saw one thing and believed another: “vidit hominem et cicatrices, et ex hoc credidit divinitatem resurgentis” (St. Thomas in Joan xx. 29 lect. vi., fine).
IV.—Moral certitude is sufficient.
Although scientific proof of Credibility, i.e., scientific proof of the Divine origin of Christianity, is most useful for the collective faith of the Church, it is not required in any individual case; moral certitude is sufficient.
1° Scientific certitude (which implies leisure, mental ability, etc.) is not possible for all. Certitude of natural reason, such as that which men generally have of the existence of God is sufficient.
2° Physical certitude is not possible for all, i.e., the certitude, e.g., of those who witnessed the resurrection of Lazarus.
Just as metaphysical certitude is founded on the absolute necessity of that which is asserted, and on the impossibility of the contradictory proposition, so physical certitude depends on the uniformity of the laws of nature. Moral certitude depends on human testimony, e.g., it is morally impossible that such a witness should in such circumstances testify falsely.
3° Divine Faith does not require a higher certitude of credibility than moral.
For moral action, in affairs of the natural order, moral certitude is sufficient. But Divine Faith requires a judgment of credibility as something certain in the natural order—something which justifies moral action. Hence Divine Faith requires a judgment of credibility which shall be at least morally certain.
The assent of Faith may accordingly be resolved into (1) formal, intrinsic, supernatural certitude, based on Divine Revelation, infallibly and supernaturally believed as the formal motive of Faith; (2) material, extrinsic, modally supernatural certitude, based on evidence of credibility as a necessary condition on the part of the subject. There is a second necessary condition on the part of the object, viz., infallible proposition of Revealed Truths through the Church. This proposition is not formal motive of Faith but only a condition.
An objection may be urged: moral certitude of credibility does not suffice, because per accidens it can be about something false, e.g., if a witness invincibly errs by recording false miracles as true.
Answer: Moral certitude is sufficient per se. There may be per accidens an illegitimate persuasion which is very like moral certitude, but is not certitude, as it can be shown that the persuasion lacked foundation, which never happens in the case of real certitude. Material heretics hold false beliefs by human opinion, whilst they assent by Supernatural Faith to certain Divine Truths.
V.—Moral certitude of credibility can be gained by all men, at least with the help of grace, although grace is not absolutely necessary.
(A) As regards those who hear Catholic doctrine. The judgment of the Universal Church confirms the words of the preacher. The Church is an “irrefragable testimony of its own Divine mission.” Motives of Credibility lead to Faith, and Faith subsequently enables the believer to appreciate better the cogency of the motives of credibility. “Lumen fidei facit videre ea quæ creduntur” (St. Thomas IIᵃ IIᵃᵉ q 1 a 4 ad 3). In this sense (as will be explained) should be interpreted the sayings of St. Anselm, “Credo ut intelligam” and “fides quærens intellectum.” The internal grace of God helps hearers of the Gospel, so that they may realise the motives of credibility; grace does not supply any deficiency in the external proposition of the Faith, but it inclines the attention of the hearer to the true motives of credibility, and corrects his intention so that he may form an unbiassed judgment. “Was not our heart burning within us, whilst He spoke in the way?” (Luke xxiv. 32).
(B) What is the teaching regarding those who are in invincible ignorance of Catholic truth?
It is of faith that all men exercising the use of reason receive sufficient grace (at least, remote) to find the way of salvation. Heretics may know the principle mysteries, and the needful motives of credibility through the teaching of their particular denomination. As regards “aliquis nutritus in silvis,” who knows nothing of Christianity, if he follows the lead of natural reason in the pursuit of good and evil, it is most certain that God will reveal by internal inspiration those truths which must of necessity be believed, or He will send some preacher of the Faith, to him as He sent Peter to Cornelius (St. Thomas, de Veritate, q 14, a 11, ad 1ᵐ).
(C) Why is internal grace not absolutely necessary for the certain judgment of Credibility?
Because the motives of Credibility are naturally knowable, just as in the case of a miracle.
Art. III.—Function of judgment of Credibility in the genesis of an Act of Faith.
I.—Acts which lead to an Act of Faith.
An Act of Faith is a human act, deliberate, elicited by the intellect and ordered by the will under the inspiration and illumination of the Holy Ghost.
Before enumerating the acts which lead to an Act of Faith, it will be useful to recall the succession of acts which concur to the deliberation and execution of a proposal.
(1) Acts of intellect and will regarding the attainment of some end.
Order of Intention
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 1° Judgment: this end is desirable | 2° Desire (inefficacious) |
| 3° Judgment: this end can and must be obtained. | 4° Efficacious intention: I desire this end. |
(2) Acts regarding means of attainment.
A.—Order of Choice
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 5° Deliberation: these means seem apt for the end. | 6° Consent to these means. |
| 7° Practical judgment regarding the best method. | 8° Choice of this method |
B.—Order of Execution
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 9° Command: the means chosen must be applied. | 10° Active use of the will moving faculties. |
| 11° Attainment of end desired. | 12° Fruition of will, the end being attained. |
Genesis of an Act of Faith
(1) Acts relating to attainment of last end, i.e., Salvation.
Order of Intention
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 1° Judgment: last end known at least implicitly as desirable. | 2° Desire of salvation. |
| 3° Judgment: end attainable and of necessity to be attained. | 4° Intention: I sincerely desire to attain my last end, my salvation. |
In case of converts, Acts 3 and 4 are performed under the illumination and inspiration of internal grace.
Auditus Fidei: Here comes logically, if not historically, the intervention of the Divine message, confirmed by miracles.
(2) Acts relating to means of attainment.
A.—Order of Choice
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 5° Deliberation. (a) Speculative judgment, “this is credible,” remotely practical. (b) Speculative—practical judgment “this must be believed,” judgment of credentity. | 6° Consent to credibility (not as yet efficacious). |
| 7° Judgment practico-practical of credentity: “this must be believed by me here and now.” | 8° Supernatural choice of the act of belief. |
B.—Order of Execution
| Acts of Intellect | Acts of Will |
|---|---|
| 9° Judgment: Believe! | 10° Active use of will. |
| 11° Act of Faith: I believe! | 12° Fruition arising from attainment of Faith. |
II.—Distinction between the judgment of Credibility and the practical judgment of Credentity.
The principal difference lies in this fact that the judgment of Credibility and the judgment speculative-practical of Credentity are found not only in those who reach Faith but even in those who with full advertence commit the sin of infidelity. On the contrary the judgment practico-practical of Credentity is not found except in the case of those who attain to Faith. Hence this judgment per se requires some help of grace.
Video meliora (speculative judgment).
Proboque (speculative-practical judgment).
Deteriora sequor (practico-practical judgment).
“The judgment in the character of extrinsic formal cause directs the will so that it may choose in a definite way; the will in the character of efficient cause applies the intellect in regard to action so that it may judge in a definite way” (Salmanticenses de Angelis disp. x. dub viii. n 270). According to the Thomist school, the judgment practico-practical of Credentity, and the supernatural choice of the act of belief are intrinsically supernatural.
An Act of Faith is not the conclusion of an apologetic syllogism. The syllogism terminates at the following judgment of Credibility.
Major: Whatever God reveals is rationally credible.
Minor: But God has revealed Christian teaching as is clear from the miracles by which it is confirmed.
Conclusion: Therefore Christian teaching is rationally credible.
Art. IV.—Compatibility of the reasonable obedience of Faith with its obscurity, freedom and supernaturality.
A difficulty has been raised regarding the certitude of Faith and formulated thus:
Unless the fact of Revelation be only probable, the obscurity, freedom and supernaturality of Faith cannot be established.
Answer:
(1) Probability of the fact of Revelation does not suffice for rational belief.
(a) If it be alleged that the probable judgment of credibility is sufficient, the answer is at once suggested: not in a matter the consequences of which are so grave (Vide Pascal, “Pensées,” Art. x.).
(b) If it be alleged that ignorant men and children rely on the testimony of pastor or parent, which is only of probable value, the answer is clear: testimony of pastor or parent is only the condition which makes known the universal testimony of the Church.
(2) Certitude of Credibility is reconciled with the liberty of an Act of Faith.
The proofs of Credibility are extrinsic, not intrinsic, and are therefore compatible with freedom. “Only that species of proof excludes Faith by which the object of Faith becomes intrinsically evident or extrinsically visible.” (St. Thomas, IIᵃ IIᵃᵉ q 5 Art. 1).
The certitude of Credibility does not diminish the merit of Faith. When Our Lord said: “Unless you see signs and wonders you do not believe,” He condemned the sceptical spirit which asks for unnecessary signs, but He did not condemn the attitude of mind which requires the Mysteries of Faith to be rationally credible.
(3) Certitude of Credibility is compatible with obscurity of Faith.
The statement, “The Word was made flesh,” is credible owing to extrinsic testimony, but intrinsically it remains a mystery.
(4) Certitude of Credibility is compatible with the supernatural character of Faith.
The higher certainty of supernatural truth cannot be resolved formally and intrinsically into the lower certainty of Credibility, but it can be so resolved materially and extrinsically. Analogously, the metaphysical certitude of first principles presupposes the lower certainty of sensitive knowledge.
When the statement is made that Revelation is that by which Faith is reached and that which is believed, Revelation must be taken as Revelation intrinsically supernatural. Revelation modally supernatural may be partly known in so far as it is a miraculous intervention on the part of God.
Hence the following:
(1) Certitude of Credibility founded on miracles is a condition of Faith, from the standpoint of the subject who aspires to Faith.
(2) Infallible proposition of the Church is a condition of Faith from the standpoint of the object to be believed.
(3) The formal motive of Faith is the authority of God revealing.
Art. V.—Summary of Catholic teaching on Divine Faith.
1° An Act of Faith.
The essence of an Act of Faith is believing in something that God has said, just because He has said it. To put it concretely, if God should appear to me, and tell me that in His one Divine nature there are three distinct Persons, and that the Second of these became Incarnate in our Blessed Lady, and died on the cross for my salvation, and I, knowing that God who tells me these things is truthful and trustworthy, believe what He has said, my act of believing is Faith. The truths I thus believe are Articles of Faith (objectum materiale), and the reason or motive on which I have believed is God’s veracity (objectum formale).
2° Equality of Faith.
It is clear that in this case I believe, not upon intrinsic evidence, viz., by perceiving the identity of subject and predicate (as I do when I say that 2 + 2 = 4, or that the three angles of a plane triangle equal two right angles), but on what is called extrinsic evidence, namely, the authority and infallibility of the teacher. This is what makes the equality of Faith. For if a hundred persons were with me when God appeared to me and told me the above-named truths, and they, like me, believed what He said because He said it, their act of belief is Faith, precisely as mine is, no matter what might be the difference of education or intellectual capacity. Ten of them might be experts in Divinity or exegesis; ten others highly versed in secular learning; ten others fairly educated, and the rest stupid or illiterate. Yet all would be capable of knowing that God had spoken and of knowing what He had said, and that He could not deceive, and the Act of Faith in all is essentially the same. It is thus that in the Catholic Church, there is no difference of Faith, as far as Faith is concerned, between the most learned theologians and the most illiterate layman, between the Pope and the simplest child or the poorest peasant.
3° Reasonableness of Faith.
It is also true that this Act of Faith common to all and by God’s grace made by all upon the same reason and the same footing, so far from being “blind belief” or “abdication of our reason” rests upon the surest and highest of all reasons, and is essentially the noblest use of our reason, and the truest form of our “reasonable service,” since nothing can be more reasonable than to believe the God of reason, and thus to share in the light of the Divine Reason Itself. Thus Faith is the union of the mind of man with the mind of God, which explains its infusion of peace and joy.
4° God’s external and internal teaching.
When the truths of Faith are presented to the mind, the intellect perceives the reasonableness of believing what God has said and that He has said it, and the will enjoins assent. In this perception by the intellect and in this impulse by the will, God, by His grace, acts upon the soul, from the outset enlightening the one and moving the other, so that grace is prevenient, concomitant, and completive in the Act of belief. In that act we have God for our Teacher (Isaiah liv. 13), and God’s method of teaching is surpassingly vital and perfect. For He not only teaches us by His voice from without—as a human teacher might—but at the same time, by His Holy Spirit, teaches us from within, disposing us internally to receive and believe what He teaches us externally. This would be the explanation why motives of Credibility which might be relatively insufficient (as in the case of children who believe by confidence in their parents, or savages who believe by confidence in the missionary) become sufficient under the influence of grace, which is the infusion of the Divine Reason into their reason, or as theologians have expressed it “ubi deficit ratio, sufficit gratia.”
5° The Work of Intellect as distinct from Faith.
When we, by God’s grace, believe the truths which God teaches us, because He teaches them, our Act of Faith is all-sufficient and complete, and we can have no higher or surer grounds of belief. Nevertheless our intellect may proceed to act upon the body of truths thus received, to examine them, to see into them (for that is the function of the intellect, intus legere), and thus realise their beauty and reasonableness to co-ordinate them and grasp their synthesis and order—to note their harmony with truths and facts of the natural order—to look around for arguments which would support them, or answers to refute objections urged against them, so that I may not only rejoice in my own assent, but, by adding to their clearness, to help to win for them the assent of others. In all this I bring the truths which my Faith has given me under the operation of my intellect, for the purpose of making plain their import and reasonableness, and their relation to other truths. This is Faith seeking understanding, or what St. Anselm describes as “Fides quærens intellectum,” and to which he alludes in his well-known sentence—“Credo ut intelligam.” We have herein the domain of Theology as marked off from that of Faith. It pertains not only to the professional theologian, but to every intelligent Catholic who follows the counsel of St. Peter, and seeks to be ready to satisfy others by giving a reason “for the hope that is in him” (1 Peter iii. 15). In that zealous use of his intellect, he is helped by the grace of Understanding given him by the Holy Ghost in his Confirmation.
6° Inequality of the Work of the Intellect.
It is evident that the work of the intellect, unlike the work of Faith, is far from being equal in all, depending as it does, with grace, upon the intellectual capacity and equipment and research of each individual.
7° No “examen dubitativum.”
It is also to be observed that the work of examination by the intellect can never be dubitative or suspensive of the assent of Faith, which rests on the teaching of God. If my God is pleased to teach me a doctrine, I cannot say to Him: “I must wait until I see whether You are telling me the truth or not.” Rather do we say: “I believe absolutely once and for all and for ever what You teach me, and I will hold it ever against all the reasons that men may ever allege, for theirs is the word of man, and yours is the Word of God—and now that I believe I will use all the powers of my soul to realise the beauty, goodness and truth of what you have taught me, and see how it harmonises with all your work, and thus bring out of our Faith-given treasure ‘old things and new.’” Thus our Faith seeks understanding, and our understanding serves to appreciate our Faith.
8° Motives of Credibility antecedent to Faith.
In the above example I have supposed that God appeared to me, and revealed the truths of Faith. I should require to know that it was really God who speaks, and that He has said what I understand Him to say. In the actual fact, He speaks to me mediately, viz., He becomes man and teaches me through His church. Hence for the fact of Revelation by God through Christ, and the infallibility of the church, we require motives of Credibility or the prolegomena of Faith. That must be the work of reason helped by grace. It is “intellectus quærens Fidem” rather than “Fides quærens intellectum.” As noted above the cogency of the motives of Credibility is relative in its sufficiency, and God accommodates His light to the soul, revealing to little ones what He has hidden from the wise and the great “for so it was pleasing in His sight.”