Part II, Chapter II, Section 2, Article 1: Nature and the Supernatural

Pohle, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, Part II, Chapter II, §2, Article 1 (pp. 180–196)

Section 2: The Supernatural in Man

Man’s whole natural endowment was intended merely as the basis and groundwork of a higher and specifically different one, viz.: that of supernatural graces which renders him capable of participating in prerogatives truly divine.¹ In order rightly to understand this sublime destination, we need a working theory of the Supernatural. To acquire a correct idea of the Supernatural, and properly to evaluate the prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise, a critical consideration of such heretical antitheses as Pelagianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism will prove extremely helpful. Since, however, man’s high estate in Paradise was due solely to Grace, and not to any claim or exigency of pure nature, it follows that per se man could have existed in any other state, and in part did so exist.

We shall, therefore, divide this present Section into four Articles: (1) Of nature and the Supernatural in general; (2) Of man’s supernatural endowment in Paradise; (3) Of various heresies concerning the Paradisaical state of man and the dogmatic teaching of the Church in regard thereto; and (4) Of the different states of man, particularly the pure state of nature.

General Readings: Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 277–280; Vol. VI, §§ 300–311, Mainz 1884–87. Palmieri, De Ordine Supernaturali et de Lapsu Angelorum, Romae 1910. Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 4 sqq., Romae 1880. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 158–184 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 428 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899). Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 3rd ed., §§ 83 sqq., Freiburg 1899. Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861. Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1905. P. J. Toner, “The Supernatural,” in the Irish Theol. Quarterly, 1912, Nos. 27 and 28.

Article 1: Nature and the Supernatural

Neither Revelation nor the dogmatic teaching of the Church supplies us with a ready-made theory of the Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the Supernatural Order both in humankind and in the angels, is so definitely marked, and the pronouncements of the ecclesiastical teaching office furnish so many positive indications, that a theological theory can be easily construed. Let us, in logical order, consider the concept of the Supernatural (a) in its comprehension, and (b) in its extension.

A. Definition of the Supernatural

1. Preliminary Remarks. To obtain a correct notion of the Supernatural, we must begin by analyzing the concept of Nature, because Nature precedes and supposes the Supernatural. The term Nature, because of its many meanings, may truly be called protean. To escape misunderstanding, which in these matters easily entails heresy, we must study all these various meanings and carefully determine in what sense precisely Nature (φύσις) is the antithesis of the Supernatural.

a) As a technical term in logic, “Nature” denotes the essence of a thing (quidditas, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), as expressed in its definition. It is in this sense that we speak of the nature of God, or the nature of the universe, nay, even of the nature of the Supernatural. Also sin (which is a privation), and the non-ens (which is a negation), possess each a nature or essence by which they are what they are. This definition of Nature takes in the entire domain of actual and logical beings, of being and not-being, of the real and the imaginary, in a word, whatever can be expressed by a definition. In this logical sense Nature is manifestly not opposed to the Supernatural, since the Supernatural, too, has its own peculiar nature, that is, its quiddity or formal essence by which it is what it is.

b) In the ontological sphere, which embraces all actually existing things, there are beings that have no nature, though, logically considered, they have an essence of their own. Such are, e.g., evil, blindness, etc. Ontologically considered, “Nature” is synonymous with substance (substantia prima, οὐσία πρώτη). In this sense God is the “Highest Nature,” i.e., the supernatural substance (substantia superessentialis, ὑπερούσιος). In this sense, too, an angel is called a “spiritual nature,” while man’s nature is said to be partly spiritual, partly corporeal. According to the particular antithesis in which we choose to place it, the term Nature, in ontology, may have a variety of meanings, each of which requires to be carefully defined. Thus, despite the objective identity of the two terms, “Nature” differs from “Essence” in that the latter term denotes simple being, while the former describes that being as a principle of action. “Nature” must be defined differently according as it is opposed to hypostasis (or person) in the Blessed Trinity,² or to spirit. Other meanings of the term are indicated by such juxtapositions as Nature and Liberty, Nature and Art, Nature and Morality, God and Nature (i.e., the created universe), Nature and Miracle, etc. With the possible exception of “Nature and Miracle”³ none of these antitheses gives us the exact meaning of the term “Nature” when used in contradistinction to “Supernatural.”

In identifying Supernatural with spiritual, unbelieving modern scientists contradict right reason, which justly regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate. Knoodt erred when he declared the antithesis “creatural super-creatural” to be equivalent to “natural supernatural.” The divine Preservation of the universe, God’s Concurrence with His creatures, and His benign Providence, though supercreatural, emphatically form a part of Nature, because without these operations on the part of God Nature as such could neither exist nor energize. For the same reason we must reject the teaching of Vock,⁴ who defines the Supernatural as that which can be wrought by God alone.

c) That which is essentially Supernatural is yet, in theology, sometimes called Natural, though only in a figurative sense. In this connection we must note two meanings of the word “Nature” which occur in the writings of the Fathers, and which Baius and Jansenius have abused in their heretical attempts to counterfeit the true ecclesiastical concept of the Supernatural. Some of the Fathers, notably St. Augustine, refer to the incontestably supernatural state of our first parents in Paradise as “the nature of Adam.” Baius and Jansenius interpret this expression as meaning that the original justice of the first man, with all its preternatural endowments, such as corporeal immortality and freedom from concupiscence, was something essentially natural, that is, demanded by human nature. But Augustine uses the word natura in its purely etymological sense, to designate that which Adam had from the very beginning received from God as a supernatural complement of his nature.⁵ “Natural,” therefore, in the usage of the great Bishop of Hippo, means “original.” Cfr. Ephes. II, 3: “Eramus natura [i.e., a nativitate] filii irae” — We were by nature [i.e., originally, from our birth] children of wrath. The supernatural state of grace which Adam enjoyed in Paradise is also called by St. Augustine⁶ and St. Leo the Great,⁷ naturalis generis conditio, that is to say, “a state in accordance with nature” (conveniens, consentaneum); for the supernatural ennoblement and perfectioning of human nature is neither “unnatural” nor “contrary to nature,” but entirely “natural,” i.e., in accordance with nature, befitting nature.⁸ In all these meanings, the terms Nature and Supernatural involve no opposition. By elimination, therefore, we arrive at the following conclusions:

d) “Nature” designates that which (1) intrinsically constitutes the being of a created substance, either as an essential or as an integral note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its essence (e.g., faculties, talents, powers), or at least can flow therefrom through the exertion of one’s own or some one else’s power (technical skill, training); or (3) whatever, though external to a thing, is necessary or suitable for its existence (e.g., food, air), for its development (e.g., instruction, civil society) or for the attainment of its end (e.g., the knowability of God, beatitude). All these factors (i.e., the constitutive elements of a thing’s being, the faculties, powers, and accomplishments flowing from its essence, and lastly such external agencies as are necessary or suitable for its subsistence, development, or the attainment of its final end), in their totality and severally respond to a proximate or remote claim of the thing under consideration. Its essence demands them. The Scholastics embrace these momenta under the term “debitum naturae” and define “Nature” or “Natural” as that which is due to a thing. (“Natura sive naturale est omne id, quod alicui rei debetur.”)

Every creature has its own specific claims, corresponding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and final end. Hence, in determining the full extent of Nature, we must go beyond the individual creature and the various species of being (matter, man, angel), and consider the totality of all beings with all their just claims or natural demands. “Nature” must consequently be defined as the aggregate of all those perfections to which created beings have a claim, each according to its specific essence, and which, therefore, the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total of these perfections is commonly called the Natural Order (ordo naturalis). Of course, any superfluity of natural goods which the Creator gives to a creature over and above its strict necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the natural order. If the soil produces more food than the human race is able to consume, if the atmosphere contains more oxygen than we require to breathe, these gifts are not “graces” in the strict sense of the term.⁹

2. Definition of the Supernatural. The Supernatural, on the other hand, flies beyond or transcends the order of Nature. It is the contrary of naturae debitum. It is naturae indebitum — in a positive as well as in a negative sense. It may be defined as a gratuitous gift of God superadded to the nature of a rational being; or, in the terms of the formal definition abstracted from the condemned propositions of Baius and Quesnel, “Donum Dei naturae indebitum et superadditum.”

a) In this definition donum Dei, being common to both Nature and the Supernatural, is the proximate genus, while naturae indebitum et superadditum expresses the specific difference. The term superadditum indicates that the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, Nature, that it inheres therein as something super-added, and elevates it to a specifically higher order. To emphasize the last-mentioned element as the most important in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection is further described as naturae indebitum, i.e., grace.¹⁰

b) Now, a gift of God may be an indebitum, i.e., a supernatural grace, either with regard to the manner of its production (supernaturale quoad modum, as, for instance, a miraculous cure), or with respect of its very substance (supernaturale quoad substantiam). There is an essential distinction between these two categories of the Supernatural. The supernaturale quoad modum has its seat not in nature, i.e., in the creature itself, but outside of it, viz.: in the divine causality. It is Supernatural only with regard to the manner in which it is communicated to the creature, as when a man is raised from the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, life), is something intrinsically and essentially natural. This species of the Supernatural appertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dogmatic Theology proper is concerned mainly with the supernaturale quoad substantiam, i.e., that which essentially and intrinsically transcends the bounds of Nature.

c) The supernaturale quoad substantiam may be subdivided into two well-defined species, according as the supernatural gift which God communicates to the creature transcends the sphere and power of Nature absolutely (simpliciter) or in a relative sense only (secundum quid). The supernaturale simpliciter is the Supernatural in the strict and proper sense of the term (supernaturale stricte dictum). The supernaturale secundum quid is also called Preternatural. There is an essential difference between the Preternatural and the Supernatural. The Supernatural involves divine perfections, i.e., such as by nature belong solely to God. The Preternatural communicates only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom from concupiscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, i.e., something which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently Supernatural. However, since such a Supernatural perfectioning of man does not in principle transcend the creatural order, a grace of the kind just mentioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite otherwise with the supernaturale stricte dictum. The strictly Supernatural absolutely transcends the sphere and power of all real and possible creatures. The possession of such strictly divine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctifying grace, therefore, always entails a sort of deification (deificatio, θέωσις) of the rational creature. For the creature to claim such prerogatives as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount to a demand to be made like unto God.

3. Definition and Importance of the Potentia Obedientialis. The best means of distinguishing properly between Nature and the Supernatural is furnished by the Scholastic concept of the “potentia obedientialis.” No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural can be constructed without a proper appreciation of this term.

As we have already pointed out, the Supernatural, though it transcends Nature, is designed for and becomes effective only in Nature. By the inherence of the Supernatural in Nature, Nature is raised to a higher sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural limitations and possibilities. Such an elevation of a creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the realization of the Supernatural postulates on the part of God a special physical impulse distinct from His preservation of the universe and His general concurrence. Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or passive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would not really transcend the natural order. On the other hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed with some specific passive potency which, while unresponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the potentia obedientialis. The Scholastics define it as a passive potency by which a creature is enabled to receive into itself a supernatural impulse from God.¹¹ This potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it must contain some faculty which receives the divine impulse and by means of which this impulse effects the supernatural elevation of the recipient.¹²

B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Supernatural Order

We now proceed to consider the substantially Supernatural (supernatural quoad substantiam) in its twofold form, viz.: (1) as the Supernatural in the strict sense of the term, and (2) as the Preternatural.¹³ From the sphere thus marked off must be excluded such supernatural perfections as the Hypostatic Union, the Blessed Eucharist, and the Sacraments, because these exist outside of human nature. They form the subject-matter of separate dogmatic treatises. We are here concerned with those graces only which effect a specifically higher sphere of being and operation in rational creatures, and which can therefore be objectively realized only in Angels and men. Of the subjoined two theses the first concerns Angels and men alike, while the second has reference to men alone.

Thesis I: There are two gifts of God which are Supernatural in the strict sense, and therefore belong to the divine order, namely, beatific vision and the state of grace.

Proof. Beatific vision is the highest gift which God bestows on a rational creature in the status termini. It is therefore justly regarded as the standard for gauging all other graces enjoyed by Angels and men. By the state of grace here on earth (in statu viae) we understand the aggregate of those divine gifts which aid man in immediately preparing for, and attaining to, his supernatural end, i.e., the beatific vision. Besides sanctifying grace with all its prerogatives, the state of grace, therefore, also includes actual grace. The supernatural character of the beatific vision as vouchsafed to existing rational creatures in Heaven is a dogma; with regard to purely possible and creatable beings it may be set down as a theological conclusion.¹⁴

a) From this teaching the supernatural character of the state of grace in statu viae is a necessary inference. The state of grace on earth is related to the beatific vision in Heaven as a means to an end. Since a means must always be duly proportioned to its end, a supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural, or even preternatural, means.

It is not quite correct, theologically, to distinguish between beatific vision in Heaven and the state of grace on earth as though they were separated by an abyss, and to contemplate them merely in their relation of end and means. Glory and grace are far more intimately related. The character of divine Sonship conferred by both constitutes a common note which puts them on the same essential level and separates the state of grace on earth from the beatific vision in Heaven merely after the manner of what is imperfect from what is perfect.¹⁵ St. Paul describes the endowment of grace which God grants to man on earth as an heirship of adopted children, while the state of grace which He bestows on man in Heaven resembles an heir’s taking possession of his inheritance.¹⁶ Elsewhere¹⁷ the same Apostle refers to the state of grace on earth as “the pledge of our inheritance, unto the redemption of acquisition, unto the praise of his glory.”¹⁸ But if the divine Sonship which we are vouchsafed here below is of the same specific nature as that which God grants to the Elect in Heaven, both states must be as strictly supernatural in their essence as the visio beatifica itself. And what is true of divine Sonship, must be equally true of sanctifying grace and of the theological virtue of charity, which, like divine Sonship, endures unchanged in Heaven, whereas hope becomes possession and faith gives way to intuition through the lumen gloriae.¹⁹ The necessity of the lumen gloriae as a means of attaining to the beatific vision of God furnishes another proof for the strictly supernatural character of that vision.

b) We do not know with the certainty of faith that there could not exist a spiritual being (such as a seraph or cherub) to whom the beatific vision, and consequently also the supernatural preparation for it (divine Sonship, charity, sanctifying grace), would be due as a postulate of its nature. Ripalda holds that such a being is possible, and that, if it existed, it would be a substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.²⁰ But this theory implies a contradiction in terms.²¹ No creature, no matter how exalted, can claim what by its very nature belongs solely to God.²² Christ alone, the only-begotten Son of God, has a strict claim to Divine Sonship and Consubstantiality with the Father because of His eternal generation from the Father. He alone can claim the intuitive vision of God and Trinitarian In-existence²³ as a right, which, of course, mutatis mutandis, also belongs to the other two Persons of the Divine Trinity. No mere creature, actual or possible, can rightfully claim prerogatives of a strictly divine order.²⁴ To hold with Ripalda that it is possible to conceive at least one creature with a natural claim to the above-mentioned prerogatives of grace, would be to deny the divine character of the eternal γέννησις of the Logos from the Father, to put natural sonship on a par with adoptive sonship, and to confound the Consubstantiality and In-existence of the Three Divine Persons with the analogical accidents of deification and spiritual indwelling. It would, in a word, be equivalent to reducing the Supernatural to the level of the purely natural.²⁵

Thesis II: Exemption from concupiscence, bodily immortality, habitual infused science, and impassibility are prerogatives which are not natural to man; they are preternatural gifts of divine grace.

Proof. The censures which the Church has pronounced against the teachings of Baius compel us to hold as fidei proximum, that the first two of the four prerogatives mentioned, namely, exemption from concupiscence and bodily immortality, are indebita, i.e., pure graces. The other two, viz.: infused science and impassibility, are likewise held by all theological schools to be free and unmerited gifts of God.

These prerogatives are called preternatural rather than supernatural, first, because the Angels have a just claim to them in virtue of their angelic nature; and secondly, because by the possession of them human nature, though it does not receive any strictly divine prerogative, is perfected far beyond anything it can rightfully demand. These characteristics exactly verify the concept of “Preternatural” which we gave above. As a matter of fact concupiscence is per se only a natural and spontaneous effect of man’s composite nature, and the Creator, as such, is not bound to exercise any special intervention to suppress the strife which results from that nature, especially since concupiscence is not in itself a sin nor yet inevitably leads to sin. In the words of St. Thomas: “Poterat Deus a principio, quando hominem condidit, etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quem in conditione naturae suae relinqueret, ut scil. mortalis et passibilis esset et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens; in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste defectus in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus esset.”²⁶

Death being a necessary resultant of the synthesis of body and soul, corporeal immortality, too, must be a preternatural gift of grace.

The same is true in an even higher measure of impassibility, because incapacity for physical²⁷ and psychical suffering²⁸ is a lesser evil than death.²⁹

As regards knowledge, God was not obliged to give man more than the faculty of reasoning, which enables him to attain to a true natural knowledge of his Creator and to acquaint himself with the essential precepts of the moral law. Infused science (scientia infusa, in contradistinction to scientia acquisita), is a free gift of grace.³⁰

Notes

Readings

Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, 4 vols. Schrader, S.J., De Triplici Ordine Naturali, Supernaturali et Praeternaturali, Vindob. 1864. Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia. Tournely, De Gratia, qu. 3. Du Plessis d’Argentré, De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum. Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861. v. Schäzler, Natur und Übernatur, Mainz 1865. Idem, Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Münster 1872. Kirschkamp, Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange, Würzburg 1878. A. Kranich, Über die Empfänglichkeit der menschlichen Natur für die Güter der übernatürlichen Ordnung nach der Lehre des hl. Augustin und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1892. A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1907. J. B. Terrien, La Grâce et la Gloire ou la Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu, etc., Paris 1897. A. Rademacher, Die übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie, Freiburg 1903. W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 283 sqq., London 1897. Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1903. De Smedt, Notre Vie Surnaturelle, Paris 1910. Ligeard, La Théologie Scolastique et la Transcendance du Surnaturel, Paris 1908.

Note on this transcription: this is a dense, technical article defining terms (Nature, Supernatural, Preternatural, potentia obedientialis) rather than narrating history, so footnotes are prefixed S- here purely to distinguish them from other files’ numbering. Several Greek philosophical/theological terms (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία πρώτη, ὑπερούσιος, θέωσις, γέννησις, ἀρραβὼν τῆς κληρονομίας) were reconstructed from garbled OCR with good confidence given the Latin/English glosses provided alongside them in the source. German and French titles in the Readings list had diacritics restored.