Part II, Chapter II, Section 2, Article 2: Man’s Supernatural Endowment in Paradise

Pohle, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, Part II, Chapter II, §2, Article 2 (pp. 196–218)

Having theoretically defined the extent and character of the supernatural and preternatural prerogatives of grace, we now proceed to demonstrate that our first parents actually enjoyed these prerogatives in Paradise. Without this fundamental truth it is impossible to understand the dogma of original sin. We shall deal with the subject in six connected theses.

Thesis I: Adam, the progenitor of the human race, was endowed with sanctifying grace before the Fall.

This proposition embodies a formally defined dogma of the Catholic faith.¹

Proof. The Biblical argument can best be stated in the form of a syllogism, the major and minor premises of which rest on numerous Scriptural texts: Adam originally possessed that which was restored by Christ; now Christ restored the lost state of justice, i.e., sanctifying grace;² consequently Adam originally possessed sanctifying grace.

a) Some theologians have tried to prove this thesis directly from Sacred Scripture; but their demonstrations do not produce anything more than probability. The text upon which they chiefly rely is Eph. IV, 24: “Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis” — Put ye on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth. But it is by no means certain that St. Paul speaks of Adam in this passage. In fact it is far more likely that he did not mean to advert to Adam at all. In the first place, it is entirely foreign to the Apostle’s manner of thinking to set up Adam as an ideal of holiness,³ and, secondly, the phrase novus homo applies far more fittingly to the “second Adam” (i.e., Christ), though this interpretation, too, is not strictly demanded by the context. Probably St. Paul simply wished to say: “Be converted, become new creatures through sanctifying grace.”

Still less convincing is the argument based on Gen. I, 26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram” — Let us make man to our image and likeness. For though the example of several of the Fathers would justify us in referring this passage to Adam’s supernatural endowment, the literal sense is sufficiently safeguarded if we take it to mean merely that Adam bore the natural likeness of his Creator.⁴

b) The Fathers conceive the possession of sanctifying grace with its attendant prerogatives as a “deification” of the soul, and consequently count it among the strictly supernatural gifts of grace. “Deus hominem creavit accessu ad Deum deificandum,” says, e.g., St. John Damascene, “deificatum (θεούμενον) vero participatione divinae illuminationis, non vero in essentiam divinam mutatum.”⁵

The belief of the Fathers may be gathered partly from their formal doctrinal teaching, partly from the way in which they interpreted Holy Scripture. Certain of the Greek Fathers (e.g., SS. Basil and Cyril of Alexandria), think the supernatural sanctification of Adam is intimated in Gen. II, 7. They take spiraculum vitae to mean the grace of the Holy Ghost as a supernatural vital principle. Others (SS. Irenaeus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) hold that imago Dei (Gen. I, 26) has reference to Adam’s nature, while similitudo Dei describes him as being in the state of sanctifying grace. This is a rather arbitrary interpretation and open to objections from the purely scientific point of view; but the fact that it was adopted by these Fathers sufficiently proves that, as witnesses to Tradition, they firmly believed in the original sanctity of our first parents.⁶

c) The question as to the precise instant when Adam was raised to the state of supernatural grace, has long been in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists. The Thomists hold that the elevation of man was contemporaneous with his creation, while the Scotists assert that Adam was created in puris naturalibus, and that an interval of time must consequently have elapsed between his creation and his elevation to the state of grace. They contend that his elevation took place at the moment when he was “put into the paradise of pleasure, to dress it and to keep it.”⁷ The Scotist view, which was shared by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and St. Bonaventure, is founded chiefly on the supposed necessity, on the part of Adam, of preparing himself for justification, since he was not a child but a full-grown man. In the early period of Scholastic theology the Franciscan view was the prevailing one.⁸ St. Thomas demolished its main argument by showing that Adam’s personal preparation for the grace of justification must have been synchronous with the divine act of Creation. “Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus,” he says, “nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.”⁹ Although the Tridentine Council purposely evaded this controversy by substituting the phrase in iustitia constitutus for in iustitia creatus in the original draft of its canon on justification,¹⁰ the Thomistic view has obtained all but universal currency since the fifteenth century.¹¹

Thesis II: Our first parents in Paradise were by a special grace exempt from concupiscence.

This thesis may be qualified technically as “doctrina catholica.”

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches that St. Paul calls concupiscence “sin,” “because it originates in and inclines to sin.” From this dogmatic definition it follows that man was free from concupiscence until after the Fall. This special prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is called the gift of integrity (donum integritatis), because it effected a harmonious relation between flesh and spirit by completely subordinating man’s animal passions to his reason.

a) That this harmony was a prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is sufficiently indicated by Holy Scripture. Gen. II, 25: “Erat autem uterque nudus, Adam scil. et uxor eius, et non erubescebant” — And they were both naked: to wit, Adam and his wife: and they were not ashamed. Shame among savages spells want of pride or decency; in children it flows from innocence. Adam and Eve were certainly not shameless, because the Bible tells us that after the Fall a feeling of disgrace suddenly overwhelmed them. Nor were they wild, uncivilized savages. The Sacred Writer represents them as perfect and highly developed human beings. Hence the fact of their not being ashamed must have been due to a state of childlike innocence, in which the evil impulses of sensuality were kept under perfect control. There is no other satisfactory explanation. It has been suggested that our first parents were blind and could not see each other. But the phrase upon which this interpretation is based, viz.: “And the eyes of them both were opened,”¹² plainly refers to their spiritual vision. St. Irenaeus’s theory that Adam and Eve were infants,¹³ is refuted by the fact that God commanded them to “increase and multiply.”¹⁴

That our first parents enjoyed complete immunity from concupiscence follows with still greater cogency from St. Paul’s referring to the carnal law which works in our members as “sin.”¹⁵ This carnal law, or concupiscence, is not a sin in itself, but, in the Tridentine phrase, “originates in and inclines [man] to sin.”¹⁶ Concupiscence cannot have existed prior to the sin of Adam, because an effect cannot precede its cause, and consequently our first parents in Paradise were exempt from concupiscence.

b) The Fathers were so firmly persuaded of the natural integrity of our first parents in Paradise that some of them (e.g., Athanasius,¹⁷ Gregory of Nyssa,¹⁸ and John Damascene)¹⁹ derived marriage from original sin. This was, of course, an unjustifiable exaggeration. Sexual propagation does not exclude natural integrity, and there can scarcely be a doubt that marriage would have been instituted even if man had remained in the state of innocence.²⁰ It was such considerations as these, no doubt, that prompted St. Augustine to retract²¹ his earlier dictum that, had the human race preserved its primitive innocence and grace, propagation would have been asexual. The primitive Tradition was most clearly brought out in the controversy with the Pelagians, who maintained that concupiscence was a vigor rather than a defectus naturae. This view was energetically combated by St. Augustine in his work De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia.²² In Contra Iulianum, by the same author, freedom from concupiscence is explained to be a gift of grace. The supernatural character of the prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise is emphasized also by some of the other Fathers.²³

c) From the purely theological point of view it will be well to explain that man has a twofold appetite, viz., the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the will (appetitus rationalis). Each of these faculties has its own circle of good by which it is attracted, and its own sphere of evil by which it is repelled. The sensitive appetite can seek only sensitive things, whereas the will is able to strive after intellectual goods as well (e.g., virtue, honor). The sensitive appetite is inordinate when it rebels against reason, and in every such case the will can attain the higher spiritual good only by dint of vigorous resistance. Unfortunately the appetitus rationalis (or will) is also affected by an immanent tendency to reject that which is truly good in favor of what is good only in appearance (sin). Rom. VII, 17 sqq.: “Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum [i.e., concupiscentia]. … Si autem quod nolo, illud facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. … Video autem aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis” — Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. … I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.

This inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil, which is called concupiscence, exerts itself most violently in the pars concupiscibilis of the lower soul life (libido, gula). But in a wider sense the inordinate affections of the pars irascibilis (as anger, jealousy, pugnacity) likewise pertain to concupiscence. In our first parents all these passions were kept in due subjection by virtue of the donum integritatis.²⁴

Theologians differ as to how man in Paradise was enabled to keep his passions under the absolute control of reason. Durandus held that God infused a preternatural habitus into the sensitive element of human nature; Scotus, that such an habitus was infused into the will; Cajetan, that God established the proper equilibrium between man’s higher and lower nature simply by strengthening his intellect. The problem is not as simple as it appears. The variety of the psychological factors involved, and the wide scope which must be assigned to the will, seem to postulate a rather complicated endowment which enriched the various higher and lower faculties of the soul with habits and enabled these habits to co-operate harmoniously.²⁵ The problem may be simplified by assuming that divine Providence exercised a special external governance by carefully removing all occasions apt to provoke an outbreak of man’s animal passions, and in case of actual danger simply withholding the necessary concursus. On the other hand we must be careful not to exaggerate the donum integritatis, else the Fall of our first parents would appear inexplicable, nay impossible. The question whether by virtue of the gift of natural integrity Adam and Eve were able to commit venial sin, has been answered affirmatively by Scotus and Gabriel Biel, against Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and we are inclined to adopt the Scotist view. For, as Schell correctly remarks: “Adam, as he was actually constituted, must have been liable to err in non-essentials, seeing that he was able to go astray in matters of decisive moment.”²⁶

Thesis III: Our first parents before the Fall were endowed with bodily immortality.

This proposition is strictly of faith.²⁷

Proof. By immortality we here understand neither the natural immortality of the soul,²⁸ nor the glorious immortality to be enjoyed by the Elect after the resurrection of the flesh, but an intermediate prerogative peculiar to man’s original state of justice in Paradise.²⁹ In that state, according to St. Augustine,³⁰ man was immortal, not because he could not die (non posse mori), but simply because it was not necessary that he should die (posse non mori). This Paradisaical immortality must have been a preternatural grace, because it constituted no strict postulate of human nature.³¹

The Scriptural argument for our thesis rests on the story of the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Under penalty of death God had forbidden our first parents to eat of the tree of knowledge. “For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.”³² After the Fall He pronounced sentence as follows: “Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.”³³ From all of which it is quite evident that, had Adam never sinned, he would not have been under the necessity of dying. Cfr. Wisd. II, 23 sq.: “Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem³⁴ et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum. Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum” — God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world. St. Paul represents the death of Adam and all his descendants as a divinely inflicted punishment for sin. Rom. V, 12: “Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit” — As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men.

The Fathers unanimously echo the teaching of Scripture on this point.

What part the “tree of knowledge” played in the preservation of life is not apparent. From the words of Jehovah quoted in Gen. III, 22 sq., we know that to eat of its fruit was a necessary condition of immortality: “Now, therefore, lest perhaps he [Adam] put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever, … the Lord sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.” This passage has led some of the Fathers to regard the tree of life as φάρμακον τῆς ἀθανασίας (“the medicine of immortality”). Others explain it allegorically.³⁵

Thesis IV: Our first parents were also endowed with an infused knowledge of natural and supernatural truth.

Proof. Sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, and immortality of the body were a heritage of Paradise, and as such, destined to descend to all of Adam’s children. Besides these our first parents possessed as a fourth strictly personal prerogative, an unusual measure of natural and supernatural knowledge.

a) While the Bible nowhere explicitly refers to Adam’s natural knowledge as infused (scientia infusa), we have sufficient Scriptural warrant for holding that it could not have been acquired by ordinary human means. It must have been infused knowledge which enabled Adam immediately after his creation to call all the beasts of the earth and the fowls of the air by their proper names³⁶ and intuitively to understand the nature and mission of Eve.³⁷ St. Augustine observes that Adam “universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit, quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae in saecularibus etiam libris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras … dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primis indidit rebus.”³⁸

A further confirmation of our thesis may be found in Ecclus. XVII, 5 sq.: “Disciplina intellectus replevit illos, creavit [i.e. infudit] illis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum, et mala et bona ostendit illis” — He filled them with the knowledge of understanding, he created in [i.e., infused into] them the science of the spirit, he filled their heart with wisdom, and shewed them both good and evil. What we can learn only by dint of painstaking application, Adam and Eve knew by virtue of infused knowledge; which is not, of course, equivalent to saying that their knowledge was substantially different from ours.³⁹

That the progenitors of the human race should be endowed with infused knowledge was meet and congruous for three reasons, to wit: (1) The Creator could not in justice abandon grown-up men to complete ignorance in matters of religion and morality; (2) Adam and Eve had no parents or teachers to give them the necessary instruction; and (3) As the head of the human race, Adam was destined to be its natural guide and teacher.⁴⁰

b) The knowledge of our first parents must have extended to the domain of the Supernatural. Above all they must have been cognizant of their final destiny. This follows from the fact of their elevation to the state of grace,⁴¹ which can be preserved only by means of external revelation and internal acts of faith, hope, and charity. Our first parents, be it remembered, were adults, not children.

As regards the precise character of their supernatural knowledge, they must have had supernatural faith, because without faith “it is impossible to please God.”⁴² St. Bonaventure was hardly justified in denying⁴³ that Adam and Eve in Paradise had faith, on the ground that “faith cometh by hearing.”⁴⁴ Until he attains to the beatific vision of God, man must necessarily walk in the twilight of faith, which, in the words of the Apostle,⁴⁵ “is the substance of things to be hoped for.”

The extent of Adam’s supernatural knowledge is a problem open to debate. This much, however, is certain: He must have known, as he was bound to believe in, the existence of God and eternal retribution in the life beyond, because Sacred Scripture teaches that an explicit knowledge of these two truths is necessary for salvation (necessitate medii).⁴⁶ In addition to this knowledge Adam probably had a belief in the Blessed Trinity and the future Incarnation of the Logos.⁴⁷

c) Any attempt to ascertain the extent of Adam’s natural knowledge would lead us from solid ground into the domain of more or less hazardous speculation. The Schoolmen, as a rule, were inclined to exaggerate the intellectual powers of our progenitor. To reduce speculation to reasonable bounds, St. Thomas Aquinas laid down two hard and fast rules. The first is: Adam depended on phantasms for his intellectual concepts; whence it follows: (α) that, unlike the human soul of Christ, he was not endowed with beatific vision here on earth,⁴⁸ (β) that he could have no intuitive but only an abstractive knowledge of the nature of the Angels,⁴⁹ and (γ) that he had no intuitive knowledge of his own soul. The second rule laid down by St. Thomas is: In the domain of nature Adam had a perfect infused knowledge only with regard to such things as were indispensable to enable himself and his descendants to live in conformity with the laws of reason. This does not mean that he was not compelled to learn and to inquire, or that he was unable to progress in matters of science and culture. There is no reason whatever for assuming that Adam was acquainted with the Copernican world-view, the stellar parallaxes, spectrum analysis, electricity, X-rays, or the infinitesimal calculus. The progenitor of the human race was well able to dispense with a knowledge of such abstruse scientific matters as these. Besides, had he possessed such knowledge, tradition would surely have preserved fragments of it. The typical exemplar of Adam’s natural attainments, therefore, is not the human knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, whom Holy Scripture calls “the second Adam,” but the wisdom of Solomon. It is worthy of note, in this connexion, that the Scholastics were not all persuaded that Adam was wiser than Solomon.⁵⁰

Another question has been raised, viz.: Was Adam gifted with infallibility in his capacity as teacher and guide of the human race? On this point, too, it is impossible to form a certain conclusion. St. Thomas sets up some strong arguments to show that Adam was infallible: “Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius. … Unde non poterat esse, quod innocentia manente intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat, ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi.”⁵¹ Considering that when ordinary mortals go astray, it is usually due to the fact that the will is too weak to resist and control passion and prejudice, it is highly probable, to say the least, that our first parents in Paradise, keen-witted, unprejudiced, and dispassionate as they were, gave their assent only to what was evidently true, and cautiously felt their way whenever the evidence was insufficient or unconvincing.

d) We now come to another difficult problem, to wit: How did speech originate? The Bible says: “Omne enim, quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen eius” — For whatsoever Adam called any living creature, the same is its name.⁵² This text would seem to indicate the existence of a primitive language. The naming of the different creatures may be explained either naturally or preternaturally. In the last-mentioned hypothesis Adam must have received language ready made by a miraculous infusion from God. Those who prefer the natural explanation hold that the first human idiom was evolved by virtue of a native impulse. Both explanations have found ardent defenders among theologians, philosophers, and exegetes. Until quite recently it was pretty generally held that Adam received the Hebrew language directly from God as a ready-made and perfect medium of speech.⁵³ This belief was shared by a nineteenth-century exegete of the unquestioned ability of Fr. Kaulen, who was impressed in favor of Hebrew by the following facts: (1) In no other language is there such an intimate relation between nouns and their objects; (2) the peculiar Hebrew use of three consonants is based upon a variation of the third letter and closely resembles logical definition by proximate genus and specific difference. These important phenomena are especially interesting from the viewpoint of the philosophy of language. Yet the theory can hardly be upheld. Comparative Philology shows that ancient Hebrew is the product of a well-defined process of evolution, and therefore cannot be the original language of the human race. Onomatopoeia is common to all civilized languages.⁵⁴ The discovery that the inflected languages (Semitic and Aryan) are derived from the agglutinative (Turanian group), and these in turn from the isolating tongues,⁵⁵ has led philologians to surmise that the primitive idiom of the human race consisted exclusively of simple, uninflected root-words. On philological grounds, not to speak of others, it seems reasonable to assume that the first man possessed a highly developed intellect and created his own language by forming monosyllabic root-words. This theory gains additional probability from the fact that the original Semitic root-formations closely correspond to the process of intellectual conception and bear all the earmarks of human invention. The names which Adam gave to various creatures, and which can still be ascertained from a study of ancient Semitic roots, are in each case based on some characteristic note representing a universal concept abstracted from a phantasm. Thus the word “moon” — mensis, Greek μήν, Gothic mena, Sanskrit mas and māsa — is derived from MA, i.e., “to measure,” from which root was formed MAN, i.e., “to think,” which in its turn furnished the etymon of such words as mens, man, Sanskrit manas.⁵⁶

Strangely enough, in rejecting the antiquated notions of the Hebraists, modern Comparative Philology has unconsciously reverted to the scientific view-point of the Fathers, who regarded primitive speech as a purely human invention. St. Augustine, for example, extols the transcendent genius of Adam as revealed in naming the different creatures passing before his eyes, and lays down the general proposition: “Illud quod est in nobis rationale, … vidit esse imponenda rebus vocabula, i.e. significantes quosdam sonos. … Sed audiri verba absentium non poterant: ergo illa ratio peperit litteras, notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis atque discretis.”⁵⁷ St. Gregory of Nyssa, who discusses the probable origin of language at some length,⁵⁸ vigorously defends the opinion of his teacher, St. Basil, that language is a human invention. Against the objections of Eunomius he lays down the thesis that, endowed as they were by nature with both reflexion and the power of making signs, men could not but learn to communicate their ideas to one another.⁵⁹ This opinion, which is the most ancient, is probably also the correct one, because it conforms to the sane and sound principle that secondary causes must be credited with all the power they are able to exert.⁶⁰

Thesis V: Bound up with the prerogatives already mentioned was the impassibility of our first parents in Paradise.

This proposition embodies a common teaching of Catholic theologians.

Proof. The impassibility with which man will be endowed after the resurrection of the flesh must be conceived as non posse pati, i.e., as incapability of suffering. The impassibility of our first parents in Paradise, on the other hand, consisted in posse non pati, i.e., in the non-necessity of suffering. They irretrievably forfeited this prerogative for themselves and their descendants by sin. The Biblical argument for our thesis is based upon the fact that Paradise was a “garden of pleasure.”⁶¹ Whether we interpret this term literally, as most exegetes do, or metaphorically after the example of Philo, Origen, and others, it is certain that our first parents in the Garden were free from pain and suffering. They led a life of unalloyed pleasure and pure delight. The pains of parturition and hard labor are punishments inflicted for sin.⁶² The immortality of the body with which the Creator had endowed Adam and Eve, necessarily excluded all those sufferings and infirmities which are the harbingers of death, while the gift of integrity (donum integritatis) effectively stopped the principal source of mental sorrow and temptation, which is concupiscence. St. Augustine gives an alluring description of the life of our first parents in his great work De Civitate Dei: “Vivebat homo in paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu volebat, quod Deus iusserat. Vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate. … Nihil corruptionis in corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. … Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. … Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum.”⁶³

The “golden age” so enthusiastically celebrated in the folklore of many nations represents but a faint recollection of the state of our first parents in the Garden of Pleasure.⁶⁴

Thesis VI: The five prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise were organically interrelated so that the preternatural graces served as a complement to the supernatural state of grace, and the preservation of the former was causally dependent on the retention of the latter. Theologians therefore justly characterize this primitive state as “the state of original justice and sanctity.”

This thesis embodies a doctrine common to all theological schools.

Proof. Sanctifying grace and its preternatural concomitants were not necessarily interdependent, else they could not exist separately in the present state of repaired nature. Their harmonious combination in Paradise was a free institution of the Creator. Sacred Scripture tells us that the loss of sanctifying grace entailed the forfeit of the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in the Garden. After the Fall, concupiscence, until then properly subdued, suddenly became rebellious,⁶⁵ death assumed sway over the human race,⁶⁶ and all manner of suffering followed.⁶⁷ By the Redemption the race recovered its lost supernatural destiny; but the bond that originally connected sanctifying grace with the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise was never restored.

Catholic theologians are not, however, agreed as to the precise meaning of the term original justice (iustitia originalis).⁶⁸ The majority take it to signify not the state of integral nature, as such, nor yet mere sanctifying grace, but the aggregate of all those organically correlated prerogatives which constituted the state of our first parents in Paradise. With the exception of infused science, this state of original justice was not a purely personal privilege, but a natural endowment which Adam was to transmit to all his descendants. This distinction explains why the sin of our first parents is transmitted to all men by propagation.

Notes

Readings

St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94–102, and the commentators. Bellarmine, De Gratia Primi Hominis. Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, l. III, c. 1 sqq. Casini, Quid est Homo?, ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862. Lohan, Das Paradies nach der Lehre der katholischen Kirche, Mainz 1874. Fr. Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies?, Leipzig 1881. Oswald, Religiöse Urgeschichte der Menschheit, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887. A. Urbas, Die Geologie und das Paradies, Laibach 1889. W. Engelkemper, Die Paradiesesflüsse, Münster 1901. S. Hunter, S.J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, p. 373 sqq., London 1895. W. Humphrey, S.J., “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 338 sqq., London 1897. F. Vigouroux, art. “Paradis Terrestre” in the Dictionnaire de la Bible, Vol. IV.

Note on this transcription: this is the longest and most footnote-dense article transcribed so far (68 notes across six theses — original sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, bodily immortality, infused knowledge, impassibility, and the organic unity of these “preternatural” gifts around sanctifying grace). Two footnotes (6 and 8) had their citations split awkwardly across a page break in the scan and were reassembled by matching content to context. Several Hebrew and Greek terms (מוֹת תָּמוּת, ἐπ’ ἀφθαρσίᾳ, גַּן עֵדֶן, θεούμενον) were reconstructed from garbled OCR using the glosses already given in the surrounding text.